Ummah or Nation?

Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society

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

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Abdullah al-Ahsan

Preface

The Muslim world is today passing through a period of creative tension.

It has recently re-emerged from a long night of colonial domination by the West and is confronted with a world in the making of which its own role was almost non-existent. As such it has to face a world made for it by others, a world far removed from its own vision.

In its struggle against colonialism, it has successfully broken many a political chain; yet it finds itself constrained by a number of other shackles: intellectual, psychological, cultural, economic and technological. The crisis that engulfed it during the last three centuries was not exclusively a product of external factors; its own internal weaknesses and failings had a role to play, both in generating internal decay and in its failure to resist external onslaughts. Nonetheless, during the last century it has been able to face the crisis defiantly. Now almost everywhere there is a new upsurge and the hallmark of this upsurge is a rediscovery of their Islamic identity, particularly at the level of the Muslim people. The gods of secularism, nationalism, liberalism and socialism have failed to capture the soul of the Muslim people, notwithstanding the damage their onslaughts have inflicted and the bleeding wounds they have left all around. The Muslim people, particularly the youth, are once again deriving fresh inspiration from the eternal sources of Muslim identity: the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet (peace be upon him). The *Ummah* is still in the grip of a tension, yet the clouds of intellectual hegemony of Western concepts and models of society and culture are beginning to dissipate. There is a breath of fresh air and the light of creativity is illuminating the horizon. The *Ummah* is striving to be on its own. It still has a long way to go; yet there is the realization that it is set along the right road.

The political system the West gave to the world, particularly after

the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), was characterized by secularism, nation-state and liberal capitalistic democracy. Since World War II nationalist fever has died down in most of the Western nations. There is an increasing awareness of interdependence and need for super-national politico-economic structures to cope with the new challenges. The fall of socialism and the prolonged crisis of capitalism have led to people's disenchantment with current ideologies and politico-economic systems. The cultural pathways of contemporary history are littered with fallen idols of every colour, shape and size. The search for new models has become more pronounced. It is time to seriously reflect on what Muhammad Iqbal said in his lectures on *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*:

> Both nationalism and atheistic socialism, at least in the present state of human adjustments, must draw upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion and resentment which tend to impoverish the soul of man and close up his hidden sources of spiritual energy. Neither the technique of medieval mysticism nor nationalism nor atheistic socialism can cure the ills of a despairing humanity. Surely the present moment is one of great crisis in the history of modern culture. The modern world stands in need of biological renewal. And religion, which in its higher manifestations is neither dogma nor ritual, can alone ethically prepare the modern man for the burden of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves, and restore to him that attitude of faith which makes him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter. It is only by rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition, and a civilization which has lost its spiritual unity because of its *inner conflict of religious and political values*.

In this context, Iqbal's call was as under:

> Humanity needs three things today: a spiritual interpretation of the Universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis . . . Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement.

> The Muslim, on the other hand, is in possession of these ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation . . . Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve . . . that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam.

It is only with this belief and this realization that the Islamic *Ummah* can have its rendezvous with destiny.

With these thoughts, I take this opportunity to introduce Dr. Abdullah al-Ahsan's new study: *Ummah or Nation?: Identity Crisis in Contemporary Muslim Society*. The author has tried to examine the intellectual predicament of the Muslim world during the colonial and post-colonial period. After discussing the concept of *Ummah* as emerging from his reading of the Qur'ān and Muslim history, Dr. al-Ahsan has tried to critically examine the influence of Western concepts of secularism and nation-state on the mind of the Muslim intellectuals and the political elite in three leading Muslim countries: Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. He has also discussed some of the major contours of pan-Islamism in the twentieth century, particularly the Organization of the Islamic Conference and its sister institutions. The author has ably used in this study those techniques of analysis and interpretation which are the stock-in-trade of Western political scientists. His focus however is on Muslim intellectuals and the political leadership of the Muslim world, which by and large has been a product of Western influences on the world of Islam. In the interests of greater precision, it is essential to distinguish the thoughts of this elite, however important, from the real feelings and aspirations of the Muslim people. The author's primary focus is on the mind and behaviour of the intellectual and political leadership of the Muslim countries and as such is a valuable contribution towards understanding not only the predicament of this class of people but also the plight of the *Ummah* as such. Yet the story would remain incomplete as long as it is not supplemented by an exhaustive and in-depth study of the aspirations and longings of the Muslim people and how they have influenced the course of events, sometimes positively, as in the case of the creation of Pakistan, and sometimes by restraining the leadership from surrendering to the Western modes of life and behaviour. A number of Western scholars, from H.A.R. Gibb to Wilfred Cantwell Smith and John Voll are intrigued by this phenomenon. They exclaim: 'Throughout the modern era, it has been

observed, the real dynamism of mass movements, even those led by secular leaders, has been generated by devotion to the faith' (*Fundamentalism Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, p. 354). It is only by examining the aspirations and the motivation of the masses that the real soul of the *Ummah* can be laid bare. The challenge that besets the Muslim social scientist lies in widening his scope of inquiry in a manner that it could simultaneously cover the crisis and the way out, the predicament of the West-oriented leadership as well as its impact on the condition of the *Ummah* and the response and re-assertion of the soul of the *Ummah* and the reaction of the masses longing for the realization of the model of Madinah. There is no denying that the identity crisis is very much there, but it is also a reality that the inner dynamism of faith is carving a way out of the crisis. The nation-state continues to be a political reality in the Muslim world; yet the nation-state has never succeeded in becoming the centre of individual or collective loyalty of the Muslim people. Even Wilfred Cantwell Smith admits: 'No Muslim people have evolved a national feeling that has meant a loyalty to or even concern for a community transcending the bounds of Islam' and that 'in the past, only Islam has provided for these people this type of discipline, inspiration and energy' (*Islam in Modern History*, Wilfred C. Smith, Princeton, 1957, p.77).

The identity crisis post-mortemed in this study will enable the reader to have a better understanding of the forces that have tried to shape the Muslim world during the last two centuries. As such it is a valuable contribution by a young Muslim political scientist and I welcome this effort. I would, however, like to add that the soul of the *Ummah* has survived this crisis by rediscovering from within its inner self the original vision of Islam. It is with the light of this vision that it is beginning to emerge from the crisis. The tension although very much there, is no longer passive and soul-benumbing. It is giving birth to a creative response in the form of almost universal movement leading to Islamic resurgence. And this inspires a new hope about the future destiny of the *Ummah*.

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Khurshid Ahmad

Introduction

In an attempt to resolve the potential conflict between various collective identities in Muslim society and furthermore to present a theoretical foundation for Turkish national identity, the Turkish intellectual Ziya Gokalp (1874–1924) wrote:

> Once we say that 'we belong to the Turkish nation', we will begin to show in our language, aesthetics, morals and law and even in theology and philosophy the originality and personality which befit Turkish culture, taste and consciousness. Once we say that 'we belong to the Islamic community', the holy Quran will become, for us, the most sacred book, the Prophet Muhammad the most sacred person, the Ka'ba the most sacred shrine, and Islam the most sacred religion. And once we say that 'we belong to Western civilization', we will behave as real Europeans in science, philosophy, technology and other civilizing fields.[1]

Gokalp wrote this at the beginning of the twentieth century under the moribund rule of the Ottomans. Within decades, with Ottoman rule over and the Turkish nation newly born under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (d. 1937), the nationalist government implemented an education policy aimed specifically at training the Turkish youth:

> '. . . to feel the honour of being a son of the Turkish race', to respect the national flag, 'to protect the esteem of the glorious Turkish history', to appreciate 'the great Turks whose services have made the great Turkish nation', to be bound by the principles of the Turkish revolution, 'to preserve', as Ataturk put it, 'and defend the national independence of the Turkish Republic . . .'[2]

Religious instruction was banned in schools and the Arabic character of the Turkish script changed to that of the Roman, the aim being to help the Turkish youth forget their past and to facilitate the adoption of a Western philosophy and lifestyle. The nationalist government also produced new history books which emphasized ethnicity. It would seem that although theoreticians of Turkish nationalism did not conceive of the Turks without Islam, the government in reality did pursue a policy which highlighted the nationalistic identity of the Turks at the expense of the Islamic *ummah* identity.

More than half a century later any observer of current socio-political developments in Turkey will note that, in spite of this policy, the Turkish people do not seem to have abandoned their Islamic identity and subscribed their supreme loyalty to nation-state identity. This situation is true not only in Turkey but generally exists in all Muslim countries. Since the First World War about four dozen independent Muslim countries have made their appearances on the world map: all these countries have developed as sovereign nation-states on the European pattern and claim the supreme loyalty of their citizens. But Muslim individuals do not seem to have given this loyalty to their respective nation-states. Indeed, the Muslim individual, in modern society, does not appear to have decided which identity, whether it be religious, cultural, linguistic, tribal, territorial, ethnic or historical, commands his supreme loyalty. Any student of contemporary Muslim society will notice that theoreticians of Muslim nationalism[3] have formulated their ideas according to both Islamic and secular principles. But when these ideas were put into practice in independent nation-states a great deal of confusion arose within the Muslim society about the question of priorities, between Islamic and European secular ideas. A Moroccan novelist who adopted many European ideas himself and emigrated to France wrote the following:

> Choose? I have already chosen, but very much I wish I no longer had to do so. For even though I have chosen to live in France and perhaps to die there – but this does not depend on me – I still keep my share in the world of my childhood and in that Islam in which I more and more believe.[4]

This statement reflects the self-image crisis among Muslims in the world today. The present work is a study of this and similar identity crises in contemporary Muslim society.

The Muslim community today is heir to a rich civilization, one which played a dominant role in world culture and politics for several centuries before the rise of Europe. Europe, however, not only deprived the Muslim civilization of this role, but also succeeded in causing a self-image crisis in Muslim society. This crisis stems from the question of who commands the supreme loyalty of an individual in society. This conflict, at least in our opinion, is primarily one between the religious *ummah*[5] and secular nationalism: this in itself reflects the tension between religious and secular ideas in contemporary society. And it is this identity crisis which is the subject of this book.

The Islamic concept of *ummah* originated under the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him) in the seventh century of the Common Era. Those who believed in the Prophet's message and migrated from Makkah to Madinah with the Prophet formed a closely-knit group. This group later came to be known as *Ummatul Muslimīn* or the *Ummah*. In time, membership of the *ummah* replaced tribal loyalty and in so doing the supreme identity of an individual in society. This change was of major significance, for in pre-Islamic Arabia, tribal identity had always enjoyed the supreme loyalty of the individual.[6]

With the establishment of Islam, a basic social change took place in the area of law and order. Islamic law, based on Qur'ānic teachings, now either remodelled or replaced customary tribal law. In this sense, the Muslim *ummah* is a community which developed in the process of following Islamic law *(Sharī'ah)*.[7] It should be noted, however, that the *ummah* did not abolish tribal identity; it only changed the hierarchy of an individual's identities in society. In essence, the tribal identity of the individual was of secondary importance to an *ummah* identity.[8]

With this new identity Muslims formed their culture and eventually established a civilization which dominated a wide area of the globe for several centuries. Throughout those centuries tribal, ethnic and linguistic differences sometimes led Muslims to wage war on Muslims, but generally the *ummah*

identity enjoyed the supreme loyalty of all Muslims. Its adherents always subscribed emotionally to the *ummah* identity as an ideal and its members have always been committed to Islamic law. It is precisely for this reason that in Muslim countries the rulers as well as the opposition movements have always endeavoured to find their legitimacy in the *Sharī'ah*. The famous British student of Islamic history H.A.R. Gibb observes:

> There were plenty of obstacles: fanatics who vindicated their conviction of being the only true heirs of Muhammad by rebellion and slaughter, partisans of rival claimants to the government of the community, disputes over principles and details of legal development. But it is precisely through these experiences and conflicts that the concept of the *Ummah* gained in clarity and significance.[9]

However, with the emergence of nationalism the *ummah*'s foundation was challenged. Although there is no precise and widely-accepted definition of nationalism, it is generally agreed that the concept is represented by nation-states which demand the exclusive loyalty of their citizens. The mere existence of a nation-state, therefore, created a crisis of identity in the Muslim world. This study focuses on the ideological background to the tensions inherent in the competing identities of Muslims as members of a nation-state and of the Islamic *ummah*.

By the end of the nineteenth century, most parts of the Muslim world had become direct or indirect colonies of one or another European power. As Muslims realized that direct armed conflict in the traditional pattern against European powers would not succeed,[10] the Muslim struggle for self rule assumed a new shape. Muslim intellectuals learned European languages and European patterns of argument; they began to argue on European terms. European intellectuals, however, approached the study of society from a background of reaction against the organized Church and its role in governing society, a reaction which gradually secularized the notion of law and government. For their part, Muslim intellectuals were conditioned by the fact of the European colonization of their lands. Therefore, while the traditional symbols of nationalism were secularized in the

European environment, they nevertheless still carried religious connotations in the Muslim environment. While Europeans found satisfaction in sacrificing their lives for the glory of the nation, Muslims were satisfied with martyrdom and reward in the Hereafter for the same act.[11]

The concept of nationalism, however, had its own demands. After the Second World War, when most Muslim countries became independent and formed their own nation-states, these new states demanded supreme loyalty from their citizens. This created an identity crisis among Muslims and it is this which is the main subject of discussion in this book. The first chapter of the book deals with the meaning and the development of the concept of the *ummah* in history. Since the foundation of the idea was laid down in the Qur'ān, we first study the Qur'ānic concept of *ummah* and then we examine how the concept was translated into reality under the leadership of the Prophet Muḥammad (peace be upon him). An attempt has been made to understand the nature of the *ummah* identity and how it relates to other collective identities, i.e. family identity, ethnic identity, linguistic identity, etc. Finally, a very brief sketch has been made of the continuation of the concept as an ideal until the present time.

Since the traditional concept of the *ummah* was challenged by the concept of nationalism as reflected in the form of nation-states in modern history, in the second chapter we concentrate on the concept of nationalism as it relates to the emergence of nation-states in Muslim lands. The main focus of our discussion, therefore, is on the literature concerning the emergence of Muslim nation-states. In order to limit our discussion, we shall only treat developments in Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan. We have chosen Turkey because it was the first Muslim country to come into contact with European ideas, and the first to announce itself a secular republic. We discuss Egypt because it has been in the intellectual vanguard among Arab countries in receiving European ideas. Egypt is also an important case because it not only became an independent and sovereign nation-state, but it also shared the same language with a number of other nation-states; this suggests that language is not the only basis for nation-states. In the case of Pakistan, the nation was created on the basis of Islamic identity, but failed to

maintain its national integrity in the name of Islam. We discuss nation-state governments in an attempt to see how they have tried to transfer the supreme loyalty of modern Muslims from an *ummah* identity to a nation-state identity and we examine the resultant outlook they have created among their citizens.

We have confined our discussion to the same three countries in the third chapter where we examine the dichotomy between the *ummah* and the national identities in independent nation-states. Once independent, Muslim nation-states are faced with a different set of problems. In fact, Muslims are faced with the real challenge of European secular thought after independence: under colonialism it was the challenge of a superior military strength; but now military strength has been transformed into an intellectual and cultural challenge to Islam. In particular, this is reflected in the law-making institutions and education policies of independent nation-states.

The *ummah* identity consciousness of modern Muslims led them, in 1969, to form a political institution known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). A study of the activities of this organization is the subject of our discussion in Chapter Four. This institution was established in response to an arson attack against the third holiest shrine of Islam, the Al-Aqṣā Mosque in Jerusalem. At this time, the institution resolved to achieve more political unity, cultural harmony and economic growth within the *ummah*. In the final chapter we have made some concluding remarks in the light of our study.

Writing a contemporary history is always difficult; some source materials are not available, some major themes remain incomplete, and one's judgement does not always have the benefit of total perspective. Yet there are compensations: the opportunity to talk with those people directly involved in running the socio-political activities of the contemporary Muslim world; the opportunity to share views with journalists who regularly report on Muslim activities; and the opportunity to capture the spirit of a society in motion.

If this book provides some insight into an understanding of the problematic relationship between Islamic and European thought, it will have served one major purpose. If it succeeds in making the contemporary Muslim world more intelligible, it

will have served another. Finally, if it provides some clues to the understanding of increasing Islamic activism in Muslim countries, it will have accomplished a third purpose.

In writing this, we have assumed a preliminary knowledge of Islamic history on the part of the reader. Major landmarks in history, for example the meaning and significance of *hijrah*, have not been defined. Famous historical figures such as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk have not been formally introduced. When words like 'tradition' and 'modern', or 'community' and 'society', have been used as technical terms, they have been defined accordingly. We have deliberately avoided the use of the term 'Western' to express the origin of modern ideas. We have always used the term 'European' for this description, because it is in Europe that modern ideas originated.

Notes and References

1. Ziya Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, tr. and annotated by Robert Devereux (Leiden: Brill, 1968), p. 52.

2. Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 220–1. This books contains a good description of the new orientation of Turkish educational policy under the nationalist government.

3. By this term we mean the attempt by Muslim scholars to redefine the European idea of nationalism in a Muslim context.

4. Quoted in G.E. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 138.

5. This word cannot be properly translated into English. Some have translated it as 'nation' and others as 'community'. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the political institution that claims to represent modern Muslims in world affairs, uses both words; the former to mean member states, and the latter to extend reference to Muslims in non-member states. We shall use the word *ummah* to express the group consciousness of all Muslims. The *ummah* identity and the nation-state identity clash when the question of supreme loyalty arises.

6. On this subject, see G.E. von Grunebaum, 'The Nature of Arab Unity Before Islam', *Arabica*, 10 (1963), pp. 5–23, and *Classical Islam*, pp. 13–16.

7. On this subject, see H.A.R. Gibb, 'Constitutional Organization', *Law in the Middle East* (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1955), pp. 3–27

and G.E. von Grunebaum, 'Pluralism in the Islamic World', *Islamic Studies*, I (June, 1962), pp. 37–59.

8. See the Qur'ānic verse 49: 13.

9. H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Community in Islamic History'. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 107 (April 1963), p. 173.

10. Among the traditional wars against European powers, the most famous are the fights of 'Abdul Qādir of Algeria and the War of Independence or the Sepoy Mutiny in India.

11. Consider, for example, the motivating national songs in European countries and in Muslim countries. In Muslim countries, the motivation usually comes for sacrifice in the name of God. Similarly, the slogans used by Muslim countries in crises are religious; during the 1973 war with Israel, Egypt used the prayer call *Allāh Akbar*, 'God is Great' as an inspirational slogan, as did Turkey during its advance in Cyprus in 1974.

CHAPTER 1

The Qur'ānic Concept of the Ummah and its Development in History

Islam is first and foremost a religious understanding of the world and the cosmos, mediated by the concepts of the absolute unity of God *(tawḥīd)* and the prophethood of Muḥammad (peace be upon him). The Islamic sense of the world and of the role people play in it is inextricably bound up with the community that accepts this sense as part of its self-definition. That community, or *ummah*, was formed as a response to the revelation granted to the Prophet Muḥammad and presented by him to the inhabitants of Arabia in the seventh century C.E. The Qur'ān frequently deals with the notion of *ummah* – the term occurs on 64 occasions in the Glorious Book – and establishes a wide variety of related ideas; this wealth of ideas has been one of the major forces in the history of the Islamic peoples, both in a popularistic and an intellectual sense. The Islamic understanding of the *ummah* is based not only on the Qur'ān but also on early Islamic history, i.e. the period of the Prophet and his four initial successors, all Companions of his during his lifetime. The four men who first held the office of successor *(khalīfah)* are known collectively as the *Rāshidūn* or the Rightly-Guided caliphs; the institution of the caliphate, as the focus of the ever more dispersed Islamic community, has been crucial to the *ummah*'s continuity at various points in Islamic history. Although the caliphate was formally abolished early this century in the aftermath of the fall of Ottoman rule, it remains an

important background element in contemporary thinking about the *ummah*.

The foundational document of Islam, the Qur'ān, is regarded by Muslims as a divine revelation offered by God through His Prophet to the people of a particular time and place. Muslims also believe that although the message was initially delivered to a particular group of people, it is nevertheless applicable to the whole of mankind. The Qur'ān vouches for its own clarity, and it is important that we, as modern scholarly readers of the text, should be clear about its character. It is not a history book, although it can play a role in history writing. Now, if we wish to undertake a long view of Islamic history, we must be clear that the Qur'ān, in itself, was a far greater force than any competing account of Islam, whether that account be the creation of a medieval theologian anxious to agree with the revelation or of a modern historian whose work is governed by distinctive notions of truth. This approach could be criticized as an essentially theological one, but such criticism would be wrongly directed for a variety of reasons. We could say most simply that the identity of Islam throughout history has been religious, and that theological enquiry, therefore, is not amiss. More fundamentally, however, the criticism can be faulted for imposing on the Islamic world a split between political and religious thought proper only to Christian Europe.

It is not our intention here to work out fully the conditions for writing a history of Islam. Rather, we wish to make it clear that the conceptual framework of the Qur'ān, having played a major role in that history, is a proper subject for inquiry into even the most recent phases of it. The same is true, to a lesser extent, of the basic Islamic understanding of events in the Prophet's life which are not narrated in the Glorious Book.

In this chapter, then, we shall consider the *ummah* in the Qur'ān and the *ummah* in early Islamic history. Beginning with an overview of scriptural usage, we shall examine the wide range of meanings given the term and the ways in which it is used in the various parts of revelation. Turning to extra-Qur'ānic usage, we shall consider the common sense of the age of the Rightly-Guided *(Rāshidūn)* Caliphs and conclude with some later examples of usage of the *ummah* concept.

The Term *Ummah*

Many aspects of the vocabulary of the Qur'ān are complex, but traditional philological inquiry is of some use in considering the *ummah*. The general meaning of the term, 'community', is clear, and an association with the term *umm*, 'mother, source', is plausible both linguistically and to native speakers of Arabic. There is no reason to consider the term a loan-word from another Semitic language or to look for influence on its semantic field from such a source, despite the proposals of some scholars.[1] The clarity of the term conforms well enough with the Qur'ān's own claim for its clarity (12: 2).

Similarly, pre-Islamic Arabic texts are of little use in considering a term so well attested as *ummah*, and it is of little importance whether the term does or does not occur in the literature of the *Jāhiliyyah* (pre-Islamic) period.[2] R.B. Serjeant, baring himself on an anthropological overview of modern cognates of Qur'ānic vocabulary, has proposed that the term '*ummah* (was used) in the sense of a confederation round a religious nucleus (in) a pattern well established long before Muhammad.'[3] Whether or not this is so, the Qur'ān uses the term so extensively that its witness overshadows the results of any such speculation.

The term appears 64 times in the Qur'ān; in 13 cases the plural, *umam*, is used. We shall consider first the variety of uses and meanings. Then, we shall inspect the chronological distribution of the occurrences, distinguishing between Makkan verses – there are 53 Makkan uses and 11 in the first five chapters of the Qur'ān – and Madinan.

The Term in a Qur'ānic Context

The primary meaning of *ummah*, as the Qur'ānic commentator Muhammad Asad puts it, is of 'a group of living beings having certain characteristics or circumstances in common'.[4] The Qur'ān states:

> There is no beast that walks on earth and no bird flies on its two wings which is not (My) creature *(umam)* like you (mankind) . . . (6: 38).

Thus, each individual species is an *ummah*, originating from a single source *(umm)*.

The whole of humanity was created as a single *ummah*, for it originated from a single source: Adam and Eve. According to the Qur'ān:

> And (know that) all mankind were once but one single community *ummatun wahidatan*, and later did they begin to hold divergent views (10: 19).

The ability to hold divergent views makes mankind different from other creatures. Man is the only species within which more than one *ummah* exists, and the basis of this division is the difference in ideas. In other words, the basis of a human *ummah* is a set of ideas or an ideology; it is this collection of ideas which serves as the source of *(umm)* in a particular group. According to the Qur'ān, humanity started out as a single community because its members followed the guidance of Allah. This single community was divided when it disagreed on the applicability of Divine Guidance. One fundamental division of this nature involved the followers and the rejecters of Divine Guidance.

From the Qur'ānic point of view, various communities in history have come and gone (13: 30), each with the benefit of Divine Guidance through the office of its prophets (16: 36). Followers of each prophet form an *ummah* (10: 47). The term *ummah* is also used to describe the trans-historical community of all the prophets (21: 92); all of them followed the commandments of One Allah. So why, if humanity had Divine Guidance for its way of life *(dīn)*, did diversity arise? The Qur'ān responds to this question by stating:

> Had Allah so willed, He could surely have made you all one single community; however, He lets go astray him that wills (to go astray), and guides aright him that wills (to be guided); and you will surely be called to account for all that you ever did (16: 93).

A choice is given to each person, for each person has the intellectual ability to choose the righteous way. An account of how this freedom was used will be made in the Hereafter. The

basic goal of life on earth is to test each person's commitment to follow Divine Guidance.

The term *ummah* is not only used in the Qur'ān to describe a well-knit group of people. It may also refer to the beliefs of such a group of people. The Qur'ān says:

> Nay, but they say, 'Behold, we found our forefathers agreed on what to believe *(ummah)* and verily, it is in their footsteps that we find our guidance (for our way of life)'. And thus it is: Whenever We sent, before your time, a warner to any community *(qaryah)* those of its people who had lost themselves entirely in the pursuit of pleasures would always say, 'Behold, we found our forefathers agreed on what to believe *(ummah)*, and verily, it is in their footsteps that we follow' (43: 22–3).

Similarly, the exemplar of an ideological group of people can also be described as an *ummah*. The Qur'ān considers Abraham as one such examplar of a divinely-guided community:

> Verily, Abraham was a man *(ummah)* who combined within himself all virtues, devotedly obeying Allah's will, turning away from all that is false, and not being of those who ascribe divinity to aught beside Allah (16: 120).

The Prophet Abraham, according to Qur'ānic commentators, combined within himself all the good qualities of the God-given beliefs of a God-conscious community. He was the most notable model of the *ummah* itself[5] and could therefore himself be called an *ummah*.

The word *ummah* can also refer to a specific length of time. For example, the Qur'ān says:

> And thus it is, if We defer their suffering until a time-unit *(ummah)* set (by Us), they are sure to say, 'What is preventing it (from coming now)?' (11: 8).

Again according to Qur'ānic commentators, *ummah* in this context refers to a span of time because all communities have a definite period of time within which to live in this world (7: 34). Therefore, the life of a particular community or civilization can be called an *ummah*.[6]

The word *ummah* is further used in the Qur'ān to refer to a more committed group of people within a large community:

> And among the folk of Moses *(qawm)* there have been (a group of) people *(ummah)* who would guide others in the way of the truth and act justly in its light (7: 159).

Similar groups existed within every community founded on a God-given ideology (7: 181).

In another context, the Qur'ān uses the word *ummah* to apply to a circumstantially or professionally unified group of people:

> When Moses arrived at the wells of Madyin, he found there a large group of men *(ummah)* who were watering (their herds and flocks) (28: 23).

In this verse, two criteria constitute the basis for the unity among the people who were watering their animals at that particular time and place. Firstly, they were all performing one particular task, i.e. watering animals; this can be considered as circumstantial unity. Secondly, they were all herdsmen by profession; this can also be seen as the basis of co-operation among them. In another verse, the Qur'ān using divine ordinance makes a distinction between different groups of people on the basis of co-operation within that group. It says:

> And We divided them (flock of Moses) into twelve tribal communities *(asbāṭan umamam)*. And when his people *(qawm)* asked Moses for water, We inspired him, 'strike the rock with your staff', whereupon twelve springs gushed from it, so that each group of people knew where to drink . . . (7: 160).

Previously the twelve tribes differed from each other only in their ancestry; at this point they are distinguished by means of their water supply. And this, in itself, serves as a divine ordering of them.

The Qur'ān makes a distinction between two words with similar meanings, i.e. *ummah* and *qawm*. Both words appear

together in the above-cited verse, i.e. 7: 159–60, in which *qawm* is used to denote all the followers of Moses in general, while *ummah* is used in a very particular sense. *Ummah* is used to describe a group of people who are thoroughly committed to the beliefs of the whole community *(qawm)*; in the next verse, 7: 160, *ummah* refers to the people within the community *(qawm)* who enjoin Divine Guidance. *Ummah* is more specific while *qawm* is more general. The specific quality of *ummah* involves the ideological nature of the described.

Ummah therefore means not only an ideological community but also the set of beliefs within a community, an exemplar of a community, a more committed group of people within a community, and the lifetime of a community. *Ummah* can easily be distinguished from *qawm* and other words of similar meaning. *Ummah* is, in fact, a comprehensive concept in its Qur'ānic usage. The Qur'ān clarifies the comprehensive nature of the concept in the verses which were revealed in Makkah.

It is in the Madinan verses that the Qur'ān explains the role of the *ummah* of Muḥammad in history. Structurally, the Qur'ān begins with a prayer which is considered to be the first chapter; the second chapter begins as the response to the prayer, introducing the Qur'ānic view of the world, humanity and history.

The word *ummah* first appears in *Sūrah* 2, Verse 128, in a prayer offered by Abraham, a historical personality respected by both *ummī* people (those without a divinely-guided book) and the people of the book (Jews and Christians). Abraham prays:

> O our Lord, make us surrenderers *(muslimīn)* unto You and make out of our offspring a community *(ummah)* that shall surrender (muslim) itself unto You, and show us our ways of worship and accept our repentance (2: 128).

The verse is preceded by an explanation of what is meant by the term 'muslim' and who the Muslims were in history. A Muslim is one who surrenders his desires to the will of Allah and accepts His guidance as his only way of life. The Qur'ān claims that Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and Jesus

were all Muslims because they surrendered to the will of Allah and followed His guidance as their way of life. Since some of Abraham's offspring through his son Isaac abandoned the message of Islam, Muḥammad, a descendant of Abraham through his son Ishmael, has been chosen to be the messenger to humanity. Therefore, the followers of Muḥammad have been charged with the responsibility to spread the message. The Qur'ān defines the followers of Muḥammad as a group of people with a special role in history as follows:

> And thus We have willed you to be a community of the middle way *(ummatan wasaṭan)*, so that you might be a witness (to the truth) before all mankind, and that the Apostle might bear witness (to it) before you. And it is only to the end that We might make a clear distinction between those who follow the Apostle and those who turn about on their heels that We had appointed (for this community) the direction of prayer . . . (2: 143).

The Qur'ān not only establishes the ideas of the unity of Allah and the prophethood of Muḥammad as the foundations of the Muslim *ummah*, it also provides the followers of Muḥammad with a physical identity. It establishes the direction of prayer as being toward the Ka'bah, the House of Allah, built by Abraham in Makkah. In its third chapter, the Qur'ān again takes up the issue of the Ka'bah. According to the Qur'ān, the Ka'bah was the first House of Allah for human beings, which is rich in blessings and a source of guidance. Whoever enters where the Prophet Abraham once prayed to Allah will find inner peace. The Qur'ān, therefore, instructs those followers of Muḥammad who are able to visit this House of Allah to do so at least once in their lifetime as a physical manifestation of their unity with other Muslims (3: 97–8).

The Qur'ān explains the Islamic worldview by saying that humanity in the beginning was a single community; this was noted earlier in our dealing with the meaning of the term *ummah* in the Qur'ān. Divisions developed because people disagreed among themselves about their way of life (2: 213). An *ummah* is a community based on beliefs and the Muslim *ummah* is that which believes in the guidance of One Allah and in the

prophethood of Muḥammad. The Qur'ān ties the *ummah* specifically to certain kinds of ideas:

> Unto everyone of you (mankind) have We appointed a law and way of life *(shir'atan wa minhājān)* (5: 48).

More precisely, then, an *ummah* is a community of law and custom. The same verse also explains why people disagree among themselves about the laws of life:

> He could surely have made you all one single community (*ummatan wāḥidatan*, but He willed it otherwise) in order to test you by means of what He has given unto you.

People have been endowed with the intellectual capacity to differ among themselves such that Allah can test their sincerity. The verse then continues, giving advice and warning:

> Vie, then, with one another in doing good works; unto Allah you must return; and then He will make you truly understand all that on which you were wont to differ (5: 48).

Since people disagreed among themselves concerning their way of life, prophets were raised up from among their own people. The followers of the Prophet Muḥammad comprised one *ummah*, a middle or balanced community *(ummatan wasaṭan)*, and the best community *(khaira ummatin)*. Its role among humanity is to counsel others to do good deeds and to forbid what is evil (3: 110). Its members are destined to do this on the basis of brotherhood (3: 103) and equality (49: 13); all share equally the responsibilities entrusted to the *ummah*. The *ummah* of Muslims took shape under the leadership of the Prophet after his migration from Makkah to Madinah.

The Creation of the *Ummah* of Muḥammad

When the Prophet Muḥammad and his Makkan followers, who gathered around him, believing in his teachings and who were persecuted by their pagan fellow tribesmen, arrived in Yathrib, they formed a well-knit group along with the Prophet's

followers in Madinah. This group ultimately took control of the city, which became known as Madīnat an-Nabī, 'The City of the Prophet'; the group received immediate political recognition from the tribes in and around Madinah. In order to understand the nature and the role of this group in history, it is necessary to reflect on the structure of Arabian society before Muḥammad.

In his article on 'Pre-Islamic Arabia' in *The Cambridge History of Islam,* Irfan Shahid traces a strong sense of Arab identity among the Arabs of that time. According to him, during the *Ayyām al-'Arab,* the golden age of the Arabs before Islam, a common culture of which poetry was a major element 'enhanced the Arab's awareness of their identity and contributed to the rise of a strong Arab national sentiment'.[7] This sentiment formed the basis of the Arab *kulturnation,* and, as von Grunebaum has observed, 'the racial pride of the Arab does not seem to have suffered by the realization of his political and civilizational backwardness in comparison with his Greek and Persian speaking neighbours'.[8]

The Arab identity was not, however, the only identity of a person within that society, nor did it enjoy the supreme loyalty of the Arabs. Von Grunebaum rightly points out that it was the identity of the individual as a tribe member that enjoyed the supreme loyalty of these people.[9] An individual was supposed to sacrifice everything in his possession to protect the honour and prestige of his tribe. He was required to observe tribal laws and customs, formulated and administered by tribal chiefs. In return, the tribe guaranteed his protection and safety in society. Tribal warfare was a common phenomenon. In addition to the tension created by these wars, there were two other areas of tension in the society, that which existed between the northern and southern Arabs and that which obtained between nomads and city dwellers.[10]

It was in this social context that Muḥammad migrated from Makkah to Madinah and founded a new organization which came to be known in history as *Ummatul Muslimīn* or the *Ummah* of Muslims. If one had accepted Islam as his way of life, an individual in Makkan society would lose the protection commitment from his tribe. The reason for this was simple. The individual was no longer willing to submit to the tribal laws and

customs administered by tribal chiefs. In other words, he changed his supreme tribal loyalty to that of a new Islamic identity. His monotheistic belief was to reshape his life. As a consequence, every new Muslim including the Prophet himself, with the co-operation of local tribal chiefs, set up a new administration for the city of Madinah. Muslims received recognition as a distinct group of people and Madinah became a confederation of various groups living in the area. The traditional biographical literature about the Prophet *(al-Sīrah)* preserves the 'Constitution of Madinah'. This document, signed by the inhabitants of Madinah and the new immigrants to the city, named the Prophet Muḥammad as the chief officer of Madinah. At the outset, it declares itself to be 'a document from Muḥammad, the Prophet, among the believers and Muslims of Quraish (the tribe of the Prophet and most other immigrants) and Yathrib, and those who followed them and joined them and lived with them. They constituted one single *ummah (ummatan wāḥidatan)* to the exclusion of all (other) people *(min dūn an-nās).*'[11] The document provides regulations concerning the administration and security of the city of Madinah.

The document recognizes that an individual may have more than one identity. It declares the formation of one *ummah* for Muslims, while allowing for the tribal identities of those who accepted the faith of Islam; it also permitted the Jewish inhabitants of Madinah to retain their religious identity. The document's recognition of multiple identities has sometimes created confusion among historians concerning the nature of the Muslim *ummah*. The Arab nationalist historian M.A. Shaban thinks that 'the members of the new commonwealth *(ummah)* did not have to accept the new religion; they only had to accept the special authority of Muhammad'.[12] He cites as evidence the inclusion of the Jews of Madinah in plans for the defence of the city. W. Montgomery Watt also thinks that Jews of various tribes belonged to the Madinan *ummah* of Muḥammad.[13] However, a closer examination of the document suggests, as R.B. Serjeant and Frederick M. Denny have pointed out,[14] that the Jews did not belong to the single community *(ummatan wāḥidatan)* to which a reference has been made in the first article of the 'Constitution of Madinah'. Let us consider the text.

In the first article the document ordains, 'Believers and Muslims of Quraish (immigrants, all of whom were apparently from the Quraish tribe) and Yathrib and those who follow and meet them and strive with them constitute one single community to the exclusion of all others in mankind *(min dūn an-nās)*.' This passage allows for both tribal and geographical identities. Later portions of the document illustrate some regulations concerning the status of some of the groups within and around the community. Article 16 reports: 'A Jew who follows us has (a right) to the same help and support (as the believers), so long as they are not wronged (by him) and he does not help (others) against them (believers).' This article clearly suggests that the Jews did not belong to the 'us'; but to the body of the other people *(nās)* mentioned in the first article. Article 16, however, reflects an offer made to individuals of the Jewish faith in order to gain their political support for the sake of the security of Madinah. In a later portion of the document a series of articles concerns the Jewish tribes of Madinah (Articles 24–35). According to Article 25, one Jewish tribe is given recognition as an *ummah*: 'The Jews of Banū Awf are a community along with the believers *(ummah ma' al-Muslimīn)*'. This recognition of the Jewish tribe as a separate entity from the Muslims would in today's terminology be called an act of peaceful co-existence and co-operation. Peaceful co-operation is reflected in the previous article (Article 24), according to which the Jewish tribe (Banū Awf) was supposed to share the expenses of defending the city of Madinah. This article notes that the Jewish tribe had their law of life *(dīn)* while Muslims had their own. In the following articles similar recognition is given to a number of other Jewish tribes in Madinah. The last article of the series states the key issue of agreement between the Jews and the Muslims in declaring the city of Madinah a sacred place for all the people of the document. The main concern of this part of the document is plainly the security of Madinah.

An important step in understanding this document and in avoiding any mis-interpretation of the relationship between Jews and Muslims involves recognizing that the document was completed in several stages.[15] Various aspects of the text suggests this. It appears that when the first article was written, no non-Muslim was in view; Muslims of different tribes

constituted the single *ummah*. Thus Jewish tribes' names are not cited in the early parts of the document, while names of different Muslim tribes do appear. Later on an offer was made to the Jewish citizens of Madinah, as noted in Article 16, in an attempt to seek the co-operation of as many people as possible in guarding the city of Madinah. We know that the threat to the city increased as time passed; the increased demand for the security of Madinah led to agreements being made with the Jewish tribes, giving them recognition as an *ummah* with their own law and religion.

Another internal feature of the text is relevant. Up to Article 23, the adherents of the document are referred to as believers or Muslims; thereafter references are made to 'the people of the document' *(ahli hādhihī aṣ-ṣḥīfah)*. The term *ummah* is avoided so as to permit allusion to all the people who were party to the document. Had all the groups or tribes involved with the document constituted one *ummah*, then it would have been easier to cite just the *ummah* instead of 'the people of the document'. Therefore, we may conclude that the Jews of Madinah were not included in the 'single community' referred to in the first article of the document; the 'single community' included only those who accepted the message *(risālah)* and leadership of Muḥammad. Similarly, we may infer that the articles of 'the Constitution of Madinah' are grouped together in the *sīrah* literature even though they do not reflect one single event.

Undoubtedly 'the Constitution of Madinah' is the most important text in the history of the early Muslim community, the *ummah* of the followers of Muḥammad. The nature of the newly established *ummah* has been viewed differently by scholars. It is generally accepted that the foundation of the *ummah* was laid down in 'the Constitution of Madinah' although some scholars disagree. For example, R.B. Serjeant challenges the very nature of the *ummah*. He thinks that it was a kind of 'tribal confederation from a number of tribes more or less independent of one another'. According to him, it was 'entirely political not religious'.[16] Serjeant's argument correctly reflects the later part of the 'Constitution', with the articles concerning the status of the Jewish tribes of Madinah; however, the notion that the document does not provide a structure for religious unity is

insupportable – the *ummah*'s basic philosophical and emotional support came from religious faith. In part Serjeant's argument depends on a problematic distinction between religious and political spheres. Moreover, Serjeant fails to note that the formation of the new Muslim *ummah* changed an individual's loyalty from that of tribe to that of *ummah*.

The *ummah* of Muḥammad, thus born in an Arabian environment, did not confine its call to the Arabs; its message was universal: it addressed the whole of mankind *(nās)*. Whoever believed in the message of Muḥammad became part of this new community. The unique character of this *ummah* was that it identified itself with previous prophets – Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus (peace be upon them) – for all of them, like Muḥammad, submitted to the will of God. This identification gave a new sense of belonging to the followers of Muḥammad.

The formation of the new *ummah* was a decisive blow to the existing social and political structures of Arabia. For it completely shattered the existing system by offering a new principle of supreme identity for individuals. It completely changed the world-view of the Arabs; it brought about a revolution in Arabian society. In the past, an individual would have fought for the honour and dignity of his tribe; after accepting Islam, the individual abandoned this idea, for now the new faith demanded his supreme loyalty. Consequently, his position within the tribe was threatened. This threat became more distinct after the formation of the single *ummah* of Muslims, the focus of the new faith. Madinan society under the Prophet recognized an individual's tribal identity, but only as a secondary matter. The tribal conflicts, which the Qur'ān calls 'a pit of fire' (3: 103) could now be reconsidered in light of the demands of Islam. In addition, an individual's identity as an Arab, a bedouin, or a town-dweller became even less important.

The Islamic reappraisal of an individual's identity can be overstated. Some scholars romanticize the concept of the *ummah* and claim, for example, that, 'he who embraced Islam had to forget all his tribal and clannish affiliation'.[17] This is misleading. We have already noted that 'the Constitution of Madinah' recognized individual tribes within the 'single

Muslim *ummah'*. But the formation of the new *ummah* drastically changed the nature of the individual's commitment to the tribe, and consequently the tribe lost its power as an independent and sovereign political unit in society. An individual, after accepting Islam, would no longer be expected to sacrifice his life and his belongings to the honour, dignity and security of his tribe: he was no longer ruled by tribal law and customs. Instead, his life was now dominated by the idea of the unity of Allah and the prophethood of Muḥammad. He now had a new set of values and laws by which to conduct his life; Muslims were now called upon to live beyond a predetermined tribal identity. In fact, the newly-established *ummah* stood on its own merit, and gained recognition throughout the Madinan area.

The *ummah* was based on the twin concepts of brotherhood and equality; neither of these concepts were new to the egalitarian Arabs. W. Montgomery Watt observes that, 'the Islamic community has a strong sense of brotherhood, and in this respect (it) continues the solidarity of the Arabian tribe'.[18] As previously stated, such a conclusion, without qualification, can be misleading. It is true that a strong sense of tribal fellowship existed in Arabian society before Islam, but since the tribes were independent and sovereign political units, this feeling was confined; those who were outside the tribe were outside the bond of brotherhood. Consequently, though Arabian society before Islam witnessed devastating tribal wars, Islam broke this tribal barrier and replaced blood ties with universal ideals.

The fervour of *ummah* identity was so strong in early Islam that the previous social structure based on blood relations was completely destroyed. A well-known anecdote of early Islamic history is relevant. It is said that Abū Bakr, later to be the First Caliph, happened to engage in battle with his son, who had not yet accepted Islam. Long after the battle the son told his father: 'O father, you came several times within range of my sword at the battle, but I did not kill you.' Abū Bakr responded: 'If you had once come within range of my sword, I would not have spared you.' There are other stories about how the Madinans *(anṣār)* shared all their belongings with the Makkan Muslims *(muhājirīn)* who, being persecuted at home, had left all their

worldly belongings behind and arrived in Madinah empty-handed. These stories reflect the nature of the new *ummah* and the way in which existing ideals were Islamized by the Prophet to further the healthy growth of the *ummah*.

The *Ummah* After Muḥammad

At the time of the Prophet's death in 11/632, much of the Arabian peninsula had come under the banner of Islam, and the *ummah* was a firmly established feature of society. Immediately after the Prophet's death a number of tribes lapsed from Islam, and Abū Bakr, the close friend who succeeded Muḥammad, was obliged to spend some time in trying to bring these tribes to recognize once again the authority of Madinah. The campaigns, known as the wars of Apostasy *(Riddah)*, are of far less significance than the creation of the office of caliph, successor *(khalīfah)* of the Prophet in worldly affairs, more properly *khalīfatu rasūl Allāh*, successor of the Prophet of Allah. This position later became institutionalized, and the concept of the *ummah* was closely identified with the institution of the caliphate. Muslims generally consider the rule of the first four caliphs, i.e. the first thirty years of the caliphate, as the period of its ideal implementation.

This ideal did not last for long. Firstly, the institution became secularized by the hereditary succession of the Umayyads.[19] Later, more than one political entity was created within the *ummah* by the members of the *ummah* themselves so eliminating the ideal of unitary succession.

Did the *ummah* die with the Prophet? Or with the disruption of the caliphate under the Abbasids or Ottomans? Or is it still a vital force in Muslim society? The current status of the *ummah* requires a separate treatment which we shall discuss later. Here we may simply note that although the concept did not survive in pristine form, its adherents have nevertheless remained emotionally involved with it. Members of the *ummah* have generally subscribed to its law, *Sharī'ah*, and have survived as a law-based community. For this reason rulers in Muslim countries as well as movements opposing them have, in most cases, endeavoured to find legitimacy in the *Sharī'ah*.

We may conclude with some examples of the emotional

attachment of the Muslim masses to the *ummah* and the related concept of caliphal sanction. The first involves an event which occurred in medieval Cairo. The last of the Abbasids had apparently been destroyed by the Mongols, and the institution of caliphate was about to vanish when:

> . . . in Rajab 659/1261 a group of bedouins entered Cairo who brought with them the 'son' of the last 'Abbasid Caliph, called al-Mustanṣir billāh Abul-Qāsim. The clever Sultan al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybars, who had already defeated the Mongol armies at 'Ayn Jālūt, gathered the qāḍīs of Cairo, and after the bedouins had given evidence that the pedigree of the new-comer was faultless and the qāḍī of the Shāfi'ites had attested their evidence al-Malik al-Ẓāhir acknowledged him as Caliph and paid homage to him. A few days later the Caliph sent Baybars a document of investiture and, thus, the Mamluk dynasty got official sanction.[20]

A little earlier and in the quite different setting of South Asia, we find the Indian Sultan Iltutmish (r. 1211–1236) concerned with caliphal sponsorship. After consolidating his power locally, Iltutmish received a sanction from the caliph in Baghdad to legitimize his rule in the eyes of Indian Muslims, even though he had the military and economic strength to rule over India without such a sanction.[21] Even the British made a similar attempt to legitimize their rule in India. In order to pacify and satisfy the Indian Muslims after the great (Sepoy) revolt against British rule in 1857, the British obtained a sanction from the Ottoman Caliph, who urged Indian Muslims to remain loyal to the British.[22]

These examples reflect the emotional attachment of the Muslim people to the idea of *ummah*. Because of the ruling of *Sharī'ah* most Muslims in history considered the caliphal need and sanction a necessary part of their belief. In this regard, Leonard Binder's view is overstated when he suggests: 'It must . . . be remembered that Islam did not so much legitimize medieval government as did the government legitimize it by recognizing Islam.'[23] The continuity alone of the *ummah* identity argues against this view. To be sure, the Muslim people

did not always succeed in having their rulers approve what they believed to be Islamically sound. Because of this tension between the ideal and reality, the *ummah* has gained and receded in importance throughout Islamic history. But nevertheless, the Qur'ānic concept of *ummah* thus achieved clarity and significance in history. H.A.R. Gibb has rightly observed that:

> There were plenty of obstacles: fanatics who vindicated their conviction of being the only true heirs of Muhammad by rebellion and slaughter, partisans of rival claimants to the government of the community, disputes over principles and details of legal development. But it is precisely through these experiences that the concept of *ummah* gained in clarity and significance.[24]

A thorough study of the concept of *ummah* suggests that the primary loyalty of the Muslim is not to the ruler, not to the state, but to the *ummah* and the *Sharī'ah* which binds it together.

One modern Muslim thinker and activist, Sayyid Mawdudi (1903–1979), has rightly suggested about the continuity of the *ummah* by saying that:

> Differences on the basis of nationality, race and tribal conflicts did crop up now and again . . . But the idea that the Muslims of the world constitute one *Ummah* remained intact . . . A Muslim from any part of the world could go to any Muslim land without any restrictions, move freely in that country, stay there as long as he wished, engage in any trade, secure the highest government post in that country, get married without any difficulty. Islamic history is replete with instances where a Muslim went out of his country and lived in other Muslim lands for decades. He might have studied in one country, engaged in business in another, become a minister or commander-in-chief of the army in a third one and, then he might go over to yet another, settle there and get married. A well-known example is Ibn Batūta's who travelled through different Muslim countries for twenty-seven years. He did not need a passport or a visa to go to any of these countries. Nowhere was he questioned about his nationality. Nowhere did he

face any difficulty in earning his living. He needed no permit to visit any place nor was any period fixed for his stay. If he sought a job under any government he got appointed without any difficulty.[25]

However, Muslims adopted the European idea of nationalism in their struggle against colonialism. This challenged their idea of supreme loyalty. We will discuss this conflict of loyalty in the following chapters.

Notes and References

1. See Rudi Paret,'Ummah', *EI;* and following him W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), p. 10.

2. Watt believes it does not occur there but Frederick M. Denny has recently argued that it does. For citation of the poem and a relevant discussion see Frederick M. Denny, 'The Meaning of Ummah in the Quran', *History of Religions,* Vol. 15 (1975), pp. 35–70.

3. R.B. Serjeant, 'Haram and Hawtah, the Sacred Enclave in Arabia', *Melanges Taha Husayn,* ed. Abdurrahman Badawi (Le Caire: Dar al-Ma'ref, 1962), pp. 41–58.

4. Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Quran* (Gibraltar: Dar al-Andalus, 1980), p. 177.

5. See commentaries by Al-Rāzī, Vol. 20, p. 134, and Al-Zamakhsharī, Vol. 2, p. 433.

6. Al-Ṭabarī, Vol. 12, pp. 6–7, and Al-Rāzī, Vol. 15, pp. 188–9.

7. Irfan Shahid, 'Pre-Islamic Arabia', *The Cambridge History of Islam,* Vol. 1A, p. 23.

8. G.E. von Grunebaum, 'The Nature of Arab Unity Before Islam', *Arabica,* Vol. 10 (1963), p. 10.

9. G.E. von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam, a History 600–1258* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1970), pp. 13–16.

10. G.E. von Grunebaum, 'The Nature of Arab Unity Before Islam', *Arabica,* Vol. 10 (1963), pp. 15ff.

11. See *Sīrah Ibn Hishām,* ed. 'Abdus Salām Hārūn (Kuwait: Dar al-Buhūth al-'Iimīyah, 1979), pp. 124–6. For an English translation see *The Life of Muhammad: Translation of Ibn Hishām's Sīrat Rasūl Allāh,* by A. Guillaume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 231–4. Also see M. Hamidullah, *The First Written Constitution in the World* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1981).

12. M.A. Shaban, *Islamic History, a New Interpretation*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), Vol. I, p. 11.

13. W.M. Watt, *Islamic Political Thought* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), p. 5. Rudi Paret, 'Ummah', *EI* (old ed.).

14. R.B. Serjeant, 'The Constitution of Madina', *Islamic Quarterly* (June 1964), p. 13. Also see Frederick M. Denny, 'Ummah in the Constitution of Medina', *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, (1977), p. 44.

15. Watt and Serjeant also hold this view. See Watt, *Muhammad at Medina* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 226, and Serjeant, 'Constitution', p. 16.

16. R.B. Serjeant, 'Constitution', p. 12.

17. Muhammad Nazir Kakakhel, 'The Rise of Muslim Ummah at Mecca and its Integration', *Hamdard Islamicus*, Vol. 5 (1982), p. 63.

18. W.M. Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*, p. 97.

19. On the secularization and change in the institution as a result of hereditary rule, see Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah*, 3 vols., trans. Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 414–28.

20. Al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*, Vol. 3, pp. 264 and 280, translated and quoted by Annemarie Schimmel, 'Some Glimpses of the Religious Life in Egypt During the Later Mamluk Period', *Islamic Studies*, Vol. 4 (December 1965), pp. 353–4.

21. See Iswari Prasad, *A History of Muslim Rule in India: From the Advent of Islam to the Death of Awrangzeb*, Rev. Ed. (Allahabad: India Press, 1965), p. 58.

22. See Hamid Enayet, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 39.

23. Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York: Wiley, 1964), p. 39.

24. H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Community in Islamic History'. *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 107 (April 1963), p. 173.

25. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1967), pp. 14–15.

CHAPTER 2

Nationalism or a Response to European Colonialism: A Review of Literature on the Emergence of Muslim Nation-States

In the twentieth century of the Common Era, Muslim commitment to the concept of *ummah* seems to have been challenged by the idea of nationalism. With the development of nationalism, and in particular the emergence of Muslim nation-states, the Muslims seem to have become somewhat confused about where their first loyalty lies – whether primary loyalty belongs to the *ummah* or to the nation-state. In this chapter, we propose to study the literature on the emergence of Muslim nation-states and in so doing determine the nature of what we shall now call Muslim nationalism. Our primary consideration will be given to the question of the individual Muslim's supreme loyalty during the nationalist struggle against, in most cases, European colonialism.

The idea of nationalism originally developed in Europe. There is no precise and widely-accepted definition of nationalism, but scholars agree with the view that the concept is represented in history by nation-states which claim the exclusive loyalty of their citizens.[1] It is precisely on this question of loyalty that the concept of nationalism clashes with that of *ummah*. In this chapter, we shall study the development

of nationalism in Muslim countries from the point of view of the individual's loyalty.

Given that nationalism first developed in Europe, we will attempt to understand the concept as it developed in Europe and then examine how it relates to the emergence of nation-states in Muslim lands. The main focus of our discussion will be on the literature concerning the emergence of Muslim nation-states.

In the Middle Ages there were hardly any traces of nationalism, either in the Islamic world or in Europe, for there were no nation-states in those days. The object of popular loyalty was religion; in Europe it was Christianity.[2] In the Muslim world, as we have demonstrated in the previous chapter, an individual's primary loyalty was to the Islamic *ummah*. With the development of nationalism, however, a Christian became an Englishman, a Frenchman, a German, or a member of one of the other nationalities. When most parts of the Muslim world had become direct or indirect colonies of one or another European power, and Muslims realized that direct armed conflict in the traditional pattern against European powers would not succeed, the Muslim struggle for self-rule assumed a new shape around the end of the last century. It seems Muslims understood that Europe could be overcome only with its own weapons. Therefore, they learned European languages and European patterns of argument; they began to argue on European terms. They adopted a European-styled idea of nationalism, arguing that they were different from their European masters and that they would live to be governed by their own national cultures and values. Thus, one must note that there is a sharp distinction between the development of nationalism in Muslim countries and in European countries. European intellectuals approached the study of society from a background of reaction against the Church and its role in governing society, a reaction which gradually secularized the notion of law and government. For their part, Muslim intellectuals were conditioned by the fact of the European colonization of their lands. Therefore, while the traditional symbols of nationalism were secularized in the European environment, they nevertheless still carried religious weight in the Muslim environment; while Europeans found satisfaction in sacrificing their lives for the glory of the nation, Muslims were

satisfied with martyrdom and reward in the Hereafter for the same act.

The earliest works on the development of nationalism in Muslim countries were published in the 1920s. Two major books on the subject were published and both were written by Hans Kohn, a Hungarian-born journalist who participated in the Zionist student movement and who was influenced by neo-romantic German nationalism before the First World War.[3] Later scholars of nationalism depended heavily on Hans Kohn's works, and we shall demonstrate this in the following pages. Kohn travelled widely in the Middle East as a correspondent for the German newspapers, *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Neue Zurkher Zeitung*. Kohn believed that Muslim countries were going through a secularization process similar to that in Europe. Looking at the development of nationalist ideas in Asia, he observed:

> A few years back religion was the determining factor in the East. Nationalism is not ousting religion, but more or less rapidly it is taking a place beside it, frequently fortifying it, beginning to transform and impair it. National symbols are acquiring religious authority and sacramental inviolability. The truth which men will defend with their lives is no longer exclusively religious, on occasion even it is no longer religious at all, but in increasing measure national.[4]

Kohn further observed:

> Only twenty-five years ago the Turks, the Arabians, and the Egyptians described themselves first and foremost as Mohammedans. They were not yet conscious of ethical designations, or only accorded them secondary consideration. Today the Mohammedan is primarily a member of his nation or a citizen of his state, and afterwards a Mohammedan.[5]

On the basis of these observations Kohn formed a theory in the study of social change. He said: 'Nationalism takes the place of religion as the principle of governing all social and intellectual life.'[6] We shall demonstrate later, however, that

Kohn was wrong. But for the moment, we shall focus on how his expertise on the issue influenced later scholars.

A widely-quoted scholar on nationalism, Harvard professor Rupert Emerson, theorizes that 'the rise of nationalism coincided with a decline in the hold of religion'. He supports his view by quoting Hans Kohn, saying:

> Hans Kohn formulated a universal sociological law which he saw as signifying the transition from medieval to modern forms of organization: religious groupings lose power when confronted with the consciousness of a common nationality and speech.[7]

Following Kohn's 'universal sociological theory' Rupert Emerson says about Asian African nation-states that:

> The nations have come to be accepted as taking priority over claims coming from any other source. Family, tribe, locality, religion, conscience, economic interest and a host of other appeals may at any given time and place prevail over national allegiance for particular individuals or groups. But it is the characteristic feature of the national era that for most men the national allegiance takes precedence over all other claims which may be made upon them when they are confronted by alternative choices of allegiances, as most strikingly in time of war.[8]

Karl Deutsch, another social scientist, also a Harvard professor and widely accepted as a theoretician on the idea of nationalism, addressed this issue of identity. He too relies heavily on Kohn's works.[9] He says:

> The question 'Who am I?' does not confront as acutely the person who lives in the midst of a family group. Everyone who knows his mother knows him. Once he leaves this background, however, the question of his personal identity – and of his own image of his own identity – arises.[10]

Deutsch obviously has the European situation in mind where, as a result of the industrial revolution, and the extraordinary mobility and urbanization of the population which it produced, led to psychological maladjustment and to an identity crisis

among the people. Deutsch argues that modernization and nationalism go hand in hand. The concept of social mobilization is central to his understanding of nationalism. This mobilization eventually leads everybody into one people, which in turn becomes the core of a nation. Can this be generalized in Muslim countries as well? Let us now examine the situation of nationalism movements in Muslim countries.

TURKEY

The Ottoman Turks were the first among Muslim peoples in modern times to come into direct contact with Europe, albeit as a defeated power. This defeatist mentality convinced Ottoman officials that Turkey had to be built anew. The understanding of these officials was that Europe will serve as the model for development in every aspect of Ottoman life.[11] Recommendations were made to the government to accept military, technological, scientific and financial help from Europe. Although Turkey never became a direct colony of any European power, it is in this sense that Turkey became colonized by European ideas. And thus began the era of *Tanzīmāt* (reorganization) reforms (1839–1876).[12] These reforms began with a European-style enlightened despot and were later carried out by Ottoman officials. Among these were declarations on the status of minorities under Ottoman rule. These were either dictated by European powers or Ottoman officials took such initiatives in order to please their European masters. The result however was a strong reaction from Ottoman intellectuals – the Young Ottomans – who began a movement to bring about reforms 'for Ottomans, by Ottomans, along Islamic lines.'[13]

The most famous and influential among the Young Ottoman intellectuals was Namik Kemal (1840–1888). It is in Namik Kemal's thought that historians identify the beginning of the emergence of a new nationalist identity in Turkey.[14] He popularized the term *vatan* (fatherland) in modern Turkish literature. According to some historians, this concept of *vatan* later led to the establishment of an independent and sovereign Turkey which now claims the supreme loyalty of its inhabitants. Namik Kemals' identification with this idea of supreme loyalty to the nation-state needs to be re-examined.

In studying Namik Kemal's life and works it is important to remember that he appeared in Turkey's political arena at a time when *Tanẓīmāt* reforms were under way. The prime focus of the Ottoman reform edicts was the position of non-Muslims. At this point, Namik Kemal and his fellow intellectuals and patriots stood for the rights of Muslims under the Ottoman rule. Kemal believed that the declining Ottoman nation *(ummet)* could regain its health and strength if it was ruled with the consent of its people. He wanted a constitutional government for the Ottomans based on the consensus *(ijmā')*[15] of the Muslim community. He also envisioned an Ottoman parliament *(sura-i-ummet)* with the Caliph at its head, to safeguard the constitution. According to Namik Kemal: 'In Islam the good and the bad are determined by the *Seriet* which is the expression of the abstract good and the ultimate criterion of the truth.'[16] For him, it was the Islamic law *(Sharī'ah)* which provided the ultimate value. However, at the same time, he appreciated the French constitution and admired the French enlightenment philosophers. Kemal expressed willingness to accept European technology, media and education to further the material development of the Ottomans. In addition to his scholarly writings, he also wrote a number of dramas and poems through which he popularized his ideas to the masses.

The British Orientalist Bernard Lewis considers Namik Kemal the apostle of the idea of fatherland in Turkey. In order to justify his claim, Lewis traces the origin and meaning of the word *vatan* in the Turkish language. He equates the French word *patrie* with the Turkish *vatan*, and the French-Turkish dictionary, published in 1841, translated *vatan* as *patrie*.[17] By scholarly standards, this argument is too simplistic. For, a deeper examination suggests that Namik Kemal's use of the word *vatan* differs radically from the French concept *patrie*. In response to an article by Ernest Renan (1823–1892) who, in fact, popularized the idea of *patrie* in the French language, Namik Kemal says:

> History bears witness that, because of certain differences that appeared among the Muslim peoples, all of them have been able to preserve their national identities. However, if anyone is asked (about his identity) he first says that he is a

> Muslim and then adds that he is, say, a Circassian or an Afghan . . .[18]

The French concept of *patrie* is, however, a secular idea, and one which claims the supreme loyalty of French men and women. In fact, contrary to secular ideas Namik Kemal always upheld Islamic standards of justice and believed that a good government is that which fulfils the *Sharī'ah*.[19] The reason for the confusion in understanding Namik Kemal's thought may lie in his appreciation of the role of the French parliament and constitution. But this appreciation was of the methodology of the French system and not of the ideas. To him, the idea of a Muslim's fundamental rights was not something that had to come from French thought. The Turkish historian Serif Mardin rightly points out that: 'He (Namik Kemal) believed that the Shari'a included all that could . . . be counted as a constitution, both the fundamental structure of the government and the fundamental rights of the subjects.'[20]

Bernard Lewis considers Namik Kemal's appreciation of French thought as an attempt to synthesize European and Islamic thought. This, according to the former, was a task which like the earlier Muslim attempt to marry Aristotelian philosophy and Qur'ānic theology, involved a reinterpretation of both.[21] This is an unjust claim by Lewis, because he fails to point out where Namik Kemal deviates from the basic teachings of the Qur'ān.

Namik Kemal was convinced that the members of the Ottoman parliament would be committed to Islam. For, he knew that the number of non-Muslim inhabitants in the Ottoman territories was very small. Therefore, he never distinguished between Ottoman and Islamic ideals and values. Bernard Lewis demonstrates his frustration here by saying:

> Namik Kemal, the apostle of liberal patriotism, adopts a milder tone (toward nationalism in Turkey), but he too, in his patriotic writings shows that he never really distinguished between what was Ottoman and what was Islamic.[22]

But here again, Bernard Lewis fails to note that there was no

place for race or language in Namik Kemal's concept of *vatan*: Islam was the only basis for his Ottoman nationality. In this sense then it would be a mistake to consider Namik Kemal as an apostle of modern Turkish nationalism.

In order to address the question of whether Namik Kemal can be considered such an apostle it is necessary to define the term 'liberal patriotism'. In his statement, Lewis does not define the term. If patriotism means one's emotional attachment to his supreme identity, then the question arises of what that identity is? For Namik Kemal it was his Ottoman-Islamic identity that was supreme, and he was not the first Muslim in history to identify himself as a Muslim as well as a native of a particular geographical territory. After all, it was not long before that Algerian Muslims fought against the French (1840s) under the leadership of Abdul Qādir, and that Indian Muslims fought a war of independence against the British (1857) on the basis of their local geographical and Muslim identities.

In this context it should be remembered that the constitution of Madinah which was discussed in the first chapter declared the city of Madinah a sacred place to its inhabitants. A Muslim fighting for the city of Madinah was fighting for Islam as well, because Muslim identity and Madinan identity were not in conflict; they were mutually supportive. When these identities were in conflict, such as with the Muslims in Makkah before *hijrah* (migration), the Muslims chose to abandon their Makkan identity in favour of their Muslim identity. As for Namik Kemal, he perceived no conflict between his Ottoman and Islamic identities; he never faced a dilemma between his identities. All through his life he struggled against Ottoman-Muslim mis-rule and European political and intellectual domination. This is also true for almost all his contemporaries. They considered themselves 'nothing but a member of a Muslim state'.[23] This is true not only for Ottoman Turkey, but for all Muslim territories under European domination.

By the beginning of the twentieth century under the impact of European secular thought, a clear shift had taken place from Ottoman-Islamic identity to Turkish nationalist identity. The place of the Young Ottomans was now taken over by a group of intellectuals who preferred to call themselves the Young Turks.[24]

The sociologist Ziya Gokalp (1874–1924) is the best known and most widely quoted intellectual among Young Turk thinkers. To Gokalp belongs the credit for reviving Turkish national pride, which Ataturk later utilized so successfully. Without the foundation that had been laid by Gokalp and his fellow Turkists, Ataturk's achievements would have been impossible or, at least, vastly more difficult. Most of his ideas were formulated during the quasi liberal rule of the Young Turks (1908–1918).[25] Himself a leader of the Young Turk movement, Gokalp expressed his identity as follows:

> Once we say that 'we belong to the Turkish nation', we will begin to show in our language, aesthetics, morals and law and even in theology and philosophy the originality and personality which befit Turkish culture, taste and consciousness. Once we say that 'we belong to the Islamic community', the holy Quran will become, for us, the most sacred book, the Prophet Muhammad the most sacred person, the ka'ba the most sacred shrine, and Islam the most sacred religion. And once we say that 'we belong to Western civilization', we will behave as real Europeans in science, philosophy, technology and other civilizing fields.[26]

Gokalp's statement reflects three different attitudes based on three different identities. Niyazi Berkes considers Gokalp's position a synthesis between two opposing identities within his Turkish identity.[27] A closer examination of Gokalp's position, however, suggests that such a view is simplistic. In the statement quoted above, Gokalp does not say which identity commands his supreme loyalty.

What happens when Turkish and Islamic identities are in conflict? Would it not be natural to think that these identities are never in conflict? How much Westernization could or should one accept? What would be the ultimate criterion by which to judge a situation where a conflict of identity arises? Gokalp's response to these basic questions is silence. The word 'philosophy' appears in connection with two of his identities, i.e. Turkish and Western. Does this mean that the philosophical basis of his Turkish identity would be supported by Western

philosophy? Will he give his supreme loyalty to national identity? If that is the case, then what would be the status of his Islamic identity? How does one resolve such basic conflicts? Gokalp does not provide us with an answer.

It appears that Gokalp's primary concern was to legitimize the Turkish identity which was not yet 'properly' recognized by the Turkish-speaking people. He accused Namik Kemal of ignoring his Turkish identity. He was correct in identifying the origin of the idea of Turkism in Central Asia; it developed in response to Russian colonialism and was later influenced by a pan-Islamic activist of the nineteenth century, Jamāluddīn al-Afghānī (1838–1897).[28] Gokalp, however, failed to recognize the European inspiration of Turkism.

The study of 'Turcology' as a science began in Western European universities in the eighteenth century. The main focus of this study was the determination of the pre-Islamic culture of the Turkish-speaking people. If Gokalp's position is considered a synthesis, then it would be more accurate to say that it is a synthesis of two ideas of Turkism. But Gokalp takes a middle position between the two ideas of Turkism rather than synthesizing them. He accepted the notion of Turkish identity held by European Turcologists, and he thought this was the result of scientific studies on the subject. Then he added the historical role of Islam in Turkish society to this idea of a Turkish identity. He did not see any contradiction between nationalism and Islam, because 'one is nationality and the other is internationality'.[29] But is the issue that simple? An examination of his attachment to both identities reveals a self-contradiction. He quotes the legacy of an ancient Turk in order to inspire modern Turks to take pride in the sacrifice and heroism of their past. He says:

> Mate, (the founder of the ancient Turkish Hun state), marched on the Taters declaring: 'The fatherland is not our property. Our ancestors who lie in their graves and all over still unborn descendants up to the Day of Judgement also have rights over this holy ground. No one has a right to yield any part of the fatherland, even if it be only an inch. Therefore, we shall fight. I am riding towards the enemy. Who fails to follow will be executed'.[30]

In Islamic history the idea of defending the homeland is common. For example, those who lived in Madinah under the leadership of the Prophet defended the city from outside attack. But that defence was identified with the defence of Islam as an ideology. Feelings for the homeland, as reflected in Gokalp's thought, are more congruent with pre-Islamic tribal identities than with the Islamic *ummah* identity. It should be noted in this context that in those battles which Muslims fought in Madinah under the leadership of the Prophet, many people fought against their own tribesmen for the sake of their ideological beliefs. Gokalp, however, was aware of the realities around him. He says about the Turkish sentiment:

> If we analyse the conscience of the Turk, we shall see that he agrees, for instance, to wed his daughter to an Arab, to an Albanian, to a Kurd, or to a Circassian, but not to a Finn or to a Hungarian. He will not wed her to a Buddhist Mongolian or a Shamanist Tunguz unless he embraces Islam. During the Tripolitanian and Balkan wars, those who shared the griefs of the Turks and gave freely of their moral support were not Hungarians, Mongols or Manchurians, but Muslims of China, of India, of Java, and of the Sudan, whose names we do not even know. It is because of this that the Turks regard themselves as one of the Muslim nations, although they belong to the Ural-Altai group from the linguistic point of view.[31]

Gokalp recognized that his nation *(vatan)* was a part of the greater Islamic *ummah* in history. He thought of the Turks, historically, as part of the Islamic *ummah*, and he took pride in the Turkish background of the Qur'ānic commentator Zamakhsharī, the philosopher Ibn Sīnā, and the mystic Jalāluddīn al-Rūmī. But he identified Turkish history in his condemnation of the same with Byzantine and Iranian civilizations and he further wanted to adopt the teachings of Western civilization.[32] However, Gokalp hardly gave any political status to the *ummah* identity of the modern Turk. He said: 'Several imperial states could be units of an *ummet (ummah)* but the nations or modern states cannot be the units of an *ummet*. The nation is not monopolistic, like an ethnic society or an *ummet*, for a nation

considers modern civilization as a whole and itself a unit of it'.[33] Thus he subscribed to the European secular world-view, perhaps without realizing it. We say this, in part, because of the poems he wrote for the common people in society; in these he glorified Islam. On 29 May, 1913, on the anniversary of the Ottoman victory over Constantinople, he wrote:

> In my hand a gun, faith in my heart
> My wishes are two, religion and homeland (*din ile vatan*) . . .
> Our path is ghāzī, its end is martyrdom,
> Our religion needs sincerity and service . . .
> Make Islam flourish, O God!
> Destroy its enemies, O God![34]

In another poem, he wrote:

> Do not deliver the Crescent to the Cross: Amen!
> Do not say the Turks are ruined: Amen!
> Lead back to Islam those who have left the path,
> Our comrade will be understanding,
> Our guide will be the Qur'an.[35]

It is inconceivable, however, that both the Qur'ān and a philosophy of secularism can guide a nation at the same time.

Gokalp wanted to maintain the Caliphate, not because he wanted to see Muslims united under the institution but because the Ottoman family was 'a blessed dynasty which has served and elevated the Turkish nation for six centuries'.[36] However, he would have preferred to restrict the Caliph to spiritual affairs only. Towards the end of his life, Gokalp himself witnessed that the institution could not function for long without temporal power, and that the nationalist Turks had rid themselves of the institution by abolishing it. Gokalp wanted to follow the jurisprudence of the school of Abū Ḥanīfah and the theology of the al-Māturīdī school to which, historically, the Turkish people had so far adhered.[37] He apparently wanted to see the religion of Islam in Turkish society subservient to that of national identity. In this Gokalp followed the theories of French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) on the role of religion

in Society.[38] Without going into detail concerning the problems such a theory presents, it should be pointed out that it did not work when the nationalist Turks tried to put it into practice. They eventually abandoned the teachings of those schools and declared Turkey a secular state.

Gokalp's ideal was to protect the homeland. According to him, this ideal was born out of national crisis:

> When a nation faces danger, individuals cannot save it. The nation itself becomes its own saviour. At these times, the individual is encouraged by the spell of a supra-mundane spirit, his will becomes silent; a general will become the only 'I' in every consciousness.[39]

Gokalp was aware of the fact that the Turks had not yet adopted his ideal notion of Turkey. Therefore he wanted all Turks to adopt a 'new life'. His new life had no pre-defined goal and no programme but did have a disciplined method.[40] Through investigations based on this disciplined method a nation could slowly attain its ideal. But this presents the most crucial dilemma in Gokalp's thought. Through his disciplined method he attained his ideal, namely protecting his homeland, but he did not know what to do with that piece of land once so protected.

Gokalp did not approve of the old life and values, and he wanted to adopt a 'moral and secular' value system for what he called the new Turkish civilization.[41] However, he did not explain the supposed 'immorality' of religion, i.e. of the Islamic value system, which had dominated traditional Ottoman society. It was precisely in this position of Gokalp's that W.C. Smith finds the most positive intellectual expression of secularism among modern Muslims.[42] Smith apparently does not find any contradiction in Gokalp's identification with Islam and the philosophy of Western civilization as reflected in the latter's thought.

Turkey was passing through years of turmoil under the Young Turks when Gokalp's writings were being published. These years were considered much more liberal than the previous years under 'Abdul Ḥamīd II (r. 1876–1908), particularly as far as freedom of expression was concerned. It is

difficult to ascertain how influential Gokalp's ideas were on Turkish society, but it appears that many intellectuals and Young Turk activists were persuaded by them.[43] As for the common people, these ideas were, as one historian calls them, an intellectualist utopia.[44]

The common Turks continued to subscribe to the traditional Ottoman-Islamic identity which involved the notion of the *ummah*. Therefore, when Mustafa Kemal (d. 1937), who was later named *Ataturk* or the father of the Turks, appeared as the victor in the War of Independence following the First World War, he also appeared as the champion of Islam and as the leader of the 'jihād armies of the *ummah* of Muhammad'.[45] Turkey faced a real identity crisis when it declared itself a secular republic, and it was at this time that some of Gokalp's ideas were put into practice. We shall resume our discussion on this identity crisis in the next chapter.

EGYPT

Political developments in Egypt differed from those in Turkey, but they too reflected a conflict of identity. Egypt differs from Turkey in three fundamental ways. Firstly, it has a sizeable non-Muslim minority; secondly, it is one of many Arabic-speaking nation-states; and thirdly, it has had a different historical experience.

Scholars generally trace the beginning of the Egyptian independence movement to the life and thought of Mustafa Kāmil (1874–1908).[46] Influenced by Jamāluddīn al-Afghānī's pan-Islamic ideas, Kamil was an activist thinker. In his short life, he became the leader and the symbol of aspiration of the Egyptian people. His life and thought makes an interesting case for the study of identity in Egypt. He mobilized the masses against British rule and shook its foundation, particularly after the Dinshawi event (13 June, 1906).[47]

Explaining the emergence of a nationalistic identity in Egypt, Nadav Safran, a Professor of political science at a leading University, quotes one of Kamil's speeches, saying that: 'No civilization will rise in Egypt and be of lasting worth unless it is built on the nation by the nation . . . unless everyone of its members realises that man has certain sacred rights . . .'

Following this quotation Safran remarks:

> Nowhere in the entire speech, or elsewhere, did Mustafa Kāmil elucidate those 'sacred rights' in detail nor did he explain and defend the sources from which they derived. One can only assume that he meant them in the Western liberal sense since he received a thoroughly Western education and moved in European circles.[48]

Therefore Safran believes that Mustafa Kāmil wanted to secure Egypt's freedom from foreign control (which was then under the control of Great Britain).

Safran is wrong and has made a gross misrepresentation of Kāmil's thought. It is not true that Mustafa Kāmil did not explain what he had meant by sacred rights. Not only in various other speeches and writings did he explain that by sacred rights he meant human rights and values upheld by Islamic teachings, but in this very speech from which Safran quotes, Kāmil clearly indicated the sources of his sacred rights. Let us first examine the internal evidence of the same passage that Safran quotes. In this passage when Kāmil stated that for a 'civilization (to) rise in Egypt . . . (it) will need to be built on the nation by the nation', he used the word *ummah* in the original Arabic, and not *watan* or *Sha'b* which he usually used to denote Egyptian nation or the Egyptian people.[49]

Now let us examine other parts of the speech from which Safran quotes. The following quotation has been taken from a speech delivered by Mustafa Kāmil on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Muhammad 'Alī's (r. 1804–1849) coming to power. In admiration of Muhammad 'Alī's contribution to Egypt Mustafa Kāmil said:

> The great man changed the situation in Egypt for glory and pride. He reconciled in his actions between the fundamentals of contemporary civilization and Islam, for he believed that Islam contains teachings concerning all aspects of life which is an ideal that man can ever dream of. We desire to follow its teachings and accept material benefits from Western civilization . . .[50]

This statement by Mustafa Kāmil clearly suggests his sources

of inspiration. Furthermore, this same statement appears within a few paragraphs of where Safran himself quotes Kāmil. It is difficult to understand, therefore, how Safran could have missed such commitment.

Most of Mustafa Kāmil's writings and speeches reflect his commitment to an Islamic identity in general and to the welfare of Egypt in particular. This emphasis on Egyptian affairs in Kāmil's writing has been viewed by some scholars as his nationalist orientation. Nadav Safran thinks that Mustafa Kāmil's whole effort was 'directed at fostering and glorifying the sentiment of nationalism', and was 'oriented toward the modern concept of the nation-state as the basic political-social entity'.[51] If this observation of Safran is correct then this will mean that Mustafa Kāmil held his Egyptian identity supreme and that his Muslim identity was secondary. But Safran is wrong: in many of his writings and speeches Kāmil expressed that he was a committed Muslim. He appreciated Muhammad 'Alī for his commitment to both Islam and the development of Egypt. It does not bother Kāmil that Muhammad 'Alī was not an Egyptian-born leader, nor did he even speak Arabic. In fact, Kāmil not only glorified this Ottoman governor of Egypt, he also strongly defended the idea of Muslim unity under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliph. He frequently wrote articles in French newspapers and responded to some of his readers' views on Islamic unity. Apparently, some of his readers did not approve of his Islamic orientation while at the same time expressed their sympathy for his struggle for Egypt's freedom and independence. He therefore asked his Western audience whether they believed that national rights were legitimate only when they destroyed religion. In fact, Kāmil suggested, the fanaticism of nationalism *(ta'aṣṣub)* can only be controlled by religious teachings. He, therefore, recommended that the education system in Egypt should be based on religious values.[52] He also counselled his Western audience that it was the teachings of Islam that had historically allowed non-Muslims to live cordially with Muslims under Muslim rule.[53] Kāmil never conceived of the rights of Egyptian people *(sha'b)* without Islam. His concern for the entire Muslim world was reflected in a newspaper which he published, the *Al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, and which covered events throughout the

whole Muslim world. It is for this service that Mustafa Kāmil was decorated with the title *Pasha* by the Ottoman Caliph. It should also be noted that he subscribed to the idea of an Ottoman Caliph while most of his contemporaries such as Abdurrahmān al-Kawākibī (1849–1903) wanted to install an Arab Caliph and an Ottoman Foreign Minister. Therefore it would not only be unfair but also an academic crime to suggest that:

> . . . he (Kāmil) did not seem to notice the contradiction between the concept of the *ummah* based on common religion, which underlies pan-Islamism, and the modern concept of nation – based on secular, political, geographical and other factors – which is at the root of nationalism.[54]

A question may be raised here as to why Mustafa Kāmil, at least for the sake of his Muslim identity, did not speak out against the French occupation of Algeria. On the contrary, he sought help from the French to free Egypt from British occupation. The answer to this question can best be sought in the political realities which surrounded Mustafa Kāmil, for, he was aware of English-French political rivalries and sought to take advantage of this situation.

Among Egyptian scholars, Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid was the first to be influenced decisively by European secular thought.[55] Lutfi al-Sayyid appeared in the Egyptian political and intellectual arena as Mustafa Kāmil's arch rival. He founded a political party called the Ummah Party *(Hizb al-Ummah)* as opposed to the Watani Party *(Hizb al-Watanī)* founded by Mustafa Kāmil. Al-Sayyid was the chief architect of modern secular Egyptian nationalism, and popularized his ideas through his journal *al-Jarīdah*. He wanted to accept European ideas with both their 'virtues and vices', but he also wanted to 'Egyptianize' those ideas in order to control their vices.[56] But, he did not know how to achieve his goal. He gave scarcely any role to religion in Egypt's educational system. He believed that the system needed a 'moral basis' which would apparently teach Egyptians how to control the vices and accept the virtues of European thought, but he never indicated any source for that 'moral basis'. The main principle upon which to base Egypt's educational policy, he

proposed, was a positivist philosophy.[57] Lutfi al-Sayyid's orientation toward a positivist and utilitarian philosophy indicated his mechanistic view of human nature. Does human nature always develop progressively with the passage of time? If so, why did Egypt suffer from decadence after having enjoyed high civilization in antiquity? Al-Sayyid's writings do not provide answers to such questions.

Ultimately, he could not explain Egyptian history on the basis of a positivist and utilitarian view of human nature. He himself criticized the Egyptians. To borrow Albert Hourani's paraphrase:

> We Egyptians . . . are hypocritical in our desire to praise and flatter those who are strong, and that is because we do not believe in ourselves as independent human beings. We are easy-going, we say 'never mind' – ma'liysh – to whatever happens; that is a sort of virtue, but one which is rooted in the weakness of the soul . . . we do not trust each other, we speak evil of others . . . we worship strength . . .[58]

Egyptian national identity enjoyed al-Sayyid's supreme loyalty. He believed that Egypt as a nation had been naturally created. He viewed neither religion nor language as necessary components of nation; geographical territory was his only valid criterion. But he had no idea as to how to determine that territory. He appreciated both Pharaonic and Islamic influences over Egypt, but did not seem to see any contradiction between them. For example, he did not explain how Moses and the Pharaoh could at the same time both be national heroes, even though Islam considers Moses a hero against the Pharaoh's tyrannical rule.

Lutfi al-Sayyid advocated self-rule for every nation. Interestingly enough, however, he opposed British rule in Egypt, not because the British were not Egyptians, but because their rule was autocratic. His opinion of the Egyptian ruler Muhammad 'Alī was even odder. He believed that 'Muhammad 'Alī was working not for himself but for Egypt', and that recognition of the hereditary rule of his family in Egypt (by the Ottomans) was also a 'virtual recognition' in 'Egypt's internal autonomy and

sovereignty'.[59] He found no evidence of any autocracy in Muhammad 'Alī's rule, even though 'Alī neither permitted an advisory institution such as a parliament, nor was he guided by any formal constitution. Al-Sayyid apparently appreciated Muhammad 'Alī's policy of opening Egypt's door to European science and technology. But the most irreconcilable dilemma in al-Sayyid's nationalist ideas was that he endorsed the hereditary rule of the House of Muhammad 'Alī, despite the fact that the latter was not an Egyptian. Does this mean that any foreigner who seizes control of a nation and initiates programmes for its material development would become eligible to establish hereditary rule over that nation? If such were the case, what then was wrong with British rule? Lutfi al-Sayyid's anti-British nationalist stand does not conform to these ideas.

In fact, the intellectual formulation of Egyptian nationalism has never been clarified. It is for this reason, in our opinion, that later scholars have had difficulty in identifying the father of Egyptian nationalism. There are four different views on the issue. Some scholars identify the contribution made by Mustafa Kāmil as the beginnings of the Egyptian nationalist movement.[60] Another scholar finds the beginning of Egyptian nationalism in the Afghānī-'Abduh inspired revolt of 1881.[61] Still another finds Saad Zaghloul, the leader of the Wafdist delegation to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, to be the originator of Egyptian nationalism,[62] while there are other strong arguments which suggest that Muhammad 'Alī was the founder of the modern Egyptian nation.[63]

Any discussion on nationalist developments in Egypt will be incomplete without some reference to the development of Arab nationalism. This is because some Egyptian leaders later became champions of Arab nationalism and Egyptian political developments were closely identified with the development of Arab nationalism.

With regard to the origins of Arab nationalism, one historian, Sylvia Haim, says '. . . indeed, it is in the arguments of the *salafiyyah* that we may trace the first intellectual burgeoning of Arab nationalism'.[64] Following this statement she explains the meaning of *salafiyyah* by saying: 'The word indicates . . . a return to the ways of the Prophet, his companions, and the Muslims of the early centuries, when Islam was in its pure state

and the Arab caliphate in the heyday of its glory.' Can we really consider the position of the *salafiyyah* as one of nationalism? Did the Prophet of Islam teach in a way which was similar to the teachings of nationalism? Sylvia Haim herself indicates in her work that she does not consider the movement of Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb (1703–1789) as one of the forerunners of Arab nationalism, even though 'Abdul Wahhāb promoted *Salafiyyah*.[65] But if returning to the original teaching of Islam is the criterion by which to judge the existence of Arab nationalism then there is no reason to exclude Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Wahhāb from the category of flag-bearers of Arab nationalism.

Haim identifies the position of Muhammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) as one of the earliest champions of Arab nationalism and defines the latter's identity as one of an Arab Muslim rather than a Muslim Arab.[66] Haim has correctly stated that Rashīd Riḍā promoted reforms based on the teachings of the Prophet of Islam and other early Muslims. Can this be considered a position of an Arab nationalist only because the Prophet of Islam and most of his Companions spoke the Arabic language as their native tongue? In order to answer this question one must examine Riḍā's views in general. Nowhere in Riḍā's writings can we find any influence of European nationalism; on the contrary, he glorified the first thirty year period under the rightly-guided *(Rāshidūn)* caliphs of Islamic history as an ideal. Had he considered all the Arab caliphs as an ideal, he could very well be considered a flag-bearer of Arab nationalism. However, he did not do so. His book on the political teachings and ideal of Islam, *Al-Khilāfah aw al-Imāmah al-'Uẓmā* reflects his total commitment to the universal ideas of Islam.[67] On the question of the conflict between Arab and Muslim identities Riḍā clearly stated that the ultimate criterion upon which he would make his choice would be his Muslim identity.[68]

Another important point to consider is Riḍā's opinion of the Ottoman Caliphate. He severely criticized the Ottoman government; firstly the despotic rule of 'Abdul Ḥamīd II and later the oligarchic and tyrannical rule of the Young Turks. This is what has perhaps been misunderstood by Haim as a sentiment of Arab nationalism. However, one must remember that Riḍā did not support the revolt of Sharif Hussain of Makkah against the

Ottoman government in 1916. Riḍā always respected his teacher Muhammad 'Abduh's (1849–1905) opinion that if the Arabs broke away from the Ottoman rule, the *ummah* of the Muslims would become weaker and, in that case, all Muslims would be subjugated by the enemies of Islam.[69]

Amongst secular formulators of Arab nationalism, Sati al-Husri (1880–1968) is the most celebrated.[70] Husri's main concern was to make the Arab identity the supreme identity of all Arabic-speaking peoples *('Arabiyyah Awwalan)*. He began his career as an Ottoman official in Istanbul at the beginning of this century. During the rule of the Young Turks he was engaged in a controversy with the theoretician of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gokalp, over the idea of Ottoman versus Turkish nationalism.[71] After the disintegration of Ottoman rule he migrated to Syria and spent the rest of his life working for the cause of Arab nationalism. He travelled and worked in different parts of the Arabic-speaking world. During his Istanbul days, he opposed Gokalp's ideas of Turkism and language as the foundation for nationalism, principally because they did not conform to his secular version of Ottoman nationalism. However, after his move to Syria his whole emphasis turned to the idea of an Arab nationalism based primarily on language. Gokalp, his former intellectual enemy, became his intellectual guide.[72] In his later days Husri advocated Arab nationalism exactly as Gokalp had advocated Turkish nationalism.

Sati al-Husri defined nationalism *(qawmiyyah)* as 'the love for the *ummah*', using the latter term in a non-religious sense. For him the *ummah* was 'a group of human beings bound by mutually recognized ties of language and history'.[73] He was aware of the existence of nation-states within the Arabic-speaking world and, therefore, recognized the existence of a particular identity *(watan)* within the nation. Al-Husri, however, pleaded for Arabism or Arab identity first. He professed the religion of Arabism, as he called it, for himself and for those who spoke the language. And he was seemingly ready to impose such an idea on those Arabs who did not uphold it. He said:

> When we find a man disowns, and takes no pride in the fact that he is an Arab, even though he is Arabic speaking and belongs to the Arab nation, we must discover the reasons

> for his attitude. It may be out of ignorance, in which case we should tell him the truth. It may be that he is deluded, in which case we should direct him to the true path. It may be that he is too selfish, in which case we must work to curtail his egoism. Whatever the reason, we must not say he is not an Arab as long as he does not wish to be an Arab but disowns and despises his Arabism. He is an Arab, whether he likes it or not, whether he accepts it or not at the present time. He may be ignorant, stupid, ungrateful, or treacherous, but he is an Arab all the same – an Arab who has lost his sensitivity, his emotions, and maybe even his conscience.[74]

Husri took his idea of a language-based culture from the German philosopher Herder (1744–1803), and the idea of imposing that culture on people from the Jacobin nationalists. Since the German philosopher Fichte (1762–1814) was influenced by both,[75] scholars have rightly suggested that Husri was influenced by Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*.[76] Thus, scholars have correctly pointed out that Husri's main inspiration came not from the Qur'ān, but from Fichte. It is a mistake to suggest that Husri's ideas were a 'synthesis of the German idea of nation and Ibn Khaldūn's philosophy of history'.[77] It is true that Husri admired the idea of *'aṣabiyyah* (a strong group feeling) as expounded by the medieval historian of Islam Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), and wanted to unite all Arabic-speaking people under one nation on the basis of this feeling. However, a basic difference between Ibn Khaldūn's *'aṣabiyyah* and Husri's Arab national feeling is that Ibn Khaldūn stated that *'aṣabiyyah* was a phenomenon which existed within a human being. Ibn Khaldūn never admired this phenomenon; in fact, he explained the word with noticeable unease. But Ibn Khaldūn did note that Islamic teachings play an important role in controlling the phenomenon of *'aṣabiyyah*. Husri, on the other hand, wanted to cultivate this feeling among the Arabic-speaking people in order to bring about a change in society. Husri hardly gave any role to Islamic ideas in cultivating *'aṣabiyyah* among the Arabs of the twentieth century. Moreover, Ibn Khaldūn's definition of an Arab is different from that of Husri's. According to Ibn Khaldūn, an

Arab is a bedouin, regardless of his racial, national and linguistic background.[78] But for Husri an Arab was a person who spoke the language 'whether he likes it or not'. Husri's American biographer, William Cleveland, rightly suggests that 'fluent in French and more familiar with European writers than with his own Islamic heritage, he (Husri) was intellectually a European'.[79] There is, therefore, hardly any similarity between the ideas of Ibn Khaldūn and al-Husri.

According to al-Husri, one major component of Arab nationalism is history, although its importance for him was secondary. By history, he did not mean historical works, but rather the history which lives through traditions in the minds of the people. Cleveland romanticizes this view as 'a mystical understanding of nation as a living force'.[80] However, neither Husri nor his biographer explain how works of written history differ from the living traditions among the people. For example, do these traditions make any distinction between the Arab of the desert (using Ibn Khaldūn's sense of the word) and the Arabic-speaking 'gentleman' of the city? Or, can those traditions be considered a foundation of common nationality for a Muslim and a Christian Arab?

There are several major problems in trying to define the Arab identity. For example, the question of the role of Christian Arabs in Arab nationalism has been a very confusing one. A nationalist Muslim Arab generally believes that Arabs are the best among all Muslim peoples,[81] and Christian Arabs have difficulty with the dominating roles played by Islamic ideas in Arabic language and history. For example, Qustantin Zuraic, a Christian theoretician of Arab nationalism, notes that both Muslim and Christian Arabs participated in the Arab wars against the Persians.[82] However, he fails to realize that this limited participation cannot be taken as a basis for nationalism because the status of the Christian participants was barely more than that of mercenaries.

Another problem with Arab nationalist thought is its tendency to identify Islamic history with Arab history. The major problem with this identification is that most contributors to Islamic civilization were not Arabs. The celebrated historian of Islamic civilization, Ibn Khaldūn, whose contribution is frequently quoted by Arab nationalist historians, admitted this

in the fourteenth century.[83] Yet another complexity is created by the religious tolerance, characteristic of some Islamic realms, which created populations of Jews and Christians working alongside Muslims at all social levels. This complexity has misled Arab nationalist theoreticians as well as some Western historians. For example, Bernard Lewis does not consider the Muslim civilization purely Muslim because 'many Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians were among its creators'.[84] But this is misleading for might we not equally ask whether it would be reasonable to call modern European civilization a Euro-Asian-American civilization given the contribution Japan and the Americas have made to its growth? Or, furthermore, would it be reasonable to call American and Japanese contributors to modern thought as creators of modern European civilization? Rather, it is more realistic to say that Europe has created a civilization in which Japan and the Americas have actively participated. Similarly, Muslims created a civilization in which others also participated.

Arabic-speaking Christian and Muslim historians have also disagreed about such basic points as the period of colonization of the Arab countries. For example, while the Christian Arab historian Hisham Sharabi considers the Ottoman rule of Arabic-speaking countries as a period of colonial rule,[85] the Muslim historian Abdul Latif Tibawi considers only the English and French rules of those countries as the colonial period.[86] Arab Christians, however, appear to give their supreme loyalty to the concept of Arab nationalism, while the concept of supreme loyalty is not so clear with Muslim nationalist Arabs. Usually, it is not clear which identity is given priority. Whatever may be the case, at the end of the Second World War, Arabic-speaking countries found themselves divided into a number of nation-states, each claiming sovereignty and the superiority of their own culture. Arab nationalism remained an emotional attachment to its theoreticians and their followers.

INDIA/PAKISTAN

The historical development of Pakistan as a nation-state differed from that of Egypt and Turkey. The *raison d'être* of the

Pakistani nation, according to Pakistani historians, involved preserving the identity of the Muslims of British India.[87] Prior to British rule in India, Muslims had migrated from the Middle East and Central Asia and many indigenous Indians accepted Islam; the community flourished and established a rule over India which lasted several centuries. Muslim leaders anticipated a threat to their Muslim identity within a post-colonial India and one which contained a Hindu majority. They argued, therefore, that the Muslims had constituted a separate nation throughout history[88] and that British India should be divided along religious lines. The modern intellectual formulation of Muslim separation in India was based on the distinct historical Muslim culture in the area. But, arguments were also advanced against the European concept of national identity based on race and language.[89] These arguments reflected the fact that Indian nationalists based their struggle for independence largely on a European concept of nationalism.

Muslims in British India began their struggle for the survival of their Muslim identity from the stand on the Urdu language,[90] and this led to arguments for both civil and political rights. They first acquired a constitutional identity in the form of a separate electorate, with Muslims voting for Muslim representatives; the separate electorate system lasted in India from 1909 to 1946. The Muslims finally achieved a separate nation-state in 1947.

The idea of a Muslim separation in India was first reflected in the activities of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898). He attempted to keep the idea of a separate Muslim identity alive in Hindu-majority India by establishing educational institutions for Muslims. But, the ideological foundation of an independent sovereign nation-state for Muslims came much later from poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1873–1938).[91] He was aware of political realities in India and suggested to divide India by creating a Muslim nation-state within it. He proposed the formation of a state constituting the Muslim majority areas of India. He argued:

> It is not the unity of language or country or the identity of economic interests that constitutes the basic principle of our nationality. It is because we all believe in a certain view

> of the universe . . . that we are members of the society founded by the prophet of Islam. Islam abhors all material limitations, and bases its nationality on purely abstract ideas objectified in a potentially expansive group of personalities. It is not dependent for its life principle on the character and genius of a particular people. In its essence, it is non-temporal, non spatial.[92]

Keeping in view the historical background of Muhammad Iqbal and his time, it may be suggested that his main concern was to establish the legitimacy of the demand for a separate nationhood for Indian Muslims *vis-à-vis* Indian nationalism. In so doing, however, Iqbal encountered a new problem, i.e. the problem of relations between this new nationality and other Islamic nationalities.[93] Iqbal resolved this problem by saying:

> For the present, every Muslim nation must sink into her deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity of free, independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. It seems to me that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.[94]

Did Iqbal follow Ziya Gokalp, the Turkish sociologist, while describing Islam as a League of Nations?[95] The answer to this question, in our opinion, is no: this is because Iqbal clearly defines the hierarchy of his Islamic and nationalistic identities. He would accommodate the national identity within Islam while Ziya Gokalp is unclear about the *ummah* identity of the Turkish people. Iqbal wanted to achieve unity of the Muslim *ummah* through the Pakistani nation, while Gokalp, on the other hand, is interested in preserving Turkish identity only for

material development of the Turkish-speaking people: he does not seem to envision any higher goal. Gokalp is also unclear about the status of the national and *ummah* identities.

However, following in the footsteps of Iqbal, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the founder of the Pakistani nation argued that although Hindus and Muslims lived together in the historical and geographical unit of India, they belonged to two separate nationalities. He said:

> They (the Hindus and the Muslims) are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature. They neither intermarry, or interdine together and, indeed they belong to two different civilizations. Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homelands, their territory and their state.[96]

This clearly suggests that the main concern for leaders of the Pakistan movement was to establish the legitimacy of the demand for a separate Muslim nation in India. Muhammad Ali Jinnah does not seem to have been concerned about relations between various Muslim nations within the *ummah*. Pakistani leaders confronted the problem of loyalty between the Pakistani national identity and the Muslim *ummah* identity after the creation of Pakistan (1947). This question will be discussed in the third chapter.

However, some sort of confusion about the status of Muslim identity *vis-à-vis* European ideas in the Indian sphere of Islam can be traced in some earlier works. These works originated in response to Christian missionary attacks on Islam. Some Muslim leaders in India realized that Christian missionary activities posed a threat to Muslim identity in India. Some, such as Sayyid Ahmad Khan, therefore, not only established educational institutions for the promotion of the education of the Muslim youth, but wrote extensively in defence of Islam against missionary assaults.

A stronger defence to this threat, nevertheless, came from

another Indian leader, Sayyid Amir Ali (1849–1928), who also stood for the rights of Muslims in India. It was the intellectual formulation of Ali's writings which became the backbone of Muslim identity in India.[97]

Amir Ali's first contribution to scholarship was *A Critical Examination of the Life and Teachings of Mohammad* (1873) which he later developed as his masterpiece *The Spirit of Islam* (1922). This and his other major work *A Short History of Saracens* (1891), were written in refutation of Christian missionary assaults on Islamic ideas and the person of the Prophet of Islam. The primary focus of Amir Ali's writings was to demonstrate the similarities between Islamic values and those of nineteenth-century liberal Europe and to establish the superiority of Islam over Christianity.

Ali was proud of the place of reason given in Islam. He argued that the Prophet of Islam never travelled out of the province of reason.[98] This was necessary for Ali because the nineteenth-century European liberal thought was based solely on scientific theories which were closely identified with the human faculty of reason. Therefore, the main thrust of Ali's argument was to demonstrate every aspect of Muslim belief in the light of those scientific discoveries. However, it was not possible to explain every aspect of Islamic faith in the light of late nineteenth-century scientific discoveries. For example, on the question of the existence of angels, Ali could not justify something which could not be seen or determined by physical science. Therefore, he interpreted this phenomenon allegorically. He said:

> Probably Mohammad, like Jesus and other teachers, believed in the existence of intermediate beings, celestial messengers from God to man. The modern disbelief in angels furnishes no reason for ridiculing the notion of our forefathers. Our belief, only is as much open to the name of superstition as their belief; . . . what we in modern times look upon as the principles of nature, they looked upon as angels . . .[99]

Can angels be equated with nature or superstition? The established Muslim view on the subject says not. Similarly, Ali

interpreted a number of other issues such as the concept of the Hereafter, the Prophet's journey to heaven *(mi'rāj)* allegorically. In interpreting Islamic concepts, he emphasized the contributions made by *Mu'tazili*[100] thinkers and philosophers to Islamic thought. He was proud of the improved status given to women in Islam; he boastfully declared that Muslim Turkey had appointed a woman as its education minister. He compared Islam and Christianity, as he wrote in response to Western criticism of Islam, and argued that if Islam was bad then Christianity (the religion of those who were critical of Islam) was worse.

Amir Ali's interpretation of Islamic teachings created a sense of self-reliance, pride and confidence among English-educated young Muslims in India. This was a developing stage for Indian Muslims. Most Western-educated Indian Muslims, like Amir Ali himself, came into contact with the English environment either on a personal or professional basis. Because of their pride in former Muslim political and economic dominance, they became victims of an inferiority complex. Although they admired Western civilization and values, psychologically they could neither abandon their patriarchal faith nor could they accept the Christian missionary propaganda against Islam. Sayyid Ahmad Khan's activities acquainted them with Western civilization and development, but could not provide them with a sense of pride. On the contrary, his apologetic works on Islam increased their sense of inferiority. While European-educated Indian Muslims were in this frame of mind, Amir Ali appeared armed not only with a defensive, but an offensive attitude. Ali's polemics along with his high official position in the British Indian government[101] provided this generation with a new confidence. This new confidence encouraged Indian Muslims to be liberal in the same way as the English, but at the same time to be proud of their Muslim identity. According to W.C. Smith, a Canadian Orientalist, Ali's works represent this whole trend of Indian Muslim society. Smith describes these young Muslims as:

> A young Muslim fashionably dressed, sits with his friends in the Lahore coffee house and talks, in English, of Marx or Lenin. He has perhaps never studied the Qur'an . . . yet

> intensely conscious about being a Muslim, he insists that he and his co-religionists in India are a nation, and he is, he says, ready to fight to establish for them a free country.[102]

This new generation of young Muslims was so confident about their 'modern' attitude, influenced by English liberalism, along with their Muslim identity, that if anyone asked them about the apparent contradiction between Islam and their liberal nationalistic spirit, they at once would answer, 'well, haven't you read *The Spirit of Islam* by Amir Ali?' However, the contradictions in Ali's interpretation were reflected in the views and behaviour of this new generation of Muslims.

But whatever behavioural and attitudinal contradictions this new generation of Muslims carried, they succeeded in achieving an independent nation-state, Pakistan, in 1947. They were optimistic about the future of this nation and this optimism was reflected in the statement of a Pakistani historian when he said:

> The battle was not fought only to win a status and territories. Valuable as these are for the preservation of the nation, it has been inquired by the idea that without a separate existence, its creative genius was likely to wither away. Given freedom and opportunity it can help in the enrichment of human thought, because every people has a unique experience out of which comes a contribution.[103]

The opportunity for experiments and applying the creative genius in independent Pakistan came soon and this will be examined in the next chapter.

The State of *Ummah* Identity During the Nationalist Struggle

During the struggle for independent Muslim nation-states the *ummah* identity, as a separate entity, also survived in the minds of many Muslims. Conferences were held to discuss the cause of decline and backwardness in the community. A number of these conferences were held during the annual pilgrimage in

Makkah and were attended by representatives from all over the world.[104] Since the idea of Muslim unity was still identified with the institution of the caliphate, discussions centred around the position and performances of the Ottoman government.

After the abolition of the caliphate, which symbolized Muslim unity, Muslim activities became more intensified. Two major conferences were held, both in 1926, one in Cairo (13–19 May) and the other in Makkah (7 June–5 July) to discuss the political situation of Muslims; both were attended by representatives from all over the world.[105] The Cairo conference was organized by some members of the famous Al-Azhar University, but ended without significant progress because of opposition both from within Egypt and from outside.

The Makkah conference was relatively more successful. It was organized by the rising leader of the Arabian peninsula 'Abdul Azīz Ibn Sa'ūd (d. 1953). However, the conference organizers met with opposition from the Turkish authorities on the issue of caliphate and the subject was, therefore, dropped from the agenda at the last moment. The conference concentrated rather on the status of Hijaz, which included the two holiest cities of Islam, and on the administration of the annual pilgrimage *(Ḥajj)*. This related issue of *ḥajj* and Hijaz was a very important one because Ibn Sa'ūd had recently freed the area from occupation by the Hashimite Sharif Hussain with the support of the British. Muslim leaders entrusted Ibn Sa'ūd with responsibility for the administration of the *ḥajj* as well as the Hijaz. In addition, a permanent institution was established called *Mu'tamar al-'Ālam al-Islāmī* or the Muslim World Congress, also under the leadership of Ibn Sa'ūd, and it was decided that this Congress would meet annually in Makkah at the time of *ḥajj*.

The *Mu'tamar* did not, however, meet annually. The second conference of the *Mu'tamar* was held in Jerusalem in 1931, under the leadership of the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amīn Al-Husaini (d. 1975), in response to the Mandate decision in Palestine concerning the so-called wailing wall (the western wall of the Aqṣā Mosque), and in response to Zionist designs in Palestine in general.[106] The mere covening of the conference on the basis of an *ummah* identity was a potential threat to the idea of secular nation-statehood and it therefore met with opposition

from a number of quarters. The Egyptian secularists called it an idea 'contrary to the modern evolution toward national states', while Turkey officially called it a valueless effort and identified it as an attempt to 'make use of religion in politics'. The British authorities of the mandate in Palestine admonished the organizers not to speak against any 'internal and external' affairs of any friendly power (meaning colonial administrations in various parts of the world). Among the religious leaders, the members of Al-Azhar opposed the organizer's idea of establishing an Islamic university in Jerusalem. The Muslim mayor of Jerusalem was opposed to the idea because of the participation of the Mufti with whom he had a history of personal enmity. Finally, the strongest opposition to the conference came from the Zionist press. But all these factors discouraged government representatives from attending the conference. Even Ibn Sa'ud, who was the first President of *Mu'tamar al-Âlam al-Islâmī* and was responsible for convening the Makkah conference, sent his delegate to the conference late.

Partly because of such opposition, invitations to the conference were sent out not only to appropriate governments but also to Muslim associations and non-governmental organizations in Muslim-populated countries. H.A.R. Gibb points out that:

> The perception by the organizers of the Congress (was) that these associations formed a new and important element in the structure of Muslim society, by which for the first time, the lay and middle classes were organised for the furtherance of Muslim objects. They therefore represented, much more fully and freely than the official delegations of Muslim governments, the genuine 'public opinion' of Muslim countries, and were able to influence opinion to a much greater degree.[107]

One major reason for inviting Muslim associations was that most Muslim countries were still under colonial administration of one form or another. However, the perception of the organizers, as Gibb calls it, reflected the growing gap in the understanding of Muslim affairs between official and non-official representatives.

In spite of all its problems, the conference progressed with only one or two difficulties. Defying the instructions of the British administration in Palestine, the conference protested against the 'Mandate System', French policies in North Africa, the anti-Islamic politics of the Soviet government in Central Asia, and Italian atrocities in Libya. The Egyptian Wafdist representative was expelled from Palestine by the British authorities because of his outspoken criticism of colonial powers in Muslim countries. The conference succeeded in creating an Executive Council of the *Mu'tamar* of 25 members, including three Egyptians, four Indians, four Northwest (i.e. West) Africans, one Persian, one Javanese, one Turk from Warsaw, one Bosnian, and ten Arabs from Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Arabia proper. One Persian official, Sayyid Ziauddin Tabatabai, was elected Secretary of the Central Bureau. The Congress also played an important part in bringing to an end the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1934,[108] but although it succeeded in implementing its originally-planned activities for a while, it failed to endure in the long run. It was originally planned that the Congress would convene every two years, but no such Congress was held after 1931. There was no significant activity toward Muslim unity until after the emergence of a number of Muslim majority nation-states. We shall return to this subject later to examine the status of an *ummah* identity as an independent entity from its role in forming national identities.

Muslim Nation-States and the Idea of Nationalism

As in Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, theoreticians of nationalism in Muslim countries have relied heavily on Islamic ideals. In contrast, European Enlightenment thought, of which the idea of nationalism is a by-product, developed against a background of medieval Europe engaged in bloody wars in the name of religion. Religion gradually lost the respect of Europeans and they diverted their supreme loyalty from religion to that of language and volk-based nations. Religious symbols provided nations with life-giving myths only and these became a part of the volk-culture.[109] Therefore, nation-states emerged in Europe on the basis of this volk-culture. Consequently international law

was formulated on the basis of the sovereignty of nation-states which claimed the supreme loyalty of their citizens.[110]

As for Muslim nation-states, even though they emerged from a different background, they gradually, after independence, became members of existing international systems and subscribed to the international law formulated around European experience. Many social scientists have, however, put forward theories and attempted to universalize this development of nationalism. Rupert Emerson quotes the Israeli activist and theorist Abba Eban, saying:

> . . . to apply elementary principle that those who enter Israel's gates shall be men and women, the central passion of whose lives shall be devotion to Israel's flag, loyalty to Israel's independence, zeal for Israel's welfare and security, and a readiness to defend her against all assaults from near and far.

With this quotation Emerson defines nation as:

> a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense; that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future.[111]

But Emerson's definition does not cover Arabs of the desert, even though his example of the Jewish people as a nation has generally been accepted. The European Enlightenment philosopher J.G. Herder (1744–1803) found a good example for his volk-society among the Jewish people. The theoretician of Arab nationalism Sati al-Hushri also thought that Judaism as a religion had succeeded only through a national language. It is historically true that the Jewish people succeeded in maintaining a feeling for group solidarity among themselves. This was possible principally for two reasons. Firstly, it confined its invitations to Israeli tribes and created a sense of a 'we' superiority, 'the chosen people' *vis-à-vis* the rest of mankind. Secondly, it succeeded in projecting a sense of 'they' through its concept of 'gentile', thus excluding others from 'the chosen people'. Neither Islam nor Christianity developed similar concepts of 'we' and 'they' and, therefore, Emerson's example

can hardly be generalized as a valid theory for all nations.

In Muslim countries, it is Islam which has generally formulated 'we' and the European colonialists formulated 'they' views. Muslim views for self-determination were formulated in the thoughts of Namik Kemal, Mustafa Kāmil, Rashīd Riḍā and other thinkers like them. They popularized the term *waṭan*, but none of them coined the term in their languages. The use of the term *waṭan* in Arabic has to be understood in the proper context of history. The term *waṭan* in Arabic language means 'the place of birth', and has been adopted in most Islamic languages such as Persian, Turkish and Urdu in the same sense. Its meaning changes depending upon the context within which it is used. For example, if a person travels from his village to a nearby town, he would identify his village as his *waṭan*. If he travels beyond his province or state, he would then identify his province or state as his *waṭan*, because people beyond his provincial or state territory would not perhaps know his village. Similarly if a person travels beyond the boundaries of his country, he would identify that country as his *waṭan*. When the above-mentioned intellectuals addressed their fellow citizens, communication had developed to an extent whereby people could easily travel beyond their continents. In this context, it is noteworthy that both Namik Kemal and Mustafa Kāmil did most of their writings while themselves living beyond their respective territories. It is in this context that one has to understand Namik Kemal's *vatan*, i.e. the Ottoman territory and Mustafa Kāmil's *waṭan*, i.e. Egypt. None of them gave supreme loyalty to their ideas of *waṭan*, which later developed as independent nation-states. In this sense it would be a mistake to equate Islamic *waṭan* with French *patrie*.

Many observers of Islamic history have noted the difference between the nationalist developments in Europe and those in Muslim countries. But generally they have been misled when theorizing about human social behaviour. Rupert Emerson recognizes Islamic ideas as the most stubbornly resistant to any nationalistic change in Muslim countries,[112] but he still thinks that, 'nations have come to be accepted as taking priority over claims coming from any other source'.[113] W.C. Smith recognizes that 'nationalism in Muslim countries is rather Muslim nationalism',[114] but he does not explain what he means by

Muslim nationalism. Does this mean that their first loyalty is to Islam and then to the nation-state? If so, can a Muslim still be a nationalist in the same way that the term is understood in Europe? Another scholar, Nadav Safran, talks about the development of Egypt as a political community and identifies Mustafa Kāmil as the forerunner of this idea. But he even resorts to un-academic methods to establish that Mustafa Kāmil was a European-type nationalist leader. Mustafa Kāmil never desired to see Egypt as a separate community from the Muslim *ummah*. And for the Muslim *ummah*, the *Sharī'ah* provided the law, Kāmil held.

The later generation of Muslim thinkers such as Ziya Gokalp, Lutfi al-Sayyid and Sati al-Husri, of course, appear to have attempted to define nationalism in the light of European secular philosophy. But none of these thinkers abandoned Islam as their identity, even though they did not clearly define Islam's relation with their national identities. Books on the subject generally lack consideration of the idea of supreme identity and its consequences on the Muslim society. Albert Habib Hourani's book on modern Arabic thought and Bernard Lewis' book on modern Turkey are perhaps the most quoted works on the subject, but they did not try to critically examine the contradictory nature of the thoughts of such secular intellectuals as Lutfi al-Sayyid, Sati al-Husri and Ziya Gokalp. They have also ignored the parallel development of the *ummah* identity alongside the nation-state identity. Muhammad Akif (d. 1935), the Turkish poet known for his commitment to Islam and the author of the Turkish national anthem, does not appear in Lewis' book. Furthermore, Lewis describes the responses against Mustafa Kemal's process of secularization as a conspiracy. Still another scholar, not a specialist on political developments in Muslim countries, but an expert on the politics of 'modernization', theorizes that 'sacred' may be employed 'to develop a system of political legitimacy and to aid in mobilizing the community for secular ends'.[115] However, the author does not realize that 'sacred' has its own demands and could challenge the secular when the two are in conflict.

It appears that the *ummah* identity consciousness generally did not receive any sympathy from these scholars. This is, perhaps, because these scholars themselves came from a secular

background and studied developments in Muslim society from a European secular and Comtian progressive world-view. We shall return to the problem of this world-view in the concluding chapter.

Notes and References

1. On the history of the development of nationalism, see Carlton J.H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1931) and Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955). Other works of these two famous students of nationalism convey the same message. On the question of loyalty, see Hayes, p. 77 and Kohn, p. 1. Also see K.W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983).

2. On the question of loyalty in European society in the Middles Ages, see Carlton J.H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York, 1933), p. 28.

3. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York: Harcourt, 1929) and *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), originally published in Germany, in 1926. For Kohn's background see the preface to his book *A History of Nationalism in the East*.

4. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East*, p. 19.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

6. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East*, p. 8.

7. See Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 158, and the corresponding note on p. 436.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

9. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication, An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

10. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and its Alternative* (New York: Alfred Knoff, 1969), p. 23.

11. See Niyazi Berkes, 'The Historical Background of Turkish Secularism', *Islam and the West*, ed. Richard N. Frye (S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1957), p. 57.

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13. On the Young Ottomans, see Serif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) and Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, pp. 137–54.

14. See Mardin, p. 21, Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, p. 179, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 141.

15. One of the sources of classical Islamic law.

16. See Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, p. 212.

17. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 334–5.

18. Namik Kemal, *Kulliyat-i-Namik Kemal*, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Mahmudi Pr. 1326 H., 1908). The present author is indebted to the late Professor Fazlur Rahman of the University of Chicago for letting him use his translation of Namik Kemal's work.

19. See Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 285–308.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 313.

21. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 142.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

23. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, p. 327.

24. On the Young Turks, see Ernest E. Ramsour, *The Young Turks, Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (New York: Russell, 1957).

25. On the intellectual activities of the Young Turks, see a contemporary account by Arnold Toynbee, *Turkey: A Past and a Future* (New York: George A. Doran, 1917), especially pp. 15–39.

26. Ziya Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, tr. and annotated by Robert Devereux (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), p. 52.

27. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, pp. 337–46.

28. Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, p. 6.

29. Ziya Gokalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp*, tr. and ed. Niyazi Berkes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 75.

30. Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, p. 103.

31. Gokalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, p. 75.

32. Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, pp. 22–33, and *Nationalism*, p. 249.

33. Gokalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, p. 133.

34. Quoted in Elton L. Daniel, 'Theology and Mysticism in the Writing of Ziya Gokalp', *The Muslim World*, 67 (July 1977), p. 181.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

36. Gokalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, p. 227.

37. Gokalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, p. 126.

38. On Durkheim's influence on Gokalp, see Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp* (London: Luzac, 1950).

39. Gokalp, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, p. 68.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

42. W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 109.

43. Toynbee, *Turkey: A Past and a Future*, pp. 20–39.

44. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism*, p. 412.

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46. On Mustafa Kāmil's life, see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought of the Liberal Age (1798–1939)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 199, and Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt (1804–1952)* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 85. No work on the life and works of Mustafa Kāmil is available in the English language. In Arabic, see Abdurrahman Ar-Rifa'i, *Mustafa Kāmil, Ba'th al-Ḥarakat al-Waṭaniyyah*, 3rd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍat al-Miṣriyah, 1950).

47. On 13 June, 1966 a number of British officials killed a woman while hunting pigeons in a village called Dinshawi. The villagers reacted angrily and attacked the officials. While running away from the village, one officer received heat stroke and later died. This caused the British authorities to take harsh action against the villagers. For a British version of the event, see P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 194–5. And for an Egyptian version, see Ar-Rifa'i, pp. 197–235.

48. Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, p. 86.

49. Safran quotes from Abdurrahman Ar-Rifa'i, *Mustafa Kāmil, Ba'th al-Ḥarakat al-Waṭaniyyah* (Cairo: 1939), p. 466. This particular edition was not available to the present author. We consulted the 3rd edition of the book (1950). This quotation has been taken from Kāmil's speech on the occasion of Muhammad 'Alī's 100th anniversary of taking power in Egypt. The speech was delivered in Alexandria, see p. 464.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

51. Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, pp. 85–90.

52. Abdurrahman Ar-Rifa'i, *Mustafa Kāmil, Ba'th al-Ḥarakat al-Waṭaniyyah*, pp. 138–40 and 492–3.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 422–3.

54. Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, p. 88.

55. On Lutfi al-Sayyid see Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 85–112, and Hourani, *Arabic Thought of the Liberal Age (1798–1952)*, pp. 170–82, and Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, pp. 90–7.

56. Jamal M. Ahmed, *The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism*, p. 97.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 95 and 102. He maintained that 'there is a natural goodness in man' and that 'the human soul has a sacred origin which can be conditioned by education'.

58. Hourani, *Arabic Thought of the Liberal Age (1798–1952)*, p. 175.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 178–9.

60. See *ibid.*, p. 199 and Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community*, p. 85.

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66. Haim, *Arab Nationalism*, p. 24.

67. On Riḍā's political ideas, see Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 69–83.

68. Rashīd Riḍā, 'Al-Mas'alah al-'Arabiyyah', *Al-Manār*, XX (1917–1919).

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70. On Sati al-Husri, see William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati al-Husri* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) and Bassam Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981).

71. On this controversy, see Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*, pp. 22–46.

72. On Gokalp's influence on Husri, see *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 40–2.

73. Quoted in Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*, pp. 92–3.

74. Sati al-Husri, 'The Historical Factor in the Formation of Nationalism', *Political and Social Thought*, ed. Kemal Karpat, p. 42.

75. On Herder, Fichte and Jacobin's ideas of nationalism, see Hayes, pp. 27–32, 43–9 and 263–6.

76. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*, pp. 88 ff. and Tibi, pp. 116, 138–44.

77. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, p. 116.

78. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah*, ed. and tr. F. Rosenthal, 3 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. I, p. 250.

79. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist*, p. 30.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

81. Ismail R. Faruqi, *On Arabism, Urubah and Religion* (Amsterdam: Djanbaba, 1962), p. 3.

82. Qustantin Zuraic, 'Arab Nationalism and Religion', *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, ed. Sylvia Haim, pp. 167–71.

83. Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddimah*, Vol. III, pp. 311–15.

84. Bernard Lewis, *The Arabs in History*, rev. ed. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 131.

85. Hisham Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. v.

86. Abdul Latif Tibawi, *Islamic Education: Its Tradition and Modernization to an Arab National System* (New York: Crane & Rinsaak, 1972), p. 87.

87. Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent (610–1947): A Brief Historical Survey*, (S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962). The whole book contains arguments pleading the case. See particularly pp. 234–54.

88. See Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan* (Karachi: University of Karachi Press, 1969), pp. 114–37. Many Hindus also believed that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations in India. For example, one leading Indian intellectual says:
'The so-called two-nation theory was formulated long before Mr. Jinnah or the Muslim League; in truth, it was not a theory at all; it was a fact of history.' See Nirad C. Chaudhuri, *An Autobiography of an Unknown Indian* (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 231.

89. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Mas'alah-i-Qawmiyat*, originally published in 1937. Reprinted (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1967). An English translation is available: *Nationalism in India* (Pathankot: Makabah-i-Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, 1947).

90. See Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *Muslim Community*, pp. 246–7.

91. For Iqbal's thought on nationalism, see Zafar Ishaq Ansari, 'Iqbal and Nationalism', *Iqbal Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (April 1960), pp. 51–89.

92. See S.A. Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal* (Lahore: Ashraf, 1964), p. 396.

93. On this question, see Sharif al-Mujahid, 'Muslim Nationalism', *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (July 1985), pp. 29–40.

94. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (Reprinted New Delhi: Kitab Bhaban, 1981), p. 159.

95. This has been suggested by Prof. Sharif al-Mujahid, see 'Muslim Nationalism', p. 37.

96. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 'Two Separate Nations in India: Jinnah's Elucidation, 1940', in Sharif al-Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: Studies in Interpretation* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981), pp. 492–3.

97. See Abdullah Ahsan, 'A Late Nineteenth Century Muslim Response to the Western Criticism of Islam: An Analysis of Amir Ali's Life and Works', *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Dec. 1985), pp. 179–206.

98. Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, reprinted from 1922 ed. (Karachi: Pak Publishing Ltd., 1969), p. 72.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

100. A group of scholars who interpreted Islamic faith in the light of Greek philosophy in the second and third centuries of Islam.

101. He was a high court judge and later a member of the Privy Council. He was also decorated with a knighthood.

102. W.C. Smith, *Modern Islam in India* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1946), p. 85.

103. I.H. Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, p. 16.

104. On the overall situation of the Muslim world see Sylvia Haim's concluding chapter in T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1966) and D.S. Margoliouth, 'The Latest Developments of the Caliphate Question', *The Muslim World*, 14 (1925), pp. 334–41.

105. See Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Survey of International Affairs* (1925), on the Cairo conference, pp. 81–91 and on the Makkah conference, pp. 308–19. Also see *Revue du monde Musulmane*, 64 (1926).

106. On this conference, see H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December, 1931', *A Survey of International Affairs* (1934), pp. 99–109 and Alfred Nielsen, 'The International Islamic Conference at Jerusalem', *The Muslim World*, 22 (1932), pp. 340–54.

107. H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in December, 1931', p. 101.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

109. On this issue, see Jacob L. Talmon, *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase* (New York: Praeger, 1961).

110. On this subject see United Nations General Assembly, *Preparatory Study Concerning a Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States* (New York: International Law Commission, UN General Assembly, 1948).

111. Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, p. 95.

112. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

114. W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, p. 85.

115. David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 268 and 292.

CHAPTER 3

Who Am I? The Identity Crisis of the Modern Muslim

Whatever shortcomings the literature on nationalism in Muslim countries might have, the idea of nationalism helped Muslims achieve independent nation-states on the pattern of European nation states. Several states emerged after the First World War, and following the Second World War most Muslim-populated territories became independent. With this development Muslims entered into a new phase in history; the confusion in Muslim nationalist thought which we encountered in the previous chapter was not transferred to the whole society. With the emergence of nation-states a Muslim found himself a member of his nation which claimed his supreme loyalty, but he had not yet abandoned the idea of the *ummah* claiming his supreme loyalty.

We begin our discussion in this chapter with the observations of two British historians of modern Islam, both writing in the 1960s. Erwin I.J. Rosenthal writes: 'We witness today a vulnerable Islam gradually giving way before a secular nationalism . . . the classical concept of Islam's religious and political unity is now threatened by the notion – arising from the effects of the French Revolution – of the separation of religion and politics.'[1] The observation of the second scholar, Bernard Lewis, is even more direct in pointing out the impact secularism had on modern Islam. Referring to the mission of the Prophet of Islam, Lewis says: 'Another such struggle is being fought in our

own time – not against Al-Lāt and Al-'Uzzā (pre-Islamic objects of worship) – but a new set of idols called states, races, and nations; this time it is the idols that seem to be victorious.'[2]

It appears from the books in which these observations were made that the authors noted only secular trends in Muslim nation-states. Only one decade later, in 1976, Bernard Lewis realized that the situation was not so simple. In an article on 'The Return of Islam' he noted how Islamic ideas have persistently resisted secular ideas in Muslim countries. Since then many people have written on 'militant Islam', 'resurgent Islam', 'Islamic revivalism' and subjects of this nature. Such discussions of recent developments in Muslim society generally reflect a state of crisis within the society.

It seems that the existence of both secular and Islamic ideas created an identity crisis – for theoretically, both the *ummah* and the nation-state demanded supreme loyalty from an individual. In order to understand this it will be necessary to study the policies of national governments in order to examine the nature of the identity they have attempted to promote. This study of identity will be the subject of our discussion in this chapter. Again, we will concentrate our discussion on developments in Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, but in this instance confine ourselves to educational and constitutional developments in these countries.

TURKEY

Turkey declared itself a sovereign and independent nation in 1923. We have noted earlier that nationalist leaders relied heavily on Islamic ideas in mobilizing the masses against foreign occupation. Noting the role religious ideas played in many wars of independence in Asia and Africa, one sociologist has said that 'in traditional societies religion is a mass phenomenon, politics is not; in transitional societies religion can serve as the means by which the masses become politicized'.[3] Following this theory one Turkish scholar says with regard to the role of Islam in Turkish society:

> In the case of countries under colonial rule with incipient nationalist movements, religion became a symbol of

> identity with the cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples which the colonial powers had attempted to destroy. Hence religion was used as an effective tool for social and political mobilization by nationalist leaders bent upon implanting a sense of pride in national culture and values.[4]

The author apparently suggests that religious ideas will assume a secondary role once the secular nationalist ideology has been established as the supreme identity of the people. It is difficult to judge whether or not that happened in Turkey because the Turks were never given a choice between Islam and nationalism as their supreme identity. In fact, as we shall note below, the Turkish constitution precluded Islamic ideals from playing any part in politics. From a study of events, however, it would appear that religious ideas will continue to influence a good number of people in Turkey, and that those who claim to have adopted secular ideas have not abandoned Islamic ideas altogether.

In the first meeting on the future constitution of the still unborn Republic of Turkey, Turkish nationalists declared on 20 January, 1921, that 'sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation' and that 'the system of administration rests on the principle that the nation essentially and effectively directs its own destinies.'[5] On the other hand, the two major congresses that were held to discuss the future of Turkey during its struggle for independence were completely dominated by religious ideas.[6] The Congress of Erzurum ended with a prayer by Mustafa Kemal himself for 'the safety of the Sultanate and the Khilafat'. It is however difficult to conceive how sovereignty could unconditionally belong to the nation while keeping the institution of *Khilāfah* alive. In Islamic jurisprudence, the institution of *Khilāfah* has historically been identified as the head of the Islamic *ummah*. But, as we have noted in Ziya Gokalp's thought, arguments for the concept of nation *(vatan)* were identified with the linguistic and ethnic background of the Turkish people. Turkey, however, could not continue for long with these contradictions.

Despite his prayer at the Erzurum Congress, Mustafa Kemal looked to secularize the constitution once his authority was

established in 1923. A fresh election was called shortly afterwards in order to make the task of secularization easier for the Grand National Assembly; opposition to secularization was strong in the existing assembly. However, says a Turkish nationalist historian, 'the elections were far from being decisive and all the supporters of Khilafatism in the previous Assembly including those who were elected on the People's Party slate (Kemal's own party) had been returned to office. Thus, the decisive battle would take place, not within the National Assembly, but within the People's Party.'[7] The reason for attempting to resolve the issue within the party was obvious; the party sought to avoid more opposition to the ideas of the Caliphate and other demands of *ummah* identity.

The Republic of Turkey gradually became a one-party state. Opposition to secularism was either tactfully avoided or suppressed by force.[8] In the beginning, Islam was declared to be the state religion; this constitutional provision was later removed. European dress was imposed upon the Turks, the script was romanized, and it was ordered that the call to prayer *(adhān)* be made in the Turkish language. The father of Turkish educational thought, Ismail Hakki Baltaciglu, even proposed changing the method of worship. He wanted to introduce music in prayer and worship and do away with physical prostration. Mustafa Kemal himself acted 'to forge a new national identity for the Turks', as a Turkish historian terms the process.[9] These measures involved hardly any participation from the common people. They were, in fact, imposed from the 'center' onto the 'periphery', to use Mardin's terms. In this sense, the process of secularization was indeed a sham.

The educational system was unified under the republican government, and the process of Westernization continued in the name of modernization.[10] For the first time in Islamic history, education became entirely government controlled.[11] The prime objective of the educational system was to transform the loyalty of the Turks from their *ummah* identity to the Turkish national identity. The American philosopher John Dewey was invited to make recommendations for a Turkish educational policy, and measures such as changes in dress and script were carefully implemented under official patronage. Special attention was given to Westernizing the younger generation. One scholar

defines the goals of the early republican educational policy as:

> . . . the training of the youth 'to feel the honour of being a son of the Turkish race', to respect the national flag, 'to protect the esteem of the glorious Turkish history', to appreciate 'the great Turks whose services have made the great Turkish nation', to be bound by the principles of the Turkish revolution, 'to preserve' as Ataturk put it, 'and defend the national independence of the Turkish Republic' and so on . . .[12]

Religious instruction was banned in the schools; and Arabic and Persian languages were prohibited in secondary schools. The new history books were written with an emphasis on ethnicity.[13]

The success of these educational policies is difficult to ascertain, but any observer of Turkish society would admit that from the 1930s onward Turkish educational institutions produced thousands of European-oriented Turks. Does this phenomenon demonstrate the success and wisdom of the educational policy? The new educational policies could reach only a small segment of the population because of the lack of educational institutions in rural areas.[14] As for the issue of meeting the material needs of the society, the policy was almost a failure. An official of the Social Planning Division calls the system 'unresponsive to economic needs, highly wasteful, and elitist'.[15] The policy does not seem to have been successful in changing the loyalty of the Turks, either. Attempts were certainly made to change this loyalty but, with the establishment of a multi-party system in Turkey, it became obvious that Islamic ideas still enjoyed the loyalty of many Turks.

In the late 1940s, the Republican People's Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal, decided to introduce a multi-party system in Turkey. The first election under the new system was scheduled for 1950. The party was apparently aware of the distance between itself and the ordinary Turkish citizen, a distance created through years of a one-party system. So a number of concessions to the demands of the *ummah* identity were announced just before the election. The Ministry of Education

reintroduced selective courses in religious instruction in primary schools. Courses for the training of prayer leaders *(Imam)* and preachers *(Hatip)* were also introduced. Private religious schools were allowed to operate, and a two-year course on religion at the *lycee* level was also made available. It was also declared that the ban imposed on visits to the tombs of religious teachers would be lifted, and that foreign currency would be made available for the pilgrimage to Makkah. Nonetheless, when the elections took place, the Kemalists lost by a wide margin.

The Democratic Party (DP), which won the election, also supported a number of the demands of the *ummah* identity. A Turkish sociologist quoted by Serif Mardin observed that 'the DP legitimized Islam and traditional rural values'.[16] This is misleading; in reality the DP did not have a programme based on Islamic ideas for the reformation of the society. The first step that the DP took toward fulfilling the demands of the *ummah* identity was to lift the ban on the call to prayer in Arabic.[17] However, it was not the lifting of the ban itself but the date of the declaration that brought popularity to the DP government: the date was a Friday in Ramaḍan (the holy month of fasting) and thus provided a symbol for the DP's commitment to Islam.[18] However, the President of the Republic during the DP period, Celal Bayer, expressed his support for the general principle of secularism, and a law was passed forbidding the use of 'religion to obtain political or personal influence or gain'.[19] In another apparent shift, just before the 1960 elections, the Democratic Party introduced new *Imam-Hatip* schools in order to train leaders of prayer and preachers for Turkish society and made an alliance with a Sufi order to gain the support of the religiously-oriented population, particularly in the rural areas.

The Turkish democratic process was, however, interrupted by the armed forces in 1960. One reason that the generals gave for their intervention was that the principles of Kemalism and secularism were at risk in Turkey.[20] A new constitution was proclaimed in 1961. Article 2 of the new constitution proclaims secularism to be the foundation of the state, and Article 19 declares that 'no individual can exploit religion with the aim of changing the social, economic, political, or legal structure of the

state so as to promote a religious principle, neither can he use religion to promote his personal or political interests'. The article, however, also guarantees Turkish citizens their religious rights. Article 163 regulates the prosecution of individuals or groups who are believed to endanger the secular principle of the constitution. Article 241 makes it an offence for religious leaders to disapprove publicly of secularizing laws. Article 242 provides penalties for the use of an official religious title in provoking or encouraging civil disobedience against the government.

Yet in spite of the ban the use of Islam for political purposes increased in the 1960s. After military intervention the DP was banned, but almost the same people who had belonged to the DP formed the Justice Party (JP). The fact that the leader of the Justice Party, Sulayman Demirel, was born in a village called Islamkoy (Village of Islam), and that his father had made a Pilgrimage to Makkah, were considered signs of the JP's love for Islam. Because of the constitutional ban on the politicization of Islamic ideas, such superficial symbols were used for propaganda in the 1965 elections.[21] In this context, G.H. Jansen rightly suggests that 'the present state of Turkish Islam is worse than that before Ataturk, for now it is being deliberately used by cynics and fanatics to achieve political power'.[22]

The National Order Party (NOP) appeared on the Turkish political scene in 1971 proposing to 'revive the moral qualities and spiritual excellence dormant in the Turkish character so that Turkish society can regain peace, order and social justice'.[23] The party condemned European ideas such as capitalism and socialism; it declared that its goal would be to modernize the country through both 'spiritual and technical' development programmes. The NOP did not mention words like Islam and religion, perhaps because of the constitutional ban on religious ideas in politics, but it was nevertheless not allowed to enter the election scheduled in 1973. Its support for the revival of the 'moral and spiritual qualities of the Turkish people' led the Constitutional Court, following a second military *coup*, to outlaw the party in 1972. According to the Court, the party violated the 'Political Parties Regulation' forbidding the use of religion for political purposes.[24]

NOP activists, however, found another way of participating

in the political process of Turkey: they formed the National Salvation Party (NSP) which took part in the election of 1973. The party met with some success, winning 48 out of 450 seats in the Assembly and receiving 11.8 per cent of the popular vote. In the next election, in 1977, the party won only 24 seats and received 8.6 per cent of the popular vote.[25] Although it has been suggested that the NSP 'stands for a re-Islamization of Turkish life',[26] it is difficult to verify such a notion because of the constitutional ban on the use of religious ideas for changing society. It is, however, clear from the activities of the NSP leaders, who participated in the coalition governments following both the 1973 and 1977 elections, that in foreign policy they stood for closer relations with Muslim countries, not because they wanted Turkey to assert its Muslim identity but because, they argued, such a stand would help the recovery of the Turkish economy.[27]

Another Turkish group that most clearly stands for Islamic ideas is a Sufi group founded by Bediuzzaman Said Nurci (1873–1960).[28] The Nurci group (with an estimated following of 200,000 to 300,000) does not claim to be a political party, but it has occasionally aligned itself with different political parties at election time. It aligned itself with the Democratic Party just before the 1960 elections and became the victim of military persecution. In the 1973 elections, it again emerged and aligned itself with the National Salvation Party. In 1977 it aligned itself again with the Justice Party.[29] The group still exists in Turkey, favouring a programme of social change; but it does not seem to be active in politics.

Whatever may be the results of these elections, it is clear that Islamic ideas are still alive in Turkey. 'In Turkey', says nationalist historian Nur Yalman, 'whenever Mustafa Kemal made efforts to establish a "loyal" opposition, it was the problem posed by Islam which kept returning to haunt the reformers'.[30] This was so, he explains, because 'the masses continue to attach themselves with symbols and rituals of Islam'.[31] Another historian observes that:

> Islam as sentiment and identity has been accepted by the political establishment as a manifestation of popular will. Not even the ruling military junta, who profess that one of

> their tasks is to restore Kemalism, intend to return to militant secularism of old. They too recognize the importance of Islamic identity to a people ninety eight percent Muslim, and the futility of trying to impose alien values on a sullen but determined population.[32]

The assertion of this identity created problems for the national government. Yalman remarks:

> It is in the field of constitutional law that the major problems have arisen. Where is the foundation of legitimacy in a Muslim state? The Quran? Or the people? Who is the sovereign? The people or God? And who is to interpret this sovereign? Legislative assemblies somehow elected? Or the Ulema who have traditionally interpreted the body of Islamic teachings?[33]

These questions, however, hardly apply to Turkey because its constitution banned political ideas based on religion and the *'ulamā'* were prohibited from playing any role in politics.

Turkey is still passing through a crisis of identity. In 1980, the armed forces intervened in politics for the third time since the multi-party system had been introduced. It has been suggested that the military has a 'vested interest in the preservation of secularism'.[34] Another election was conducted in 1983 under the strict guidance of military rule; leading political parties and leaders were prohibited from participation. The new Motherland Party won the election. It has been reported that most leaders of the Motherland Party were already active in politics under the National Salvation Party platform.[35] While it is difficult to ascertain the orientation of the Motherland Party, it is clear that under its leadership Turkey is interested in developing a closer relationship with Muslim countries.[36] On the other hand, there are reports that many Muslims are being persecuted because of their commitment to Islamic ideas.[37]

In Turkey, a modern national identity has emerged under the patronage of nationalist governments. But the status of Islam has remained unclear in Turkish national identity. While the military remained committed to secular Kemalist ideas, the common people appear to have remained more committed to

Islamic ideas. Thus Turkish society is currently passing through an identity crisis. This identity crisis was further highlighted with Turkish efforts to join other Muslim countries in founding the Organization of the Islamic Conference. We will discuss this phase of Turkish identity crisis in the next chapter.

EGYPT

Egypt declared itself an independent and sovereign nation when it promulgated its first constitution in 1923. However, its sovereignty continued to be limited by the British presence in Egypt for several more decades. Moreover, there remained some contradictions in the 1923 constitution. Article 1 of the constitution declared that 'Egypt is a free, independent and sovereign state'. One author points out that Egypt thereby replaced the traditional concept of *ummah* with the European concept of nation-state.[38] The constitution also declared that 'all power emanates from the nation' (Article 23). At the same time, the constitution declared that the 'king is the supreme chief of state and his person is inviolable' (Article 33). The King was also granted the right to select and appoint the prime minister, to dissolve parliament, and to postpone parliamentary sessions (Articles 38–49). The question arises as to how the King could be the supreme chief of a state and have these powers if all powers emanated from the nation? In our view, if power emanates from the nation, this would mean that the representative of the people would make policies for the nation. This has not been the case in Egypt. In reality, as we shall note below, when the constitution was put into practice, both the King and the British executed their supreme authority when they felt that their authority was threatened by parliament.

After the formal declaration of independence, Britain intensified its hold over Egypt by continuing to control vital departments of the government through its advisers. When elections were held in January 1924, the Wafd Party secured 90 per cent of the parliamentary seats, but Saad Zaghloul, the leader of the Wafd, had to resign as Prime Minister after only nine months in office because of a disagreement with the British. This was followed by decrees by the King first to postpone, then to dissolve the elected parliament. New elections

took place in 1926, and the Wafd Party was returned to power with a strong majority. However, the leader of the Party, Saad Zaghloul, was blocked by the British from becoming prime minister. Similar crises over constitutional issues continued in Egypt until the military take-over in 1952. Although the constitution affirmed that 'all power emanates from the nation', the British retained the power to veto the nomination for prime minister. Occasionally, British troops surrounded the palace to impose British demands on the King. Even when an issue did not concern the British, the King and the majority party were often opposed to each other in exerting influence on the decision-making process.[39]

Britain could exert pressure on Egyptian affairs because it continued to maintain armed forces in Egypt to protect its 'interests'. Because of the lack of clarity in the constitution concerning the authority of King and parliament, Egypt experienced instability during this monarchic period. Elections took place on 10 occasions in the 27 years from independence to military *coup* in 1952. During this period, Egypt had 32 cabinets. After the Second World War, Egyptian leaders attempted to reduce the British influence in Egypt by appealing to the UN and the United States. Ultimately, Egyptian leaders succeeded in confining the British forces to the Suez Canal zone. However, because of the economic and political importance of the Canal in Egyptian life, Britain continued to play a significant role in internal affairs.

Intellectual efforts, seeking to change the loyalty of Egyptians from their traditional Muslim identity to a secular national identity, continued. Lutfi al-Sayyid's mission was now taken up by Taha Husayn (1889–1973).[40] Like his predecessor, Husayn also advocated a nation-state identity as the supreme identity for Egyptians. Egypt's identification with the East had caused its backwardness, he argued. Therefore, Egyptians should study history in order to understand how Egypt had always been part of the 'Mediterranean civilization' which gave birth to European civilization.

Taha Husayn argued that in the past Egypt had culturally been a part of Europe and the Mediterranean culture. The Egyptian mentality, according to him, was originally shaped by Greek philosophy and art, and by Roman laws and political

organizations.[41] Later, Islam changed the language of Egypt but not its original mentality. Therefore, the hope of an Egyptian revival lay in returning to this original mentality. A return to that mentality would lead Egypt in the same direction that contemporary Europe had moved. This return to the Egyptian past would mean that Egyptians would offer their loyalty to the Egyptian nation; he believed that for a European, the principal source of an individual's loyalty and sacrifice rested with the nation. It is worth noting, however, that Husayn did not blame Islam for causing the loss of the original Egyptian mentality. In articulating the idea of the nation, Husayn encountered problems similar to those of his predecessor Lutfi al-Sayyid.

Like many nationalist thinkers, Taha Husayn was also interested in education, and this is the subject of his book *Mustaqbil al-thaqāfah fī Miṣr*. He was involved with educational institutions throughout his life and became Minister of Education for a short period (1950–1952). Before discussing Husayn's contribution to Egyptian education, it is necessary to outline the Egyptian education system. Egypt has traditionally been known for its educational institutions, particularly al-Azhar, which has served as a centre for Muslim education for more than 1000 years. Following the French invasion of Egypt (1798), Muhammad 'Alī introduced a new educational system and established a new Department of Education within the government. The primary aims of his policy were to create an army on the European model, and to provide bureaucrats for the administration of his government. These goals did not pose any significant threat to Egyptian Muslim identity. Rather, the first real threat grew out of Ottoman capitulations for extra territorial concessions,[42] and appeared during the period of direct British rule, which began in 1882. Private schools were established throughout Egypt, administered by the French, Italians, Americans, Greeks and English. Egyptian students in these schools were influenced by European culture. As one author puts it, Egypt culturally became 'a colony of everyone'.[43] Traditional institutions like al-Azhar, on the other hand, did not change significantly under British rule. This situation created a dichotomy in Egyptian society between traditional Egyptian learning and European-oriented, modern learning. While European-oriented institutions supplied manpower for the

governmental bureaucracy, the traditional institutions produced only teachers of Arabic and Islamic studies.

After independence in 1923, Egypt attempted to formulate a uniform official educational policy. New universities and vocational institutions were opened, and the Ministry of Education took over most of the foreign-controlled institutions. Education was made available to a large number of Egyptians, and modern science courses were introduced in all institutions, including the traditional al-Azhar. One academician comments about the success of the new educational system:

> The secondary and university student learned surprisingly little in school about the political, social and economic problems of his own country. Even the B.A. candidate in political economy at the University of Cairo found his schedule crammed with such subjects as an Arabic adaptation of French constitutional law. The major in Arabic literature, concentrating on the ancient and medieval classics of the language, was no closer to reality. Efforts have been made at both the secondary and university levels . . . to rectify this situation. University economics and sociology programmes, for example, both include a number of courses on Arab and Egyptian problems. A compulsory course entitled 'Egyptian society' (later renamed 'Arab society') was introduced in the final year of secondary school, and subsequently required for freshmen throughout the universities, higher technical schools, and the military academy. However, examination of the contents of this course reveals little serious discussion of social and political problems, but a great deal of propaganda and historical mythology. When asked why historical chapters almost entirely ignored four centuries of Ottoman rule in the Arab East, the co-author of one of the texts disarmingly explained that the Ottoman age was a dark period in Arab history and that he and his colleagues had decided to treat only the brighter periods.[44]

This observation reflects one phase of Egyptian society. In its constitution, the country claimed to be an independent and sovereign state. But when it came to academic studies, the

constitutional law of another country had been taught. In the constitution, the country proclaimed itself Muslim by declaring Islam the national religion, but in the sociology course the programme does not define how Islamic ideas relate to secular subjects like sociology and anthropology. If only 'brighter periods' of history are taught to the country's future generation, then how can a student appreciate the reality of 'dark periods' in human history?

Thus the Egyptian educational system never defined its 'national goal', nor did it define what was the supreme identity of its citizens. It wanted its citizens to be Egyptians first, particularly after the incorporation of the Education Minister Taha Husayn's thought into the curriculum, both before and after the revolution. But it never abandoned the Muslim identity which also demanded the supreme loyalty of the Egyptian Muslim. This confusion worsened after the military take-over of the Egyptian administration.

The military take-over in 1952 led to the abolition of the monarchy; after the Suez War (1956) Egypt managed to get rid of direct British interference in Egyptian affairs. A courageous stand against the British made the military officers, particularly their leader Gamal Abdul-Nasir (known as Nasser), popular heroes not only in Egypt but throughout the Arabic-speaking lands.

As far as collective identities are concerned, Abdul-Nasir identified three as relevant to Egypt; but all three were beyond the immediate Egyptian identity. The first involved the Arabic-speaking countries, with language serving as the basis of unity. The geographical unity of the African continent was the second identity, and the basis of the third was faith in Islam.[45] He apparently did not conceive of any division or conflict between these groups or within the areas, i.e. Arabic, African and Islamic. In reality, Abdul-Nasir witnessed success within the first sphere for only a short period of time. This success was achieved not because of the strength of the concept, but rather because of the courageous stand he took in 1956 against the British role in Egypt, a position that he took on the basis of his Arab and Egyptian identities. However, within two decades, Egypt's interests, as conceived by its leaders, were threatened, and Egypt abandoned this first sphere of Abdul-

Nasir's collective identity. His immediate successor, Anwar al-Sadat, began his own 'search for identity'.[46] Sadat's primary commitment was in defining Egyptian, rather than Arab, Islamic or African identities.

However, after coming to power in 1952, the army abolished the 1923 constitution, and a new one was adopted. Further changes took place when Syria joined Egypt for a short period to form the United Arab Republic (1958–1961). This name was retained even after Syria broke away from the UAR. The new constitution stated that the people *(sha'b)* of the United Arab Republic were a part of the Arab nation *(Ummah al-'Arabiyyah)*, and that the religion of the state was to be Islam (Article 1). Constitutional amendments in 1971 went even further in defining Egypt's commitment to Islamic ideals. In fact, one of them (Article 2) states that the Islamic *Sharī'ah* is the main source of legislation. In reality, however, both the regimes of Abdul-Nasir and Anwar al-Sadat were far from implementing Islamic ideals. It is for this reason that the government of Egypt has faced and still faces increasing opposition from Islamic activists. The constitutional provisions do, nevertheless, reflect the general commitment of the society to Islamic ideals. One author rightly suggests that Islam has been used by Egyptian leaders only to legitimize their rule: 'On the whole, both Nasir and Sadat have exploited Islam effectively . . . Nasir's Islamic appeal . . . was far more than cosmetic, and Sadat has sought to appropriate the revival of orthodox piety to his own political purposes.'[47]

While governmental leaders were using Islam to their own advantage, there was at least one group in Egypt which stood for the supremacy of the *ummah* identity. This group, the Muslim Brothers, succeeded to an extent in fusing many aspects of the secular and religious educational systems in Egypt.[48] Its founder, Hasan al-Banna, described Islam as creed and worship, fatherland and nationality, law and culture, tolerance and strength – an all-encompassing way of life. He believed that all Muslims constituted one single brotherhood, and that geographical boundaries and blood differences did not pressure barriers in this brotherhood.[49] He said:

> Islamic brotherhood makes every Muslim believe that

> every piece of earth where there lives a brother who follows the faith of the Holy Qur'an is a part of the common Islamic fatherland. (It is a part of that common Islamic fatherland) about which Islam enjoins upon its children to work for its protection and well-being. Therefore, the horizons of the Islamic fatherland transcend the boundaries of geographical and blood nationalisms *(Waṭaniyyat)* to create a nationalism of high principles and pure and right beliefs and the truths which God has made a source of light and guidance for the world at large.[50]

Hasan al-Banna does not seem to have suggested the complete integration of all Islamic lands into one Islamic state. Rather he wanted Muslim nations to form some kind of organization *(Ḥayāt al-Umam al-Islāmiyyah)* to deal with the problems of the Islamic *ummah*; an idea that was earlier presented by the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal. Al-Banna clearly places his supreme loyalty in the Islamic *ummah*.

On the governmental level, however, the idea of supreme identity remained more confusing in Egypt than in Turkey. This is because a third idea, the concept of Arab nationalism, not only challenged an Egyptian national identity but also the Muslim identity of Egyptians. The idea of supreme loyalty was never clearly spelled out by Egyptian intellectuals, nor was such an idea reflected in the Egyptian educational policy.

PAKISTAN

Following the contributions made by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Justice Sayyid Amir Ali and the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal, the leader of the Pakistan Movement, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), argued during pre-independence days that Muslims in India constituted a separate nation (the two-nation theory), that they had their own culture, heritage, and law, and that they wanted to practise those in their own homeland. But the Pakistani leader's stand on the subject seems to have changed after the creation of Pakistan. This led to a controversy over the nature, secular or Islamic, of the constitution in independent Pakistan. In the 1947 debates of the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah said:

> . . . (every Pakistani is) a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make . . . we are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state . . . I think we should keep that in front as our ideal, and you will find that in the course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.[51]

This statement of the Pakistani leader does not conform to the stand that he took prior to the creation of Pakistan; then he argued that 'the Muslims demand Pakistan, where they could rule according to their own code of life and according to their own cultural growth, traditions and Islamic laws . . . Our religion, our culture and our Islamic ideals are our driving force to achieve our independence.'[52] This wavering stand from the Pakistani leader is partially responsible for an identity crisis in Pakistan.

A Pakistani historian of constitutional development describes the situation following the creation of Pakistan as follows: 'The phrase "Islamic State" had been on the lips of almost all the intelligentsia of Pakistan, and had produced an immense volume of talk and enthusiasm; yet the term had not been precisely defined . . .'[53] By intelligentsia, the author means, in fact, Pakistanis educated along liberal European educational lines, i.e. according to a curriculum with no training in Islamic subjects. The intelligentsia, therefore, could hardly contribute to the formulation of an understanding of the Islamic state or political theories beyond 'lip service', as noted by the historian. We shall return to the educational policy later; at this point we shall concentrate on a discussion of political developments.

Debate on the framework of the constitution continued both inside and outside the Constituent Assembly, which met from 1947 to 1956. Islamic clauses were incorporated into the proposed constitution, but the constitution 'did not give any special privilege or exclusive power to the Ulema', because it was believed that 'such a clause might prove to be an excellent

tool in the hands of reactionary ulemas'.[54] By *'ulema'* the author means a Pakistani educated in accordance with the traditional Muslim educational system. The conflict between two groups of intellectuals characterized the constitutional development of Pakistan. The President of Pakistan, Iskandar Ali Khan Mirza, warned the *'ulamā'* to 'keep religion out of politics'.[55] G.W. Choudhury, an apparent participant in the constitution-making process of Pakistan, describes the situation as follows: 'The Pakistani intelligentsia are elaborating a new twentieth-century and authoritative interpretation of Islam, and when they wish to see Pakistan become Islamic, their picture of an Islamic State is altogether different from that of the *ulema*, and it is not greatly dissimilar from that of a modern democratic state.'[56] In this context, E.I.J. Rosenthal rightly asks:

> What is Islam? If Islam were but a religion, the Hindus and Christians of Pakistan would simply be religious minorities. But if Islam is not only a religious or political unity, but an ideology, a religious or a political ideology or both in one, the position of a religious minority must be different . . . How can a Hindu accept an Islamic ideology? If he cannot subscribe to it what will be his position as a citizen?[57]

Some Pakistani scholars, however, were well aware of such allegations against Islamic ideology and refuted them categorically.[58] In reality, it seems that European-oriented scholars left almost no room for the *'ulamā'* to take part in the nation-building and constitution-making process in Pakistan.

Another Pakistani historian, Aziz Ahmad, describes the situation as 'confused because the Western intelligentsia is as ignorant of Islamic religion and history as the *ulama* and the conservatives are of the stresses and challenges of the modern highly technological civilization.'[59] This mutual incomprehension view generally holds true because of the dual educational systems that Pakistani *'Ulamā'* and European-oriented intelligentsia were trained in. Abul A'la Mawdudi, a leader of the Islamic constitution movement in Pakistan, said:

> We have been ceaselessly fighting for the recognition of the fact that we are a separate nation by virtue of our

> adherence to Islam . . . If, now, after all these precious sacrifices, we fail to achieve that real and ultimate objective of making Islam a practical, social, political and constitutional reality . . . our entire struggle and all our sacrifices become futile and meaningless.[60]

Mawdudi also explained the nature of an Islamic state in modern times and explained the rights of non-Muslims in Pakistan. He also held that world peace could be achieved only by adhering to Islamic ideology. After explaining ideology, he said:

> Men can establish brotherly relations with each other only when they know that they have all been created by one God, that they are all answerable to Him, that He alike [sic] is the Creator and Sustainer of all, that all human beings have been created out of the same flesh and blood, that no one is better than others because of his parentage . . . Anyone who is righteous and just is worthy of respect irrespective of whether he was born in the East or West.[61]

However, Mawdudi's opinions on these issues carried little importance in the sight of the real policy-makers of the country.

It may be recalled that a similar dichotomy existed both in Egypt and Turkey between the European-oriented personality and the traditional Muslim personality. In Pakistan's case, this dichotomy was even clearer.

Like their co-religionists in Egypt and Turkey, Indian Muslims could lay claim to a rich cultural tradition based on Islamic learning.[62] However, with the establishment of British rule, this traditional system of education, as well as the role of Muslim religious teachers, was decisively challenged. The British administration allowed the traditional educational system to continue, but the products of this system would not find jobs outside the mosque. On the other hand, the British introduced their own educational system in India to serve their own interests.

The formulator of the British educational system in India, Lord Macaulay (1800–1859) stated that the aim of the

educational system was 'to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern – a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in task, in opinions, in morals and in intellect'.[63] The concept of nationalism emerged in India as a by-product of this system. After all, nationalism was part and parcel of English taste and intellect. A retired British Indian Civil Service officer, O.A. Hume, helped Indian nationalists to found the Indian National Congress and became the 'father of the Congress',[64] the party which led to Indian independence. Muslims, on the other hand, felt threatened by a Hindu-dominated Indian nation, and therefore began to assert their Muslim nationality within India. These assertions culminated in an independent Pakistan in 1947,[65] Islamic ideology affording the only link between the two geographical territories separated by a thousand miles.

After Pakistan was created, the controversy between the European-oriented intelligentsia and the *'ulamā'* and their supporters lasted for several years. A compromise was reached after nine years, and a constitution was promulgated in 1956, declaring that Pakistan was an Islamic Republic with a parliamentary form of government. But during the nine-year discussion period the ruling political party, the Muslim League, had disintegrated in the provinces of Pakistan, and the political situation was chaotic.[66] Less than two years after the adoption of the constitution, the military intervened in politics and took over control of the country. The constitution was abrogated just before the general election was to be held. In the absence of stable political parties, the military aligned itself with the civil bureaucracy and established an oligarchic rule.[67] The military government promulgated another constitution in 1962. But by 1969, the government was faced with protests from various quarters of the country. Consequently, the military government, which had become a self-proclaimed civilian government resigned, handing over power to another military ruler.

Under the civil-military oligarchic rule, the economic gap between the separated territories, a gap which had existed even in the British period, was further widened. Bengali-speaking Eastern Pakistanis were deprived of their proper role in the civil-military bureaucracy of the government administration.[68] Almost nothing had been done to minimize the linguistic

differences between the two parts of Pakistan and Islam remained the only connection. Gradually anti-Pakistani sentiment developed in Eastern Pakistan, and within 25 years of the creation of Pakistan another nation-state, Bangladesh, was created, challenging anew the idea of Muslim nationalism.

A new constitution was formulated in Pakistan, as the Western part of the country came to be known, in 1973. It declared Pakistan's commitment to an Islamic moral standard (Part II, Article 2b). However, during the seven-year rule, the popularly-elected government engaged in a series of repressions. In 1977, a mass movement erupted throughout the country against the ruling party which had rigged the elections on a massive scale.[69] It is interesting to note that this mass movement was launched in the name of Islam.[70] And as a result, the military again intervened in politics. Although the military initially declared that political power would be transferred to civilian politicians, the leader of the military *coup*, General Zia-ul Haq managed to remain in power for 11 years. We shall return later to this second military rule in Pakistan but for now we shall concentrate on the role of education policies in building a national identity in Pakistan.

In keeping with its ideology, attempts were made to reformulate the educational policy in Pakistan.[71] A meeting was convened, in 1946, to discuss the future educational system. Discussions continued after the creation of Pakistan under the leadership of the first Education Minister, Fazlur Rahman, who emphasized the necessity for an Islamic ideological foundation for an educational policy.[72] The Ministry of Education organized a conference of leading experts and a number of recommendations were made. But none of these were implemented because of the reluctance of the Ministry of Finance, where bureaucrats were not convinced that the newly-born Pakistan should spend money on education.[73] Academic institutions continued to operate under the previous (British colonial) system of education formulated by Lord Macaulay, although lip-service to Islamic ideology was given in public. Without guidelines, the educational system was, as Qureshi puts it, aimless.[74] The historian complains that the need for creating a Pakistani personality through education was ignored by the government. He continues:

> It was the Pakistan Movement that weaned most (Muslim youth) from Indian nationalism and some from Marxist materialism. The enthusiasm for Pakistan created the feeling that all was well with the Muslim youth. Even earlier that was the general sentiment. A generation that had pursued the aim of economic welfare through the acquisition of the new education and had remained Muslim in sentiment because of tradition and the influence of its parents and homes thought that what had happened to it would happen to its children as well, forgetting that the Islamic influence grew more and more diluted because of the ever increasing impact of new influences percolating through literature and amoral and religiously neutral education. The nature of the education was such that the potentially positive influence that could have been exerted in favour of the Islamic code of morals and beliefs was eliminated, and the subtle European suggestions conveyed through literature and textbooks were permitted to play their role unhindered.[75]

Qureshi became Minister of Education for a short period and held the highest position at a major university in Pakistan for more than a decade. He articulated the failure of Pakistan's education policy before his death in 1979. He blamed public policy for its failure to develop a national identity based on Islamic ideas.[76] This failure, he suggested, led to the growth of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan, a growth which eventually culminated in the creation of Bangladesh.[77] Responsibility for this failure, the author maintained, belongs to the bureaucrats who were responsible for running the country.[78]

The failure of the educational policy led Pakistani society into an identity crisis. Pakistan was created on the basis of the Muslim identity of Indian Muslims. Pakistanis, however, failed to formulate their constitution and their educational policy by neglecting to incorporate Islamic ideas into them. The creation of Bangladesh on the basis of the linguistic identity of East Pakistanis is the most striking example of the failure of Pakistani identity.

It has been noted earlier that the military took over power in Pakistan in 1977 after a mass movement against the govern-

ment. We have also noted that the fundamental demand of this movement was to implement Islamic ideals in Pakistan. Responding to this demand and adopting a policy of what he called 'the process of Islamization', General Zia-ul Haq said:

> The basis of Pakistan was Islam. The basis of Pakistan was that the Muslims of the sub-continent are a separate culture. It was on the two-nation theory that this part was carved out of the sub-continent as Pakistan. And in the last 30 years in general . . . there has been a complete erosion of the moral values of this society . . . These are the Islamic values and we are trying to bring these values back.[79]

General Zia-ul Haq also explicitly declared his supreme loyalty to the Islamic concept of *Ummah*. He said:

> Islam does not recognise any geographical limits dividing its followers. Muslims are Muslims, regardless of whether they are also Ajami (foreigner) Arab, Pakistani or Russian. Nationality is irrelevant within the *Ummah*, within the universal brotherhood of Islam or the commonwealth of Muslim nations. But Islam does recognise separate communities and nations, separate countries within their own geographical frontiers.[80]

It will be recalled that the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal who is known for presenting the idea of Pakistan also presented the idea of an Islamic *Ummah* as a 'League of Nations'. However, when Iqbal presented his theory, most Muslim nation-states were still under the domination of European powers. This theory was later developed by Mawdudi.[81]

Mawdudi began writing about the subject before Pakistan was born. He then vehemently opposed the idea of geographical cultural nationalism.[82] He supported the demands for Pakistan, however, and wanted Islamic ideas to be implemented in Pakistan. Mawdudi proposed to go beyond Pakistan in uniting the Muslim *ummah* and submitted a number of proposals to an Islamic Summit Conference for achieving this goal.[83] We shall return to discuss the idea of a Muslim commonwealth and the role of Muslim nation-states in the next chapter. Here, on the

basis of our discussion in the preceding pages, we suggest that Muslim countries such as Pakistan have never decided completely about where their supreme loyalty rests – whether the nation-state or the Islamic *ummah* enjoys their first loyalty.

Crisis of Identity

Not only Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, but all Muslim nation-states have fallen victim to this crisis of identity. Throughout the crisis, educational institutions within Muslim society, continued to graduate students. Those students who chose to adopt the European way of life became victims of an inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* the Europeans, perhaps because they could not change their colour and background, and, perhaps, because they could not absolutely abandon their Muslim identity.[84] Those who decided to maintain their nationalist identity did not know enough of Muslim history and the Muslim philosophy of life to counter the challenges of European ideas; precisely because the educational policy taught them too little about those areas. Those who studied Islamic ideas on their own did not have the strength to fight against the system established by the colonial administrations and thus faced a predicament.[85] On the other hand, students in traditional Muslim schools were almost unaware of scientific and technological developments occurring in Europe; such matters were not included in their educational curricula. Overall, the educational system created a crisis of identity in Muslim society.

The split educational system began during Ottoman rule under the *Tanẓīmāt* leadership and continues to the present day.[86] Fazlur Rahman correctly points out that 'under Tanẓīmāt leadership the gulf between the traditional and modern, the ''other worldly and eternal'' and the ''this worldly and transitory'' came to be the gulf between the elite and the Turkish masses'.[87] Of the situation in Pakistan, Fazlur Rahman further observes: 'If there are today practically, and indeed dangerously, two nations in Pakistan, it is not only because the religious leadership has little contact with the demands of a modern society, but even more so because of the cultural

bastardy of the Westernized classes.'[88] The split in education exists not only in Turkey and Pakistan but in all Muslim countries. European education taught the 'Westernized class' the concept of nationalism. This concept could not be formulated in Muslim countries without incorporating Islamic ideas. However, Islamic ideas had their own demands after the creation of nation-states, ideas which could not be reconciled either theoretically or in practice. This resulted in an ever-widening gap between the Europeanized ruling elites on one side and the rural traditional masses on the other. The crisis of identity was ever renewed within the personality of those who studied under the European system of education. Gustav von Grunebaum describes this contradiction within the modern Muslim personality so aptly when he says that 'the Arab Muslim finds himself in a modern house built with Western guidance in which he wants now to lead his own life without knowing exactly what is suitable for him'.[89] Von Grunebaum studied this confusion in identity among European-styled Muslim intellectuals; for example, he quotes a Moroccan novelist saying about himself:

> Choose? I have already chosen, but very much I wish I no longer had to do so. For even though I have chosen to live in France and perhaps to die there – but this does not depend on me – I still keep my share in the world of my childhood and in that Islam in which I more and more believe.[90]

As for the *'Ulamā'*, the products of the traditional educational system, they usually supported the European-educated intelligentsia during the nationalist struggle, but after the creation of the nation-states, they failed to influence the administration of the country. Therefore, they could not justify the claim of Islamic states within Muslim nation-states.

Muslim nation-states are also facing a challenge from the point of view of international law. More than one independent Muslim political authority has existed for centuries, but no defined political boundaries separated them. Therefore, any Muslim could travel, work and engage in business within the Muslim territories without facing any major legal problem.

With the highly decentralized forms of government and the *Sharī'ah* generally being followed, the Muslim rulers had little impact on the life of the common Muslim. Under pressure from Britain and Russia, the Ottoman Caliphate and Persia were the first two Muslim governments which delimited their boundaries.[91] The process continued until the creation of the UN when Muslim nation-states became its members and were recognized as sovereign. From the international legal point of view this meant, 'states are free from external control' and 'policies established and decisions taken by their governmental institutions are supreme within their territories'.[92]

Although this sounds positive in terms of ending the rule of European colonial powers in Muslim territories, it also meant that a member of one Muslim nation-state could not take an active interest in the affairs of another Muslim nation-state. This challenged the traditional Islamic concept of brotherhood. With the UN's declarations and recommendations becoming a new source of international law,[93] the traditional understanding of the *ummah* being a law-based community was challenged. The UN declaration of the sovereignty of nation-states over natural resources provided some relief for technologically-underdeveloped countries, but it also prevented people from some poorer countries from sharing what many Muslims viewed as God-given wealth. Traditionally, the Muslim viewed all natural resources as God-given, and believed that he was eligible to receive them. However, with the UN declaration that right was legally precluded.[94]

With the implementation of similar declarations, Muslims discovered that this new system of international law established a similar system to that which existed in pre-Islamic Arabia. Like modern nation-states, the pre-Islamic Arabian tribes were sovereign bodies, while the individual was subject to his tribal laws.

The individual was also considered equal to other members of the tribe, and the choice of leadership was also subject to some kind of election process in that society. Elie Kedourie disagrees with the comparison of the present nation-state system with the pre-Islamic tribal system. He thinks that it is a misleading analogy because tribal identity was determined by birth and today's national identity is a self-determined factor.[95]

Then he asks the question of whether a father can determine the nationality for his son? In response, a counter question can be asked as to whether or not the birth of an individual determines his nationality today? Kedourie forgets that what happened in his generation does not happen in his children's generation. He could migrate from Iraq to England and settle there, but can an Iraqi today choose to become a citizen of England simply if he wants to? An argument can be made that if an Iraqi disagrees with the political authority in Iraq, he can seek political asylum in another country. However, such a system also existed in pre-Islamic Arabia. During pre-Islamic days, an Arab could seek protection or refuge in another tribe if he was in disagreement with his own tribe. This analogy between the pre-Islamic Arabian tribal system and the present nation-state system is a disturbing phenomenon for the Muslim activist. One Muslim activist calls the present system worse than the pre-Islamic system because the present system is organized and the pre-Islamic Arabian system was not centrally organized.[96]

Generally, the long-term results of nineteenth-century nationalism have not been welcomed by historians.[97] Hans Kohn finds degeneration and danger in the development of nationalism. In writing of the United Nations, however, Kohn is optimistic. The UN emerged as a curb on the excess of nationalism, manifest in two world wars, and Kohn finds it a likely restraint, believing the UN, through collective action, can control nationalistic excesses.[98] Islamic activists do not share this assessment of the UN, suggesting that it was created more 'with a view to sharing the spoils of imperialist machinations than to achieve any other purpose'.[99] Although the international legal expert Quincy Wright thinks that the UN has successfully stopped hostilities in Palestine and Kashmir,[100] it is precisely in such cases that many Muslims have found bias and double standards operating in the world body. They think that the body's Security Council, dominated by the superpowers, has always favoured Zionists and Indians. Even when resolutions have been taken favouring the Muslim cause, the world body has failed to implement them.[101]

The role of the UN, particularly on the issue of Palestine, has disappointed many Europeanized Muslims. W.C. Smith quotes

one leading intellectual from Damascus as saying:

> Against the wishes of my family I broke with our tradition, our environment and took up Western culture. I went to Paris and for six years I studied and lived there. I adopted Western ways of life, of thought; and Western values. Our old-fashioned critics used to say to people like me, 'you are letting down the Arab cause and are betraying us'. We used to think that they just did not understand. Now we wonder if they weren't right. The way it is turning out, we feel that we have backed the wrong horse. We sided with the West; and the West has let us down.[102]

Since common Muslims know that their nations participate at the UN, they generally hold their governments responsible for failures on these issues in the world body. Consequently, nation-state leaders lose legitimacy in the eyes of common Muslims.

Zionist activities in Muslim lands have always sparked Muslims into united action. As we have noted earlier, a world conference was held in 1931 as a result of the controversy over the so-called Wailing Wall of al-Aqṣā Mosque. Muslim activities were intensified in 1948 against the military action of the Zionists in Palestine which led to the creation of the state of Israel. We shall also note below that the OIC was created in response to the fire at al-Aqṣā Mosque in Jerusalem. There has been a direct relation between Zionist activities and the Muslim quest for unity. The greater the Zionist presence, the greater the quest for unity among Muslims. We shall discuss this issue in greater detail in the next chapter. Here we may suggest that the more nationalist leaders have failed to solve Muslim problems, the more the nation-state has lost legitimacy in Muslim eyes.

This, however, is not to suggest that the nation-state system has failed absolutely. The system's very existence has created a consciousness of identity among Muslims. What is suggested here is that nation-states have neither succeeded in creating an absolute identity claiming the allegiance of their citizens nor in establishing themselves as the primary locus of Muslim identity. Any study related to contemporary Muslim society needs to deal with this phenomenon.

Notes and References

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3. Donald E. Smith, *Religion and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 124.

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5. Bernard Lewis, 'Turkey', *Dustur: A Survey of the Constitutions of the Arab and Muslim States* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966), p. 16.

6. Toprak, pp. 64–6.

7. Niyazi Berkes, 'Historical Background of Turkish Secularism', *Islam and the West: Proceedings of the Harvard Summer School on the Middle East*, July 25–27, 1955, ed. Richard N. Frye (S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1957), p. 55.

8. Toprak, pp. 66–70 and Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 498–9.

9. Serif Mardin, 'Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?', *Daedalus*, 102 (Winter 1973), p. 182.

10. On Turkish education, see Andreas M. Kazamias, *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966) and Walter F. Weiker, *The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981).

11. On the history of the traditional education system in Islam, see A.L. Tibawi, *Islamic Education: Its Traditions and Modernization into the Arab National Systems* (London: Luzac, 1972), pp. 23–46.

12. Kazamias, pp. 220–1.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 186–7.

14. On the impact of the educational policy in rural areas, see Frederick W. Frye, 'Socialization to National Identification Among Turkish Peasants', *Journal of Politics*, 30 (November 1968), p. 964.

15. Quoted in Weiker, p. 155.

16. Mardin, p. 185.

17. The order for calling the *Adhān* in Turkish was followed only in big cities under the direct supervision of the government. In rural areas it continued to be called in Arabic. It should also be noted that before 1960, 74 per cent of the Turkish people lived in rural areas.

18. Toprak, pp. 79–80.

19. Serif Mardin, 'Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey', *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James P. Piscatori (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 144.

20. On the reasons for military intervention in 1960, see *ibid*. And on the apology of the armed forces for intervention see the official statement of the armed forces in *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 377–86.

21. For the slogans of the 1965 elections see Toprak, p. 92.

22. G.H. Jansen, *Militant Islam* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 119.

23. *Ibid*., p. 98.

24. *Ibid*., p. 99.

25. Toprak, p. 119.

26. Mardin, 'Religion and Politics', p. 151.

27. See Feroz Ahmad, 'The Islamic Assertion in Turkey: Pressures and State Response', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4 (1982), pp. 105–8.

28. For a short discussion on the group, see Serif Mardin, 'Religion and Politics', pp. 156–7.

29. This shift of the Nurci group is, perhaps, responsible for the fluctuation in election results of the National Salvation Party in the 1973 and 1977 elections.

30. Nur Yalman, 'Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution in Turkey', *Daedalus* 102 (Winter 1973), p. 155.

31. *Ibid*., p. 145.

32. Feroz Ahmad, p. 103.

33. Nur Yalman, p. 147.

34. Serif Mardin, 'Religion and Politics', p. 148.

35. The present author was told this by some members of the Motherland Party. Also see 'Motherland Triumphs Over Military', *Arabia* (December 1983), p. 12.

36. See the Prime Minister now President Ozal's interview with *Arabia* (May 1984), pp. 16–17 and (July 1982), pp. 18–19.

37. See the report of a MIT-trained female professor being fired from her job for covering her head, which she did, as she puts it, because of her commitment to Islam, in 'Why the Hijāb gives the Generals the Jitters', *Arabia* (November 1984), pp. 7–10. According to the report the professor appealed to the court on the ground that the constitution protects the personal freedom of every citizen. Pointing to Kemalist principles, the court ruled in the case that 'even though the clauses of the constitution are meant to protect each citizen's religious freedom, there were more supreme principles in the country'.

38. Safran, p. 109.

39. For brief accounts of general historical events in Egypt during the period under discussion, see P.J. Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt* (New York: Praeger, 1969), pp. 265–91.

40. On Taha Husayn, see Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought of the Liberal Age (1798–1939)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 324–40. See also the English translation of one of his best-known works *The Future of Culture in Egypt (Mustaqbil al-thaqāfah fī Miṣr)* tr. Sidney Glazer (New York: Octagon Press, 1975).

41. Taha Husayn, *Future of Culture in Egypt*, pp. 7ff.

42. On the nature of capitulations, see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 5.

43. Malcolm H. Kerr, 'Egypt', *Educational and Political Development*, ed. James S. Coleman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 172.

44. Kerr, p. 182.

45. See Jamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Buffalo: Economia Books, 1959), pp. 57–78. Later Abdul-Nasir identified his programme as one of 'scientific socialism' and 'Arab socialism'. These were more like programmes for development rather than identities. Therefore, we have avoided further discussion.

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48. On the rise of the Muslim Brothers Movement, see Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), especially pp. 12–34.

49. On the stand of *Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* on this issue, see Zafar Ishaq Ansari, 'Contemporary Islam and Nationalism: A Case Study of Egypt', *Die Welt des Islam*, N.S. Vol. VII, No. 2–4, pp. 3–38.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

51. Quoted in G.W. Choudhury, *Constitutional Development in Pakistan* (London: Longman, 1959), pp. 63–4.

52. Quoted in Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, ed. and tr. Khurshid Ahmad, 2nd ed. (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1960), pp. 15–16.

53. G.W. Choudhury, p. 65.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 51–3.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 174–5.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

57. E.I.J. Rosenthal, p. 70.

58. S.A. Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan*, tr. and ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1955), particularly pp. 31–41.

59. Aziz Ahmad, *An Intellectual History of Islam in India* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), p. 15.

60. S.A. Mawdudi, *Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan*, pp. 5–6.

61. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1967), pp. 12–13.

62. Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610–1947): A Brief Historical Survey* (S. Gravenhage: Mouton, 1962), pp. 83–163.

63. Christine E. Dobbin, ed. *Basic Documents in the Development of Modern India and Pakistan 1835–1947* (London: Van Nostrand, 1970), p. 8.

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65. For a general discussion on the emergence of Muslim national sentiment as a threat to Hindu domination, see P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) particularly pp. 126–46.

66. See Khalid B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 32–46.

67. *Ibid.*

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Bengali-speaking Muslims of East Bengal sacrificed a number of their Constituent Assembly seats to Urdu-speaking Muslims in the 1946 elections. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, was elected from East Bengal. For a detailed discussion on the subject, see Raunaq Jahan, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

69. See Khalid B. Sayeed, pp. 157–64.

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72. See his own book on the subject: Fazlur Rahman, *New Education in the Making of Pakistan* (London: Cassell, 1953), pp. 6 and *passim*.

73. Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, 'Educational Policies in Pakistan', *Perspectives of Islam and Pakistan* (Karachi: Ma'ref, 1979), pp. 47–8.

74. Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *Education in Pakistan*, pp. 49–72. It must be recalled that the aim of this education system was to produce civil service officers to help the British administration in the country.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–1.

76. Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, 'Educational Policies in Pakistan', pp. 45–62.

77. Ishtiaq H. Qureshi, *Education in Pakistan*, pp. 122–44.

78. The author quotes one bureaucrat as saying to him: 'We should first satisfy the hunger of the poor, luxuries like education will come later.' *Ibid.*, p. 218 n. Another bureaucrat suggested abolishing the departments of Arabic and Persian in order to overcome the university's financial burden. See *ibid.*, p. 225 n.

79. Quoted in Tahir Amin, *Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988), pp. 171–2.

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81. See Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Nationalism and India* (Pathankot: Maktabah-i-Jamā'at-i-Islāmī, 1947).

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88. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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94. On the significance of the declaration, see *ibid.*, pp. 79–100.

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96. Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (Cedar Rapids: Unity Publishing Co., n.d.), p. 20.

97. A.J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 10 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), Vol. IV: pp. 163, 165 and Vol. IX: p. 409. Carlton J.H. Hayes and Hans Kohn also maintain the same view expressed in different books on the subject.

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99. Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, *Unity of the Muslim World*, p. 3.

100. Quincy Wright, *International Law and the United Nations* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1980), p. 14.

101. See Hatem I. Hussaini, ed., *The Palestine Problem* (Washington, DC: Palestine Information Center, 1980), and Sarwar Hasan, *The Kashmir Question* (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966).

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CHAPTER 4

Ummah or Nation?: The Identity Crisis of Modern Muslim Nation-States

The failure of nation-states to create an absolute identity and claim the allegiance of their citizens has left modern Muslims in a crisis. This crisis is the result of the conflict within the citizen's national and *ummah* identity consciousness. In this chapter we shall discuss the idea of an *ummah* identity in Muslim society after the creation of independent Muslim nation-states.

We have noted earlier the *ummah* identity consciousness among Muslims during the nationalist struggle. It has been pointed out that a number of conferences were held to discuss the unity of the Muslim *ummah*. We have also noted that the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal conceived the Muslim *ummah* as a kind of league of nations; and following in the footsteps of Iqbal the Egyptian revivalist leader Hasan al-Banna and the Pakistani revivalist leader Abul A'la Mawdudi presented their ideas of Muslim unity. In this chapter we shall discuss the activities of Muslim nation-states towards achieving this goal. In our discussion, we shall concentrate only on the collective activities of Muslim-majority nation-states.

After the emergence of a number of Muslim majority nation-states as independent and sovereign political units following the Second World War the *Mu'tamar al-'Ālam*

al-Islāmī was revived. But because of the lack of interest on the part of government representatives the *Mu'tamar* could not emerge as an effective organization. However, the Muslim desire for unity increased with the passage of time. Faced with the challenge of Arab nationalism presented by Egypt's President Abdul-Nasir, the Saudi Crown Prince Faisal, who later became King of Saudi Arabia, came forward with the idea of a Muslim unity based on the concept of *ummah*.[1] But Muslim governments hardly paid any attention to this idea.

A change in the situation occurred after 1967 when the leading Arab nationalist countries were defeated by Israel. Immediately after the war King Faisal renewed his call for pan-Islamic collaboration, specifically designed to liberate Jerusalem from alien occupation. He proposed an Islamic summit conference, but his call went unheeded. The defeat was, nonetheless, a crushing blow to ideas of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism.[2]

Another significant turn toward Muslim unity occurred after an event on 21 August, 1969 when Muslims everywhere came to know that extensive damage had been caused by an arson attack on al-Aqṣā Mosque in Jerusalem. The former Mufti of Jerusalem and the Secretary General of the *Mu'tamar al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, Amin al-Husaini, appealed to all Muslim states to hold an immediate Muslim summit conference to discuss the situation. The Saudi King's call for a similar conference was renewed. Support for the idea came from Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan. Protest rallies against the arson attack were held throughout the Muslim world, condemning Israel and supporting the idea of an Islamic summit conference.

The first Islamic Summit Conference was held 22–25 September, 1969, in the Moroccan capital Rabat. At the end of the conference it was declared that 'Muslim governments would consult with a view to promoting between themselves close co-operation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam'.[3] The conference also decided to hold an Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference to discuss and take necessary steps to implement the decisions of the Summit Conference. Consequently, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was founded with its General Secretariat in

Jeddah. With the establishment of the OIC Muslim society entered a new phase in its identity crisis; for, since the abolition of the caliphate no other institution had claimed the political loyalty of all Muslims. In our discussion on contemporary attempts towards Muslim unity we shall confine ourselves to OIC activities.

The Charter of the OIC in its Preamble declared that: 'Their (member states) common belief constitutes a strong factor for *rapprochement* and solidarity between Muslim people.'[4] OIC leaders explained their belief as:

> Strict adherence to Islam and to Islamic principles and values as a way of life constitutes the highest protection for Muslims against the dangers which confront them. Islam is the only path which can lead them to strength, dignity and prosperity and a better future. It is the pledge and guarantee of the authenticity of the *Ummah* safeguarding it from the tyrannical onrush of materialism. It is the powerful stimulant for both leaders and peoples in their struggle to liberate these holy places (Jerusalem and Palestine) and to regain their rightful place in the world so that they may, in concert with other nations, strive for the establishment of equality, peace and prosperity for the whole of mankind.[5]

This declaration poses a challenge to the OIC itself. Among its member states there are Islamic Republics, monarchies, military dictatorships, national democracies, democratic socialist republics, scientific socialist republics, peoples democratic republics. Most of these states are based on European secular ideas such as nationalism, socialism, scientism and democracy. Do these ideas conform with the ideology of the OIC? Does the OIC believe that all citizens of its member states are a part of its common belief? In other words, what is the status of a non-Muslim citizen in a member country? A complementary question may also be asked: what, in the OIC's view, is the status of a Muslim citizen in a non-member country? It does not appear from its declarations and resolutions that the OIC has taken any definite position on this issue. This created confusion in the operations of the organization. A few instances may be

mentioned here. At the Third Islamic Summit Conference (1981), the inaugural session was held inside the Ka'bah in Makkah. Islamic law does not allow a non-Muslim to enter the Ka'bah. The host officials of the Conference, therefore, had to prevent the Lebanese President from participating in the session. In contrast, the Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology and Development (IFSTAD), one of the OIC's many subsidiary organs, defines Muslim talents, in its study of the brain-drain from Muslim countries, as 'the Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of member states as well as the Muslims of the minority communities in non-member developing countries'.[6] For its scholarships, however, it requires that all applicants be Muslims. As for employment within the OIC system, the OIC maintains an unwritten practice that only Muslims from member countries are eligible for its jobs. The Islamic Development Bank, an affiliated organ of the OIC, on the other hand, employs Muslims from non-member countries also.[7]

The primary members of the OIC are nation-states, not individuals. The question arises as to what is the primary basis of the *ummah*. In the early Islamic context, the question would be whether individuals or tribes formed the primary basis of the Muslim community. As noted above, when the Islamic *ummah* was first established, individuals constituted the primary basis of the community. When an individual accepted Islam, the *ummah* would have accepted him as having a primary commitment to Islamic law rather than to tribal customary law. Thus, the supreme loyalty of an individual was changed from his tribal identity to an *ummah* identity. When a whole tribe accepted Islam, its tribal identity was maintained even after its commitment to Islam and the change of its supreme loyalty to Islamic law. In contrast, the OIC does not possess the capacity to accept any individual, no matter what his ideology or belief. As for the issue of supreme loyalty, the OIC does not claim the supreme loyalty of any individual, for its Charter clearly mentions that it is composed only of sovereign nation-states.

According to Article 8 of the Charter, 'every Muslim state is eligible to join the Islamic Conference upon submission of an application expressing its desire and preparedness to adopt this Charter'. The Charter does not define what it means by 'Muslim

state', but it appears from OIC publications and lectures delivered at OIC meetings that the term means a nation-state where Muslims constitute a majority of the population. In practice, however, the OIC has not followed any consistent policy concerning what it calls a Muslim state. India applied for membership in 1969 on the grounds that it had a sizeable Muslim population (in fact, it has the second largest Muslim population in the world), but its application was rejected on the grounds that Muslims were a persecuted minority in India. On the other hand, the OIC has accepted the membership of Uganda, although the majority of its population is not Muslim. Uganda applied and was admitted to the Organization in 1974, during the Second Summit Conference, apparently because Uganda at that time had a Muslim president. But Uganda is still a regular member of the OIC, although its present President is no longer a Muslim. A number of countries with a Muslim majority, including Albania, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Ghana and Tanzania have never applied for membership of the OIC.

The Charter mentions in its preamble that its member-states 'reaffirm their commitment to the UN Charter and to fundamental human rights, the purposes and principles of which provide the basis for fruitful co-operation amongst all people'. It also declares that the participating states resolve 'to preserve Islamic spiritual, ethical, social and economic values, which will remain one of the important factors of achieving progress for mankind'. It may be asked whether or not the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the Islamic value system are congruent. By definition, a Muslim is one who surrenders to the will of Allah.[8] For a Muslim the will of Allah is expressed in the form of the Qur'ān. Therefore, when a person declares himself to be a Muslim, he necessarily submits to the Qur'ānic value system. The UN Declaration, on the other hand, advocates absolute freedom of conscience – will Muslim nation-states pass laws challenging Qur'ānic values for the sake of such freedom of conscience or for the sake of European secular values? For example, based on the principle of absolute freedom of conscience, most European and American countries have legalized sexual relationships outside the institution of marriage. Will Muslim countries too allow the same, although such laws challenge Qur'ānic values?

As to the objectives of the OIC, the Charter commits the OIC to take necessary measures to support international peace and security founded on justice. But the Charter does not define its concept of justice. Is it justice based on the Qur'ānic value system, or justice based on European secular ideas? In the European secular system, values change with time; while from the Islamic point of view any deviation from the Qur'ānic value system constitutes apostasy. Islamic jurisprudence has never developed any source of law which challenges the Qur'ānic values. It does not appear that the OIC has devised any workable approach to reconcile these two opposing value systems.

In another statement, the Charter declares the OIC's commitment to 'strengthen the struggle of all Muslim peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence and national rights'. How can the OIC even attempt to support the struggle for independence and the national rights of Muslims within a sovereign nation-state? Is it possible for a Saudi or a Pakistani Muslim to express views or concern about the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia, or China or to help the Muslims in India under the existing nation-state system? What could Muslims in OIC lands do when their brothers were massacred in Assam state in India in 1983? The OIC discussed problems of this sort when it undertook to open an office for Muslim minority affairs within the General Secretariat. In its resolution on the issue the Organization proposed to proceed 'very carefully to avoid having the Organization of Islamic Conference accused of interference in the affairs of non-Islamic states, which may have Muslim minorities, and yet be valuable allies in the fight against Zionism and in the pursuance of the other aims of the organization'.[9] The statement is somewhat unclear. Does it mean that the OIC could trade off the fate of one group of Muslims for another? For surely a nation-state could adopt an anti-Zionist policy but at the same time persecute its own Muslim minority. The OIC, however, later opened the Minority Affairs Office at the General Secretariat without discussing the issue further. The Office has dealt with some problems of Muslim minorities in non-member countries. We shall discuss this later.

The Charter was apparently intended to reconcile Islamic ideals with historical realities dominated by European secular

principles. The OIC claims to revive the ideal *ummah* of Islamic history, but it faces the reality of the Muslim world being divided into nation-states. Such an attempt reflects the crisis of Muslim society today. That the society has accepted the domination of European secular ideas but has not abandoned its Muslim identity. Traditional values exist in the society in the form of Islamic ideals. At the same time the society tends not to stand for Islamic ideals over secular values; rather, Muslims have tried to accommodate both value systems. In its attempt, the OIC challenged the constitutions of a number of member countries. Constitutionally declared Islamic countries such as revolutionary Iran, Mauritania, Comoros, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia justified these conflicts on the grounds that they have no control over international affairs, and that they have submitted to certain secular ideas for the sake of international relations.[10] The Islamic ideals of the OIC have more seriously challenged constitutionally declared secular republics such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Lebanon and Turkey. Bangladesh is committed to secularism as one of its state policies; the Lebanese national pact demands that a Christian serves as its president; Indonesia is committed to its *pantjsila* programme, which is based on secularism; and Islamic ideas are constitutionally banned in Turkey from playing any role in politics. Such conflicts have discouraged these countries from ratifying the OIC Charter, though Bangladesh ratified the Charter despite all the contradictions. Lebanon, Indonesia and Turkey became members of the organization without ratifying the Charter, and this was based on the fact that they had participated in all the meetings which led to the founding of the OIC. Their failure to ratify the Charter prevents them running candidates for the position of Secretary General. These theoretical contradictions have prevented the OIC from making ideal decisions and implementing many resolutions. We shall briefly discuss some activities of the OIC in the following pages.

Co-operation Among Muslim Countries on Political Issues

The OIC has dealt with many political issues such as the occupation of Muslim lands by foreign forces, relations with

large and superpowers, the security of member states, conflict among member states, Muslim minorities, relations with other international organizations. In order to limit our discussion, we shall confine ourselves to the OIC's treatment of the Palestinian issue and the issue of Muslim minorities in the Southern Philippines.

The OIC was established to support the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people which had been curbed by the Zionist Movement.[11] The OIC expressed its support for the Palestinian people and their representative the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) because, it declared that this was a duty imposed on them by the Islamic concept of *ummah*. The OIC also decided to declare '*jihād* as the duty of every Muslim, man or woman, ordained by the *Sharī'a* and glorious traditions of Islam'. It called upon all Muslims, living inside and outside Islamic countries, to discharge their duty by contributing each according to his capacity, in the cause of Allah the Almighty, Islamic brotherhood and righteousness.[12]

Here the OIC makes a contradictory statement, at least theoretically, by expressing its support in the name of Islam as well as nationalism. The PLO has categorically declared its struggle a national one, and is based on a European idea of nationalism.[13] The OIC has expressed its unqualified support for the PLO and appealed to Muslims the world over to participate in the *jihād* against the Zionist Movement and Israeli aggression. But the question is: how can a Muslim who is ruled by the national law of an alien government participate in such an act without jeopardizing his existence? Or, can the member countries of the OIC themselves participate wholeheartedly with the Palestinian people in their struggle for what the OIC calls the national rights of the Palestinian people? It seems the OIC attempted only to dramatize the issue.

The dramatization of the Palestinian issue by the OIC is reflected by its stand on the question of the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel. Persuaded by its national interests Egypt, a member-state of the OIC, abandoned its commitment to the OIC and attempted to reconcile its differences with Israel. In response the OIC expressed that:

> The Conference condemns the Camp David Accord signed

in September 1978 and the Washington Treaty signed between Israel and the regime in Egypt on March 26, 1979, and considers them a blatant departure from the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and a violation of international law and the United Nations resolutions related to the Palestinian problem and the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, and repudiates all their results and effects and considers them null, void and not binding on Arabs and Muslims, particularly on the Palestinian people. It further considers these agreements a bilateral settlement that ignores the core of the problem – namely the Palestinian question – an attempt to liquidate the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, notably their right to return to their homeland, to self-determination and to the establishment of their independent state on their national territory. Accordingly the Conference calls for resistance to the agreements by all ways and means, and condemns the role of the United States of America in the conclusion of these agreements and the attempts to impose them on the Palestinian people.[14]

In another Resolution the OIC decided to 'suspend the membership of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the Organization of the Islamic Conference and all its agencies and bodies up to the time when the reasons that provoked this suspension are eliminated'.[15] The preamble of the Resolution listed a number of reasons for the suspension. Egypt had violated the Charter of the OIC as well as that of the United Nations. The resolution also mentioned that Egypt had violated all OIC Resolutions regarding Jerusalem and Palestine. It pointed out that the Resolution prohibited all OIC member countries from negotiating with Israel independently, especially since Israel had violated what it called civilizing norms, seizing Arab and Muslim territory and destroying Muslim shrines located in Jerusalem. The Resolution considered the visit of the Egyptian President to occupied Jerusalem a violation of Egypt's commitment to other Muslims. The OIC urged all member states to sever all diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt. Most member states abided by the OIC sanctions against Egypt.

Within a few years, however, the OIC had changed its position on this issue. In January 1984, at the Fourth Summit Conference in Casablanca, the OIC expressed its desire to 'continue to oppose the Camp David approach' for the solution of the Middle East crisis. Nonetheless, in its resolution on the subject, the OIC did not condemn Egypt for signing the agreement with Israel, as it did previously.[16] In another Resolution adopted in the same conference the OIC lifted the suspension of Egypt's membership.[17] At the Conference the Guinean revolutionary leader, Ahmad Sekou Toure, argued that 'the Conference did not prove that Egypt's membership was suspended during the Taif summit (of 1981)'.[18] The President was referring to the Third Islamic Summit Conference; it is interesting to note that he failed to notice the decision by the Tenth Foreign Ministers' Conference on the issue to which we have referred earlier. The Moroccan King's argument on the same issue is also noteworthy. He is reported to have said that Egyptian President Mubarak had recently informed him that 'the agreement concluded by President Sadat was virtually dead'.[19] At the same time President Mubarak claimed that his country had always been committed to the Charter of the OIC, and therefore, that Egypt should not be blamed for events leading to its suspension from and readmission to the OIC.[20] There seems to be some discrepancy between the reports. But none of the member states noticed this discrepancy.

In this series of events it was never clear who interpreted the Charter of the OIC. When Egypt was suspended, the majority of OIC members declared that it had deviated from the Charter by signing an agreement with Israel. When Egypt was readmitted, nothing was mentioned about the Egyptian deviation from the OIC Charter. Egypt, for its part, has maintained that it never deviated from the OIC Charter, neither before signing the agreement with Israel nor after.

In order to support the Palestinians in their struggle against the Zionist Movement and the State of Israel, the OIC not only resolved to declare *jihād*, but also founded a fifteen-member Al-Quds Committee headed by the Moroccan King, created an Al-Quds Fund to support its *jihād* activities, and decided to undertake in all Islamic countries a psychological mobilization of the people through official, semi-official, and popular uses of

the mass media; member states were invited to open offices for volunteers 'wishing to participate in the *jihād* for the liberation of the holy land'. In practice, however, Muslim countries left the Palestinians alone to fight Israel. When the PLO first launched its war against Israel in the mid-1960s, the Egyptian President Abdul-Nasir banned its activities from Egyptian territories on the grounds that by providing the PLO a home Egypt had become subject to Israeli retaliation. Later, President Anwar al-Sadat completely abandoned the PLO, defied OIC resolutions and signed an agreement with Israel. Thus, the Egyptian government has always abandoned ideas of Arab and Islamic brotherhood when they clashed with Egyptian national interests. Similarly, Jordan sought to get rid of the PLO in a civil war in 1970. In this case, it seems that the PLO did not trust the government in power in Jordan and itself attempted to take control. Other Arab countries including Syria, Libya and Iraq went even further in protecting their national interests in Middle Eastern politics by creating their own factions within the Palestinians.[21] Most OIC countries have remained unconcerned throughout the PLO's struggle against Israel, even at the moment of the most decisive assault against the PLO during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The PLO describes the situation by saying: 'It (the PLO) was besieged for 88 days in Beirut while no one extended any help or support. It was then besieged in Tripoli – a joint Arab-Israeli blockade while neither Arab nor Muslim moved a finger . . .'[22] However, at the end of the Fourteenth Foreign Ministers' Conference of the OIC, held in December 1983, the Chairman of the Conference officially cabled the PLO chairman, saying:

> On behalf of the delegates of the 14th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, I wish to reiterate and affirm that the struggle of the Palestinian people is our struggle. We speak with one voice in seeking a just and durable settlement of the Middle East crisis.[23]

It seems that although the OIC countries identified themselves with the problem of Palestine, they failed to share the grief and pain of foreign occupation with the Palestinian people. Furthermore, the OIC has attempted to dramatize its role on the

issue. Why should OIC member countries identify themselves with the people of Palestine? The OIC alluded to this question in various resolutions. It claimed that identification followed from a commitment to an *ummah* identity and to the Islamic idea of brotherhood. Yet no country wanted to jeopardize its national interests for the sake of its *ummah* identity consciousness. This paradox is a reflection of the identity crisis of contemporary Muslim society.

The OIC has had major problems in dealing with matters involving Muslims in non-member countries. Although Muslims in non-member countries have no status in the OIC Charter and are not officially represented in the OIC structure, the organization has frequently shown its concern for them. The OIC set out to prepare a statistical index on Muslims living in non-member countries at an early stage in its development and in a resolution noted that 'Muslim minorities in some countries of non-Muslim majorities do not enjoy the political and religious rights guaranteed by international law and norms', and appealed to 'countries with Muslim minorities to respect those minorities and their culture and belief and grant them their rights in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights'.[24] It also prepared a comprehensive study of the conditions of Muslim minorities, stating that these were in some cases unacceptable and expressed 'concern at the inhuman treatment meted out to Muslim minorities and communities in some countries'. It also called upon its member states to 'manifest support and assistance to the people under the yoke of colonialism and racism'.[25]

The Filipino Muslims have received more attention from the OIC than those of any other community in a non-member state. The OIC received a report about the Muslims in the Southern Philippines in 1972 and in a Resolution expressed concern over the 'plight of Muslims living in the Philippines' and felt the necessity to 'seek [the] good offices of the government of the Philippines to guarantee the safety and prosperity of Muslims there as citizens of that country'.[26] It decided to send a delegation composed of the Foreign Ministers of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Somalia to Manila to discuss the problem. It also appealed to 'peace-loving states, religious and international authorities to use their good offices with the Philippine

government in order to halt the campaign of violence against the Muslim community in the Philippines and ensure its safety and the basic liberties guaranteed by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In addition, the OIC requested its member states Indonesia and Malaysia to use their good offices for the same purpose in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).[27]

In a later Resolution, in addition to expressing 'deep anxiety over the situation prevailing among the Filipino Muslims', the OIC urged 'the Philippine government to find a political and peaceful solution through negotiations with Muslim leaders, particularly with the representatives of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in order to arrive at a just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims'. It also called upon the government to 'halt organized Christian immigration from the north intended to change the demographic structure of the South'.[28]

These Resolutions were not adopted without debate. According to one report, a major part of one day's discussion during the Fourth Conference of Foreign Ministers (1973) was spent on the question of whether or not the OIC should speak about the internal affairs of a sovereign nation-state.[29] This is one of the dilemmas that the OIC faces. On the one hand, it is obliged to stand for justice, particularly for oppressed Muslims, because of its commitment to the ideal Islamic *ummah*. On the other hand, it is committed by its Charter to respect the sovereignty of nation-states. According to international law, the issue was an internal affair for the Philippines. But when persecuted, the Muslims of the Southern Philippines knocked on the door of the OIC, because of the OIC's commitment to the *ummah* identity. The OIC could not formulate an argument refusing to help their Muslim brothers based on international law. Therefore, it found a scapegoat in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In the preamble of all its Resolutions on the subject, the OIC mentions that it respects the idea of national sovereignty as well as the covenant of the Declaration on Human Rights. The opposition of some countries to Resolutions on the subject again reflect the basic identity crisis of modern Muslims. Some countries were opposed not only because of their commitment to international law based on secular ideas, but also because of

their national interests. Indonesia's national interests tended to favour the government of the Philippines rather than the MNLF, therefore, Indonesia opposed the OIC resolution on the subject.[30]

The minority question symbolizes the identity crisis we have seen so often. Traditional Islamic political theory defined a clear role for minorities in Muslim society. The modern European-model nation-state has also attempted to define a role for minorities in society, but the minorities' role is often not clearly defined. Confusion increases in Muslim society because Muslim nation-states have accepted the modern European nation-state system without abandoning traditional Islamic ideals.

The four-member mission of the OIC went ahead with its plan and succeeded in bringing the Filipino authorities and the MNLF to the negotiating table. This was a significant success for the OIC. The mission persuaded the Filipino government to sit down with other nation-states to discuss an issue which it regarded as an internal affair. The mission also brought the MNLF, which demanded complete independence from the Manila administration, to negotiating autonomy with the government. The MNLF held that the 13 Muslim-majority provinces it represented had earlier only been brought under the Manila government during the American colonial administration.[31] Negotiations between the two parties resulted in an agreement issued on 22 December, 1976 in Tripoli, Libya. OIC representatives, led by the Libyan Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, signed the document as witnesses and observers. It was decided that the Manila authorities would grant autonomy to the 13 Muslim-majority provinces in the South; the MNLF and the Philippine government were left to work out the details of the autonomy plan.[32] Soon the two parties disagreed. The problem was temporarily solved after a meeting between the Filipino President and the Libyan Head of State during the former's visit to Libya in March 1977.

The Manila authorities implemented the Tripoli Agreement unilaterally. The 13 provinces were divided into two groups and a referendum was held to judge popular support for certain proposals about the future of the territory.[33] The referendum was conducted by the government alone; the MNLF disagreed

with the procedure and boycotted the referendum. The government reported that 97.93 per cent of the voters rejected the MNLF demands for autonomy; government agencies also reported that 75 per cent of the total registered voters participated in the referendum, though foreign correspondents disagreed with the government estimates.[34] The MNLF accused the Manila administration of deceiving both the Muslims of the Southern Philippines and the OIC representatives. Its leader said in an interview that 'We considered the Tripoli Agreement [between the Libyan and Filipino presidents] a landmark. It should have been a turning point. But because of the treachery of President Marcos [of the Philippines] and his regime the gap between peace and war has widened.'[35] The Secretary General of the OIC agreed with the MNLF leader.[36] From the point of view of the Manila administration, however, the problem was solved. The OIC, for its part, still recognizes the MNLF as the legitimate representative of the Moro Muslims of the Southern Philippines; it subsequently granted the MNLF observer status.[37]

The Manila administration did not confine its role to neutralizing the issue internally. Although the problem had not been solved from the OIC point of view, the Manila government successfully neutralized those OIC countries which were active in defusing the conflict. This was necessary in order to counter possible diplomatic and economic measures against itself by those countries. The Filipino First Lady and President Marcos made separate trips to Libya and succeeded in convincing the Libyans that the Moro issue was an internal affair for the Philippines. The First Lady's visit seems to have been more successful. A statement was issued from Tripoli after the visit expressing the view that the conflict could only be solved by the Manila government and the MNLF.[38] Filipino authorities paid similar visits to Saudi Arabia. Although no statements were issued from the Saudi capital, the Saudis are reported to have provided the Philippine government with economic assistance.[39] Both these countries, however, continued to support resolutions supporting the Muslims of the Southern Philippines in OIC meetings.[40] The problem continued even after the change of government in the Philippines.

Compared to its role in the affairs of Muslim minorities in

other countries, OIC activities in the Philippines can be considered a success; the activities succeeded in bringing about talks between the Filipino government and Muslim representatives. Under the circumstances, perhaps, the OIC could do nothing more than that. The OIC has failed to take similar action in the case of Muslims in other non-member countries. Its failure is apparent in the case of India, which has more Muslims than most Muslim-majority nation-states. The OIC has never expressed any concern over the plight of Indian Muslims. Although India's membership application to the OIC was rejected on the grounds that Muslims in India were a persecuted minority, the OIC never discussed the condition of Muslims in India. Important events such as the Muslim massacre in Assam in 1983 and the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims are relevant here. The OIC had only a few months earlier (1982) expressed its deep concern over the killing of Muslim Palestinians in Beirut camps. Although the Assam killings did not attract judicial investigation as did the Beirut massacre, the OIC does not seem to have taken any notice of the problem, indeed it was never raised in any international forum.

OIC and the Cultural Unity of Modern Muslims

Beyond their political co-operation activities OIC countries identified the fraternal and spiritual bonds among their peoples. From the very beginning of its existence, the OIC has expressed its determination to safeguard and promote Muslim culture and civilization. Its heads of states and governments declared:

> We . . . pledge ourselves to co-ordinate our efforts in the field of education and culture, so that we may draw on our religious and traditional sources in order to unite the *Ummah*, consolidate its culture and strengthen its solidarity, cleanse our societies of the manifestations of moral laxity and deviation by inculcating moral virtues, protecting our youth from ignorance and from exploitation of material needs of some Muslims to alienate them from their religion.[41]

In order to achieve the unity of the Muslim *ummah*, the OIC

established a number of supporting organs to foster co-operation among Muslim countries. Among these, the Rabat-based Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO); the Istanbul-based Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture; the Jeddah-based Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology and Development (IFSTAD); the International Islamic News Agency (IINA); and the Islamic States Broadcasting Organization (ISBO) are noteworthy.

The Rabat-based Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization receives the highest priority among all OIC organs designed to achieve cultural unity among Muslims. The purpose of this organization is to strengthen co-operation among member states in educational, scientific and cultural research, and to make Islamic culture 'the axis' of the educational curriculum in member countries. ISESCO intends to support 'real Islamic culture, and to protect the independence of Islamic thought from cultural invasion, distortion and debasement'. It further seeks to encourage co-operation among the member states in scientific research, and to develop the applied sciences and advanced technology within the framework of 'permanent Islamic values and ideals'. It also proposes to 'preserve the features of Islamic civilization' and 'protect Islamic identity in non-member countries'. ISESCO also serves to co-ordinate specialized institutions within the OIC dealing with education, science, and culture, and to encourage the co-ordination of similar institutions in member states. In so doing it aims to encourage 'understanding between peoples, and to help maintain peace and security in the world'.[42] These objectives also reflect the OIC's interest in developing a supranational *ummah* identity. In addition to a common educational curriculum based on Islamic teachings for use in all OIC member countries, ISESCO is also interested in developing an *ummah* identity consciousness among Muslims in non-member countries.

These objectives will not be easy to achieve without resolving the basic question about the status of the *ummah* identity: is the supreme identity of the modern Muslim the *ummah* or the nation? In other words, there will need to be a resolution of the relation between Islam and secular European ideas. ISESCO, for example, intends to make Islamic culture

the axis of the educational curriculum for member states and expresses a desire to support 'real Islamic culture, and to protect the independence of Islamic thought against cultural invasion, distortion and debasement'. How does one 'protect' one culture from the influence of another without knowing the character and intensity of the 'invading culture'? Is it possible to ignore the impact of European thought in the modern world? Hardly. Given that it is not possible to avoid the impact of modern European culture, how does a Muslim relate to that culture? ISESCO objectives will be realized only after the nature of Islamic culture itself has been clarified. What is 'real Islamic culture'? Does this phrase mean that all Muslims of the world hold a single opinion about Islamic culture, or is there room for various interpretations? If broad disagreement is possible, then how can the OIC implement its ideas? Does it intend to bring together Muslims holding diverse opinions to discuss their differences? Or will it impose a single set of approved opinions on all Muslims? ISESCO activities to date do not suggest a desire to find solutions to such critical questions.

In another of its objectives the ISESCO intends to find 'ways and means to protect the Islamic identity in non-member countries'. ISESCO has not explained what it means by the nature of 'Islamic identity' which it intends to protect in non-member countries. Is this Islamic identity clearly understood in member countries? What is its relationship to the nation-state identity? What does a Muslim do when his Muslim identity and his nation-state identity clash with each other? When these countries fought for independence from European colonialists, they argued that they were different from their colonial masters because they were Muslims; when they became independent, they accepted the European idea of nationalism. We have treated this crisis of modern Muslim majority nation-states earlier in this work, and ISESCO seems to be aware of this. Pointing to Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, an editorial of its journal *Islam Today* notes that:

> . . . having gained their political independence, they were still far from restoring their identity. For those were only formal changes with no bearing on their state of cultural alienation.

> On the contrary, colonialists made deliberate attempts to deepen and widen such alienation in the minds of generations who received their training in the West and who were profoundly influenced by its culture and other features of its materialistic civilization.
>
> As they gained formal independence, Third World countries found themselves besieged by the blocs of industrialized powers, whose designs for political influence were disguised by the notion of economic and cultural dependence.[43]

If this historical sketch is accepted, then the question arises, why have these countries not tried to restore their identity since they have achieved their formal independence? After over three decades of independence, the issue sounds out-of-date. Why should the OIC countries still suffer from cultural alienation and feel cut off from their past, now that they have gained control over their affairs? Why haven't they devised ways to 'restore their cultural identity'? Granted that European colonialists caused this alienation by providing training to Muslims during the colonial period, why do these countries still send their young people to Europe and North America for the same kind of training? ISESCO does not seem to have an answer to these questions; it does not appear to have devised any plan for dealing with them. ISESCO intends to develop an educational curriculum for its member states based on its idea of cultural identity; it does not appear from ISESCO documents that it has succeeded in developing such a plan as yet. ISESCO problems reflect the identity crisis of modern Muslims; they are aware of the need for European technology but are so far unable to integrate European technological ideas with their traditional world-view.

ISESCO is conscious of its role within the OIC system. It claims in its Annual Report that it was created to 'achieve unity and harmony within the Muslim *Ummah*' and states that it intends to work in 'the very sensitive areas which determine the civilizational future of nations'.[44] The Director General of the ISESCO thinks that the organization has been established on firm ground, and that it is, therefore, in a position to achieve its goals. In an editorial in its journal, the Director General notes that:

> ISESCO was established on firm cultural premises, and not on the flimsy grounds of politics. Had this been the case, it would have become entangled in inter-state differences and conflicts of interest. It would have stumbled and flinched in search of uncertain objectives. Instead it emerged as the true expression of Islamic revival and as a tool for promoting and expanding Islamic knowledge while enhancing its adaptability and its responsiveness to the challenges of progress and evolution.[45]

Despite the organization's non-political character, the Moroccan King used the platform at a 1983 ISESCO Conference to attack an OIC member country not present at the Conference.[46] The OIC does not seem to be worried about this use of the ISESCO platform for political purposes; the Foreign Ministers' Conference has continued to support the Moroccan government's 'special' role in ISESCO affairs.[47]

The most interesting of all OIC educational attempts to develop an *ummah* identity consciousness among Muslims involves Islamic history and tradition. This effort is especially interesting because it originated in a secular republic, Turkey. Inspired by the Saudi Monarch Faisal bin Abdul Aziz, the government of Turkey proposed the establishment of a research centre for Islamic history, art and culture.[48] Turkey itself was requested to submit a detailed study on the subject, and eventually the Istanbul-based Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture, known within the OIC circle as the Istanbul Center, came into being.

The Istanbul Center claims to be an institution where scientists, historians, writers and artists from all OIC countries can carry out research on the common legacy of 'the brotherly peoples of all the Islamic countries'. The Center aims at creating a setting for close co-operation among historians and writers from various Islamic countries, 'in order to put an end to the prejudices spread by some foreign writers, as regards the history, art and culture of the Muslims'. It also plans to publish books and monographs, aimed at creating 'an environment of understanding and sincere friendship among Muslims', and to issue a quarterly review of the history, art and culture of Islamic countries and thus propagate the fundamental principles of

Islamic civilization. In so doing, it wants in particular to 'correct all baseless information, which still exists in the textbooks in some Muslim states and which might give rise to discord among future generations of Muslims'. One of the Center's objectives is the promotion of co-operation and the exchange of books on history, art and culture among universities and research institutions in the member countries. It also intends to organize periodic seminars, symposia, and congresses, hosted by either the Center itself or by one of the member states.[49]

Explaining the role of the Center, the Turkish Prime Minister, now President, said:

> The Islamic world is in dire need of solidarity and this can be achieved by culture which is the basic element in the formation of a society. To realise the idea of the solidarity of the Muslim *Ummah*, we have to obtain the goal of cultural solidarity . . . We must also remember that we are confronted with many complex problems each claiming a priority but the culture should merit our utmost attention. It is hoped that to obtain the much desired future, this Center is going to play a pivotal role.[50]

It is interesting to note that a Turkish leader now views Islamic solidarity as a dire need, given that earlier Turkish leaders viewed any attempt to organize Muslims on the basis of an *ummah* identity as valueless and attempts to organize the Muslim masses in Turkey on the basis of Islamic ideas as unconstitutional.

It is also interesting to note that the Center plans to re-evaluate Islamic history. In discussing the need for the history project the Center newsletter explains:

> There is a need for re-writing and re-interpreting Islamic history. This has become absolutely necessary under the changed circumstances obtaining in the world in the post-colonial era. This will help in fostering closer co-operation among the Muslim countries by trying to remove the clouds of distrust and causes of dissension which have been a legacy of the past. The importance of this project is therefore self-evident and need not be over-emphasised.[51]

Why precisely does the OIC need to re-evaluate and re-interpret Islamic history? What is wrong with the histories written so far? Is the only reason the desire to 'put an end to the prejudices spread by some foreign writers', as the Center states? It is scarcely true that only foreign writers have written history books on Muslim peoples; Muslim historians have also written on the subject. Does the Center intend to re-interpret or modify the historical views of some Muslim historians also? The Turks were the first Muslims to abandon the *ummah* identity and to subscribe to secular nationalism. After the birth of the Turkish Republic, history books were re-written emphasizing the role of ethnic Turks in history. If the Center intends to revise this class of historical works and to re-evaluate them from an *ummah* point of view, this would reflect a major alteration in modern Islamic development.

The Center's role is important, critical and sensitive, for it claims to deal with problems of the cultural interaction of the modern Muslim people. Muslims throughout history have been in contact with many alien cultures and civilizations; sometimes they have influenced and sometimes they themselves have been influenced by those cultures. Contact with modern European culture and civilization was different: when the Muslims encountered modern Europeans, they suffered military defeat; they displayed a defeated mentality. With the development of the European concept of nationalism, the *ummah* identity suffered a setback. The OIC, to be sure, was established on the basis of both these ideas, the traditional and historical idea of the *ummah*, and the modern idea of the nation, and so the OIC, facing challenges from both angles, is awkwardly placed to look back into history.

In order to respond to the demands of Muslim unity, therefore, the OIC needs to take into account the problematic relationship between European secular thought and Islamic thought. Until this relationship is clarified, it will be difficult for the OIC to achieve its goals. The OIC has established organizations, made plans, but it is far from achieving solutions to major problems.

Co-operation Among OIC Countries on Economic Issues

OIC heads of states and governments expressed their awareness of the potential for co-operation among themselves in economic and financial matters from the very beginning of the OIC's existence. This awareness is also reflected in the OIC Charter. Noting what it called 'the absence of political will' on the part of developed countries, the OIC declared that 'it was necessary for Islamic countries to resort first and foremost to the mobilization and to the revalorization of their national resources, to ensure the economic and social welfare of their people'. It expressed hope that 'the member states of the Conference would extend to one another their support and solidarity in their respective national endeavours aimed at securing the mobilization of their resources for development purposes'.[52] The OIC resolved to join its members' material resources with Muslim spiritual bonds to encourage the overall development of the society. The OIC vowed to achieve economic independence from industrialized countries and to that end set up a 'special Committee of Representatives and Experts', later known as the Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs.[53] This became the main advisory body of the OIC. The Committee prepared a 'General Agreement for Economic, Technical and Commercial Co-operation Among the Member States of the Islamic Conference' (hereafter referred to as the General Agreement), in order to foster co-operation among these countries.

The General Agreement urged member states 'to provide necessary arrangements, guarantees and incentives to encourage the transfer of capital and investments among themselves'. This move was intended to promote the socio-economic development of all Islamic countries and to open up new avenues for the optimum utilization of the economic resources available within the Islamic world. The Agreement also urged member states to encourage joint projects which would 'realize broad economic benefits and advantages'. Such projects, according to the Agreement, would complement member states' economies. The Agreement also urged member states to 'co-operate in preparing various studies to explore and identify

the possibilities and opportunities of investing in joint projects'. It recommended that member states encourage the maximum potential for food production within Islamic countries, and that they co-operate in seeking to satisfy their food requirements within the Islamic world.[54]

The General Agreement is certainly correct in its estimate of the potential for co-operation among the member countries. Among the OIC's members there are capital-abundant countries such as Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich countries, and there are capital-scarce, labour-abundant countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey. Among its members there are food importing countries such as Saudi Arabia and other similar economies, and there are food exporting countries such as Pakistan and Turkey. Moreover, many of its member states have the potential to increase food production significantly. There are nation-states among its members which export manufactured goods such as Malaysia, Turkey, Pakistan and many others import them. Geographically, most of these countries are quite close at least compared to their non-OIC trade partners. Most importantly, there are member countries which possess great potential for economic growth but lack resources for development, including Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia. On the other hand, some members of the OIC have turned into financial giants in the international money market. In short, there is potential for economic flexibility among the member countries of the OIC; if the General Agreement were to be implemented, it would not take long for the OIC to achieve its economic goals. We shall discuss OIC activities in food and agriculture, and in scientific, technological and similar other areas of co-operation in order to point to the dilemma of the modern Muslim society.

In a resolution on the 'food situation in OIC countries' in 1978 the Ninth Conference of Foreign Ministers noted that most member countries depended on external sources to meet part of their food requirements even though many of them possess vast areas of arable and grazing land.[55] The OIC is, indeed, correct in this analysis. While some member countries import substantial amounts of food and agricultural products from outside, some have the potential to increase food production substantially. The OIC countries have the potential to produce annually 75 million

tons of grain by the year 2000, and this can be done by cultivating only 50 million hectares out of 2200 million hectares available to these countries. The Sudan alone is reported to have the cultivable land needed to produce adequate food to feed the population of all these countries.[56] A variety of member countries have the potential to increase substantially the amount of cocoa, coffee, cotton, jute, natural rubber, rice, timber and breeding animals they produce.

In light of this tremendous potential, the OIC decided to convene a meeting of Ministers of Agriculture of the member states to discuss the recommendations of its experts on the issue. Egypt offered to host the Agriculture Ministers' Conference, which was scheduled to be held in 1979.[57] However, the Egypt conference never took place, perhaps because of Egypt's isolation from the OIC for political reasons. But the following year's Conference of Foreign Ministers noted with satisfaction that the Committee on Food and Agriculture of the Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs had made important policy recommendations directed towards the goal of achieving food security in the Islamic world. In order to proceed further with these recommendations, the OIC still needed a meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture and it accepted the offer of the government of Mali to host such a meeting.[58] But it appears that the meeting was not held on schedule. In another Resolution a year later the Foreign Ministers' Conference (1980) expressed regret that because of insufficient response from member states the meeting of Ministers of Agriculture could not be held. The resolution, however, noted that the Committee on Food and Agriculture was able to clarify its recommendations after several further meetings. The government of Mali was requested to announce another date for the meeting and an appeal was made to all member states to respond favourably to the call.[59]

Meanwhile, the Ankara-based OIC affiliated institution, the Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries, known within the OIC circle as the Ankara Centre, prepared a document entitled 'The Food Problem in Islamic Countries and Proposals for Future Action.' A number of recommendations were made, among them the diversion of resources to land reclamation programmes through

agricultural banks and the creation of incentives for the rural population by (a) discontinuing the practice of keeping food prices artificially low through compulsory procurement; (b) generating more agricultural employment; and (c) introducing land reforms. The proposal also urged member states of the OIC to put emphasis on growing more staple foods such as wheat and rice, and on developing animal husbandry. It urged that arrangements for the intra-OIC transfer of existing technologies be made, placing particular emphasis on labour-intensive technologies. The document also recommended the exchange of information and the promotion of technical know-how through existing research and educational institutions in member countries. It urged the creation of regional food reserve stocks for use in emergencies, and the concentration on areas of comparative advantage, i.e. complementaries such as labour-rich, capital-poor countries supplying manpower to and receiving capital from a labour-poor, capital-rich country. The document recommended that OIC member states undertake joint ventures, particularly in producing tractors, fertilizers and seeds, and in building necessary infrastructures. It also recommended the close co-ordination of national food and agriculture policies. The document proposed the creation of a special fund aimed at creating additional facilities for storing and building up food resources. It also recommended that a system of consultations be established to help in translating some of the recommendations into effective programmes of action.[60]

The OIC has not implemented these recommendations. It has consistently admitted in its resolutions that food production can be increased, and that food self-sufficiency among its member states can be achieved by adopting the recommended measures. The member states do not, however, seem to have taken the recommendations seriously. After these recommendations were submitted to the OIC, an Action Plan was announced at the Third Islamic Summit Conference (1981). The Conference made an appeal, through the Saudi Monarch, for funds to support the economic development of Muslim countries. The Action Plan outlined some practical steps to implement the recommendations of the Ankara Centre.[61] But the proposed Agriculture Ministers' meeting in Mali was cancelled for the

second time. But one meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture of OIC countries was at last held in Ankara, Turkey in 1981. According to one report the ministers agreed to allocate US $1.5 billion for agriculture and food security. They are also reported to have decided to create stocks of basic foods in certain key locations. A permanent follow-up committee was formed with representatives from Pakistan, Senegal, Turkey and the UAE.[62] In order to implement the resolutions the OIC needed further meetings between Ministers of Agriculture. Sudan offered to hold the next such meeting. But it appears that the meeting was never held. In a Foreign Ministers' Conference held in 1983, it was noted in a Resolution that because of its inability to host the meeting the proposed meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture could not be held. In its resolution on the subject, however, the OIC maintained its rhetoric and expressed concern about the slow progress on the issue.[63]

A number of other agencies active in OIC member countries have attempted to achieve major agricultural objectives. In 1975, for example, the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development drew up a 25-year Master Plan to make the Sudan the 'breadbasket of the Arab world'. Under the Plan, by the end of the first 10 years, the country was to produce 42 per cent of the region's vegetable oil import needs, along with 20 per cent of its sugar, 15 per cent of its wheat, and 58 per cent of its livestock import needs.[64] In 1980, a number of Sudani projects were started in sectors such as dairy, poultry, fruit and vegetables; the results have not been reported so far. A Khartoum-based organization, the Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, has drawn up a US $33 billion programme for food security in the Arab world. Experts in the Programme have reportedly completed 300 studies on such subjects as grain, vegetable oils, meat and fertilizers. The results of these projects have not been reported.

There are genuine problems in achieving the goals of the OIC in agriculture and food production. Pointing to the case of the Sudan, which has the highest potential and has received the highest priority from all parties concerned, one report says:

> Sudan's experience shows that money and good intentions alone are not enough to improve agricultural output.

> Despite huge investment by the Gulf states and the Khartoum government, many of its projects have turned out to be failures, or have not progressed from the drawing board to the field. Without the participation of the farmers in the planning, without adequate training facilities, and the necessary roads, power and marketing installations, even those projects which get under way face obstacles that can actually reduce fertility. Crops that are harvested can rot if storage and distribution facilities are poorly organized, or if they are in the wrong place.[65]

One major reason for such poor organization is negligence on the part of the national governments. Again pointing to the case of the Sudan, one report claims that because of the failure of the Sudanese government to educate the farmers properly, the country is suffering from desertification. If this process continues, 'Sudan will not only join the ranks of its troubled neighbours but probably head the list'.[66] Thus it appears that there is a lack of commitment by national governments in implementing OIC resolutions.

Apart from the issue of self-sufficiency in food and agricultural production there is a potential for trade in food and agricultural products within the OIC community. A study conducted by the Islamic Development Bank, an affiliated institution of the OIC, shows that through the process of trade-diversion and trade-generation self-sufficiency can be achieved among the OIC countries in a number of essential food items including meat, cereal, wheat, rice and sugar.[67] The study prescribes a number of steps to achieve this goal. Co-operation among OIC member countries does not seem headed in this direction however. According to the present trade pattern among OIC countries, two studies conducted in 1977 and 1983 found that the main importers of Turkey's livestock are Italy and France, while the exporter of Indonesia's livestock is France. Lebanon and Turkey export butter to the United Kingdom and Belgium, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries import butter from the European Community and Australia. Australia and New Zealand are increasingly challenging Somalia's supply of livestock to Saudi Arabia, because the former two countries are reported to be regular in their supply and able to supply well-packed goods.[68]

In order to foster co-operation among Muslim countries in the fields of science and technology the OIC founded the Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology and Development (IFSTAD) with its headquarters in Jeddah. The IFSTAD seeks to promote and encourage research in science and technology 'within the Islamic framework' in order to help solve the current problems of the Muslim world and of mankind in general. It also aims at strengthening the bonds of Islamic solidarity. The IFSTAD hopes to ensure that all member states of the OIC, both individually and collectively, are able to make the greatest possible use of science in the formation and implementation of their socio-economic plans, keeping in mind the need to 'consolidate the unique Islamic personality and character'.[69]

The IFSTAD's realm of responsibility is wide. The organization deals with manpower and social affairs, population and health, and technical co-operation. Among the Foundation's priorities is the establishment of an institution for the study, research and publication of Islamic values on science and technology. It defines its range of particular interests as:

> Islamic theory, philosophy, and systematization of science and technology; history of Muslim science and technology (including the medieval and modern interaction between the Muslim and other legacies in science and technology); Islamic sociology and ethics of science and technology, and of science and society; creativity and psychosociology of scientific research (historical and contemporary); Islamic economics of science and technology; Islamic analysis and assessment of scientific and technological potential (personnel, institutions, funds, facilities, etc.); Islamic theory, and Muslim practices of science and technology policy-making and legislation at the global, regional and national levels; Islamic scope for and constraints on the transfer, diffusion and implementation of science and technology, specially of contemporary non-Muslim origins; Islamic organization and management of scientific and technological activities of the levels of the performers and institutions; pan-Islamic, regional, and international co-operation, policy and legislation in science and technology, Islamic societal analysis and

assessment of the content and results of scientific and technological plans and projects etc.[70]

This statement makes it clear that the IFSTAD plans to go beyond the economic aspect of co-operation among OIC countries; to deal with questions of ethics, values and morality. The statement reflects a concern about the way in which European concepts of science and technology are related to the Islamic system of ethics, values and morality. Indeed, is there any relation between ethics, values and economics today? Is technology value free? The medieval Islamic philosopher Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) argued that research in the pure sciences such as physics, chemistry, mathematics did not clash with Islamic values. But he pointed to problems with the influence of Greek thought in theology and philosophy. Modern 'scientific' subjects such as economics and sociology also challenge Islamic values. When Adam Smith, a professor of moral philosophy, wrote his famous *Wealth of Nations* (1776), he was concerned with the fate of workers in the newly-emerging industrialized society, but his book became a cornerstone of capitalism. Economics seems to have been taken as a value-free subject since then. Technology, too, tends to be treated in the same way, but technology is no more value-free than economics. For example: is it ethically right, despite economic advantages, to force-feed an animal in order to increase its rate of growth? Other questions of a similar nature could be raised. The IFSTAD does not seem to have addressed these questions as yet.

The IFSTAD has taken greater interest in arranging consultancies for the OIC community in scientific and technological matters. According to the first Director General of IFSTAD, 93 per cent of the scientific consultations in Muslim countries are done by experts from the industrially-developed, non-Muslim nations, although highly qualified Muslim consultants are available. IFSTAD has compiled a list of Muslim consultants with their addresses and fields of specialization and has made the list available to OIC member countries. The list includes Muslim professionals working in highly industrialized non-Muslim countries.[71]

The IFSTAD has a programme for developing Muslim

manpower. Through its scholarships it proposes (1) to encourage qualified students to pursue advanced studies free of financial hardships; (2) to develop highly developed manpower; (3) to help develop independent research capabilities; (4) to reduce the brain-drain (to industrialized countries); (5) to increase the transfer of technology to Muslim countries and communities; (6) to promote the overall development of higher education; (7) to promote co-operation, interaction and understanding among Muslim countries and communities; and (8) to help Muslims retain and develop their Islamic identity.[72] The applicant for an IFSTAD scholarship has to be a Muslim.

During the academic year 1983–84, the first year of the IFSTAD's programme of scholarship, it offered 160 scholarships, over half, 99 to Muslim communities in non-member countries.[73] The emphasis on Muslim minority countries suggests that the IFSTAD, in addition to economic motives intends to encourage a supranational *ummah* consciousness, which is in effect, the most important goal of the OIC itself. The IFSTAD programmes might suggest that the OIC is most interested in encouraging a Muslim identity in non-member countries, believing that the Muslim identity is completely secured in member countries. As we have pointed out in the previous chapter, the status of the *ummah* identity is, we believe, not clearly defined in Muslim-majority OIC member countries.

The IFSTAD programmes also reflect an interest in curbing the brain-drain from member countries. Muslim migration from North Africa, the Middle East, and South and South East Asian countries to Western Europe and North America increased significantly after the Second World War in order to meet the labour requirements in those areas. Furthermore, in the 1950s and 1960s the newly-independent Muslim nation-states began to send students for higher training to those countries. Many of these students never returned to their home countries even after successfully completing their studies. This happened for two reasons: because their native countries were not sufficiently developed to provide them with proper jobs; and because their native countries were not in a position to offer 'adequate' financial rewards. Many Muslims also migrated to the industrially-developed, democratic countries for political reasons.

The IFSTAD identifies three types of brain-drain from OIC countries. Migration of labourers, skilled and unskilled, is the first kind of brain-drain. The second is the movement of highly qualified persons from the OIC sphere from capital-poor to capital-rich countries. The third type takes place within a particular country, when talented persons are unemployed.[74] The first kind of brain-drain has decreased significantly since the 1970s because of restrictions imposed by industrialized countries on immigration, and also because of new possibilities for better and more lucrative jobs in oil-rich Muslim countries. The study does not treat the saddest kind of brain-drain from Muslim countries, i.e. the phenomenon of illegal immigration to mostly industrial countries. Many Muslims, usually highly educated, travel to European and North American countries to attend academic institutions. Because of financial problems some end up looking for illegal jobs; usually they find only odd jobs. Once they enter this kind of employment, they risk ruining their lives.[75] Frequently this happens because of political problems in their home countries.

The problems of economic co-operation among OIC countries reflects the crisis of contemporary Muslim society. In spite of all its potential for stimulating economic growth, the OIC has failed to trigger the 'take off' of its member countries' economies. In its analysis of the economic situation of its member countries, the OIC blames industrialized countries for 'deteriorating trade terms' between the developed and developing countries. It accuses developed countries of lacking the political will to share economic growth with the developing countries and of failing to transfer technology to developing countries.[76] In reality, however, it may be that the OIC countries themselves lack the will to change the situation in their favour. It certainly seems that their activities reveal a lack of commitment. For example, the meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture, scheduled twice in Mali, could not be held on either date because of the lack of response. OIC countries have similarly failed to co-operate in initiating economic activities in other areas, despite the high comparative advantages existing among them. OIC countries also seem to lack managerial skill: collectively, they possess all the necessary elements for co-operation; they have the manpower, technological know-

how, capital for investment, and the requisite land and raw materials. Yet the OIC has failed to marshal and combine all these resources for economic development.

Political suppression and moreover political instability has created some shocking conditions. Many Muslim workers remain in Western countries not because of the attractions of these countries, but because they can find no market for their skills and talents at home. Many other Muslims do not return home because of unfavourable political environments in their home countries. Most capital-rich countries prefer to invest in industrialized countries, and indeed, Muslim individuals working in oil-rich countries also prefer to invest in Western countries because of political and economic instability in OIC countries. The OIC countries themselves bear the major responsibility for this aspect of their economic plight.

The strongest force inhibiting the success of the OIC is the secular concept of national sovereignty. The member states remain stronger than the mother organization because of their commitment to national sovereignty. Following the custom of modern international law based on the idea of national sovereignty, the OIC has considered the problem of a particular nation within the *ummah* as a problem of the nation concerned. Now the question is: why has the OIC identified with the problems of the Muslim *ummah*, while it has repeatedly failed to take decisive measures to achieve goals related to these problems? This can be explained only by the fact that these commitments earn legitimacy for the ruling elites. In spite of the dominance of nation-states, many Muslims continue to subscribe to the traditional ideas of *ummah* and Islamic brotherhood. Such Islamic ideas have become more powerful since the Arab defeat in 1967; thus the OIC has repeatedly expressed its commitment to the idea of the *ummah* and Islamic brotherhood when adopting resolutions. It appears that the ruling elites in Muslim countries have attempted to respond to increased Islamic activism by making commitments to Islamic unity. The failure of the OIC, however, raises the question as to whether the idea of *ummah* unity in contemporary times is valid at all? Is the *ummah* simply a myth? In response, it might be said that the *ummah* as a social, political and religious unit existed in history. Its political unity, however, was destroyed at a very early stage.

However, Muslims have always been committed to its law and have aspired to acquire this unity. It is for this reason that rulers in Muslim countries throughout the last fourteen hundred years have made commitments for such a cause. In this sense, it would be correct to say that even though the *ummah* unity appeared to be a myth in recent history, it has been a life-giving myth in Muslim society. Why the idea of Muslim unity has not worked in reality is an issue which needs more research. But the continued expression of commitment to Muslim unity without related acts could lead to disastrous consequences for society.

Notes and References

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2. On this subject, see Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

3. OIC General Secretariat, 'Declarations of the First Islamic Summit Conference', *OIC Declarations and Resolutions of Heads of States and Ministers of Foreign Affairs Conferences 1389–1401 H. (1969–1981)*, n.d., p. 18.

4. See the Charter of the OIC in the present author's work *OIC: Introduction to an Islamic Political Institution* (Herndon, VA.: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1988), pp. 127–34.

5. *Declarations and Resolutions*, p. 23.

6. OIC document IS/3–81/CS/D.2.

7. Islamic Development Bank, *Eighth Annual Report 1403, 1982–1983*, p. 120.

8. The word 'Muslim' comes from the Arabic verb *aslama*, to surrender. Traditionally, it has been understood that the word '*muslim*' refers to 'one who surrenders to the will of Allah'.

9. OIC resolution 1/8–AF (Administrative-Financial).

10. Among these countries only Saudi Arabia did not ratify the UN Declaration on Human Rights, arguing that Islamic values were enough to ensure human rights.

11. The Zionist Movement originally began in the late nineteenth century with the aim of establishing a Jewish state. The movement succeeded in creating the State of Israel in Palestine in 1948, and gradually expanded its territory. The Movement aims at expanding the territory of this Jewish state.

12. For a detailed account on OIC activities on the Palestinian issue, see *OIC: An Introduction*, pp. 57–63.

13. See any PLO publication on the issue.

14. Resolution 8/10–P (Political).

15. Resolution 18/10–P (Political).

16. Resolution 1/4–P (IS) (Islamic Summit Conference).

17. Resolution 1/4–ORG (IS) (Organizational, Islamic Summit Conference).

18. See 'OIC Summit: Egypt's Casablanca Comeback', *Arabia* (March 1981), p. 15.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Ibid.*

21. See 'PLO: National War or Jihad?', *Arabia* (October 1983), p. 30.

22. See 'Arafat Renews His Call for Jihad', *Arabia* (August 1984), p. 7.

23. OIC document A/39/133, S/16417 (English), p. 290.

24. Resolution 10/4.

25. Resolution 11/8–P (Political).

26. Resolution 12/3.

27. Resolution 4/4.

28. Resolution 8/5–P.

29. See 'Muslims in the Philippines: What Role for the Islamic Conference?', *Impact* (14–27 June, 1974), p. 5.

30. *Ibid.*

31. For a historical background to the conflict, see C.A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press for the Asian Center, 1973), and Peter Gowing, 'The Muslim Filipino Minority', *The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major*, ed. Raphael Israeli (London: Curzon Press, 1982), pp. 211–26. Also see 'Philippines: The Roots of Moro Identity', *Arabia* (July 1982), pp. 24–33.

32. For the official record of the agreement, see *Impact* (11–24 February, 1977).

33. On the proposals of the referendum, see *Impact* (22 April–12 May, 1977), p. 7.

34. *Ibid.*

35. See 'The Roots of Moro Identity', *Arabia* (July 1982), p. 31.

36. 'Philippines: Dangerous Threshold', *Impact* (13–26 May, 1977), p. 7.

37. Resolutions 7/8–P and 20/9–P.

38. *Impact* (10–23 June, 1977).

39. See 'Marcos Woos the Saudis', *Arabia* (May 1982).

40. Resolutions 17/13–P and 26/14–P.

41. See *Declarations and Resolutions*, p. 721.

42. *OIC: An Introduction*, p. 86.

43. See 'Editorial', *Islam Today*, 1 (April 1983), p. 9.

44. 'Progress Report of the Director General of ISESCO at the First General Conference', *Islam Today*, 2 (April 1984), pp. 98–107.

45. Abdelhaid Boutaleb, 'Editorial', *Islam Today*, 1:9.

46. See the Moroccan King's attack on Iran, 'His Majesty King Hassan II's speech at the closing session of ISESCO Consultative Committee', *Islam Today*, 1: pp. 56–60 and particularly p. 59.

47. See Resolutions 3/13–C (Cultural) and 1/14–C.

48. Resolution 18/7 ECS (Economic, Cultural and Social) and the interview of the Director General of the Istanbul-based Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture in 'Regarding Islamic Heritage', *Arabia* (March 1984), pp. 81–2.

49. OIC: General Secretariat, *Organization of the Islamic Conference*, n.d. [1981], p. 62.

50. OIC, Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, *Newsletter*, O.I.C. Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, 2 (November 1982), p. 3.

51. *Newsletter*, No. 1 (May 1982), p. 6.

52. Resolution 3/2 (IS).

53. Resolutions 5/5–E and 6/7–E.

54. Resolution 1/8–E. The Resolution is followed by the complete version of the General Agreement. See *Declarations and Resolutions*, pp. 274–7.

55. Resolution 10/9–E (Economic).

56. On this subject, see Ahmad S. Heiba, 'Agricultural Resources in the Muslim World: Capacity and Future Growth', *The Muslim World and the Future Economic Order* (London: Islamic Council of Europe, 1977), pp. 296–315.

57. Resolution 10/9–E.

58. Resolution 12/10–E.

59. Resolution 6/11–E.

60. OIC, Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries, 'The Food Problem in Islamic Countries and Proposals for Future Action', *Areas of Economic Co-operation Among Islamic Countries*, (1980), pp. 71–3.

61. See the Action Plan in *Declarations and Resolutions*, pp. 780 and ff.

62. See *Arabia* (December 1981), p. 81.

63. Resolution 8/14–E.

64. See 'Dangerous Dependence', *Arabia* (June 1982).

65. *Ibid.*

66. See 'The Desert: Sudan's Manmade Disaster', *Arabia* (January 1984), pp. 56–7.

67. Suat Sksuz, *Potential for Trade Expansion Among Member Countries of the Islamic Development Bank* (Staff Research Paper No. 001), (Jeddah: Economic and Policy Planning Department, Islamic Development Bank, 1984).

68. See Monzer Kahf, 'International Trade Patterns in the Muslim Countries', *The Muslim World and Future Economic Order*, pp. 201–7. Also see 'Somalia: Host of Problems', *Arabia* (December 1983), p. 59. For statistical data of potential co-operation among OIC countries, see 'The Food Problem in Islamic Countries and Proposals for Future Action', *Areas of Economic Co-operation Among Muslim Countries*, pp. 75–91.

69. OIC, IFSTAD, *IFSTAD: Its Policies and Objectives* (IFSTAD Document No. 2), n.d.

70. See Ziauddin Sardar, *Science and Technology in the Middle East: A Guide to Issues, Organizations and Institutions* (London: Longman, 1982), pp. 111–12.

71. OIC, IFSTAD, *Consultancy Service* (IFSTAD Document No. 7, n.d.) and *Consultants' Profiles* (IFSTAD Document No. 11, 1984).

72. OIC, IFSTAD, *Scholarship Programme* (IFSTAD Document No. 4, 1984).

73. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

74. OIC, IFSTAD, *L'Exode des Competences: Etude Preliminarie* (IFSTAD Document No. 10, n.d.).

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76. See Resolutions 1/10–E, 2/11–E, 1/12–E, etc.

CHAPTER 5

Some Concluding Remarks

The problematic relationship between European secular thought and traditional Islamic ideas has created an identity crisis in contemporary Muslim society. However, some researchers have suggested that this problem is not unique to Muslim society. A number of American scholars, after analysing the situation in their own society, suggested that although the problem existed, it could be overcome by ignoring certain identities. The scholars said:

> In an interview with children, Hartley, Rosenbaum and Schwartz (1948) found that multiple group membership did not seem to cause problems. The reply of a five years old child illustrates one novel, but workable solution. 'I'm Jewish when I am awake; when I am asleep I am American'.[1]

But, as illustrated in the earlier chapters, the situation in Muslim society is different. A Muslim does not always identify himself as a member of his nation-state when he is asleep. He is generally conscious of his multiple identities when he is awake. Therefore a solution which could be *noble* and *workable* in American society has not been workable in a Muslim society. In fact the solution to the problem given by the five-year-old boy is not workable even in American society. Deprived minorities such as the Afro-Americans and Spanish Americans do not take their American identity so casually. Therefore, it is proper to

raise the question of where does an individual's supreme loyalty lie when his/her identities are in conflict? In our opinion this will depend on the nature and philosophy of the ideology of a given identity. For any ideology to lay successful claim to the supreme loyalty of an individual it should be able to accommodate other identities within it.

The whole of mankind belongs to one family; but within this family every individual human being is different from one another; each of us carries a personal identity. Since we live in a society, our background, our environment and our education lead us to create various other identities within ourselves. For a person may be a member of a particular family, of a particular ethnic group, of a particular geographical territory, of a particular religious group, or of a certain socio-political entity. A person can bear two or more of these identities at the same time. The existence of multiple identities in a given society is an undisputed reality. Now the question that we need to address is: how can a person resolve a situation of conflict between two or more identities? In such a situation that person must define the preference of his identities in order for him to function in society.

Only a stronger philosophical and ideological foundation of an identity will be able to claim the supreme loyalty of an individual. The ideology of the supreme identity should be strong enough to generate a sense of unity among its adherents and at the same time it should be flexible enough to accommodate other identities within its fold. The ideology of the supreme identity should also be able to provide an individual with a sound ideal to inspire and guide him in all aspects of his life. This ideology should also be able to develop certain mechanisms to maintain an organic relationship between freedom, individual responsibility and morality. In fact, the ideology of the supreme identity will need to provide its adherents with universally applicable values which will lead them to develop these mechanisms. Most importantly, an adherent should have the freedom of choice in adopting the ideology of his supreme loyalty. Any pre-determined factor weakens an ideology.

From the standpoint of European secular thought, Western civilization has defined nationalism, to be more specific

nation-states, as the ideology of the supreme identity of modern man. A common racial origin, language, history, religion, culture, common economic interests, and the fact of geography are some of the fundamental characteristics of nationalism. The main weakness of nationalism is that it is pre-determined by a person's birth: a person has very little choice in determining his or her national origin. The characteristics of nationalism, in fact, are not sufficient factors to define most nation-states that exist today. The idea of nationalism is also generally very rigid: it does not easily accommodate the existence of any other identity within itself. It must be mentioned here that some modern nation-states particularly the USA and Canada, have recognized the existence of other identities based on race, language and culture to accommodate immigrants from various parts of the world. But as reflected earlier in the statement of the five-year-old boy, this accommodation has not enabled the nation-state identity to claim the supreme loyalty of its citizens.

The idea of nationalism has not been able to develop any mechanism to maintain an organic relationship between freedom, individual responsibility and morality. The failure of nationalism has also been reflected in formulating an ideal to inspire and guide modern man. In fact, Western civilization lost the connection between itself and values with the distinction drawn by its famous prophet Immanuel Kant (1724–1804); that is, between what he called the *noumenal* world and the *phenomenal* world. Values of the phenomenal world failed to create a sustained ideal for the Western man. This has led many Westerners to look for an all-encompassing philosophy to inspire and guide modern man. Pointing out this need, W.C. Smith rightly says:

> . . . for all of us, in any nation, the question of ideas is of utterly crucial practical importance – of ideals and their relation to immediate history. It is quite possible . . . that North America, despite its technological prowess, material affluence and tolerably adequate political structure, may lead itself and the world to inconceivable disaster because of intellectual shallowness, moral obtuseness, or an inadequate vitality of its ideals.[2]

The question we need to ask in the present context is whether the Muslim society will be able to develop such a system that will enable its members to choose their supreme identity and whether this will have an impact on the world at large. An impact? Of course, there will be. After critically evaluating the role of Islamic ideology in modern history Smith says:

> Indeed, the various intellectual and moral issues are today themselves internationalized. We would contend that a healthy, flourishing Islam is important not only for the Muslims but for all the world today.[3]

Again the question is how will the Muslims develop this mechanism? In Islam, theoretically speaking, one definitely finds an all-encompassing ideology. It accommodates other identities within its fold (49: 13) and it has the potential to inspire and guide its adherents. Most importantly, a community established in the light of Qur'ānic teachings existed in history and the Muslim community today views it as an ideal community. But it is also a fact of history that this ideal community existed only for a short period of time. And with the development of nationalism the Islamic *ummah* identity has lost the status of the supreme identity of Muslims. Many contemporary Muslim thinkers and scholars have noted this dilemma of the Muslim community and have put forward ideas for its solution. A Pakistani intellectual, Altaf Gauhar, has said:

> Western cultural imperialism has been able to influence and undermine our beliefs, values, attitudes and manners and the task before us is to reassert our identity and to reach for our destiny. I am not advocating revivalism. Societies move forward not backward. They move forward through a sustained process of cultural assimilation, cohesion and continuity. The past cannot be revived but it can be restructured and this we cannot do unless we rediscover and reinterpret the beliefs and the values enshrined in the Holy Qur'an and made available to us as a living and everlasting model in the life of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).[4]

It is perhaps fairer to say that Muslims themselves have not

been able to adjust to the developments and discoveries in Europe rather than saying that Western cultural imperialism has been able to undermine Muslim beliefs and values. It is easier to find a solution to the problem if the root cause is identified within the community instead of blaming others.

Gauhar's advocacy for Qur'ānic beliefs and values is confusing. He is interested in reasserting Muslim identity in order to reach for Muslim destiny; but he categorically rejects any revival. If the modern Muslim society is to be restructured on the basis of Qur'ānic beliefs and values then there will definitely be some revival. The model of the Prophet on the basis of which Gauhar wants to restructure the modern Muslim society is now a part of history. One will hardly find the Prophetic model being practised in contemporary society. In arguing against any revival Gauhar says that societies move forward and do not roll backward. In our view, however, it is time which moves forward and societies go through ups and downs in history. This view of the philosophy of history has been ably demonstrated by the medieval Muslim historian Ibn Khaldūn and the modern British historian Arnold Toynbee. One could, however, disagree on the nature and degree of the revival.

Gauhar's idea of the progress of societies reminds us of the Comtian view of societal development. This French philosopher, frequently referred to as the Father of Sociology, believed that theology had been superseded by a positive stage of development. He also believed that 'the highest progress of man and society consists in a gradual increase of our mastery over all our defects of our moral nature'.[5] Based on theories from Physics and Biology, Auguste Comte (1798–1857) laid the foundation of the modern study of human behaviour and became the Father of Social Sciences.

Gauhar holds the view that Qur'ānic beliefs and values should be reinterpreted but he does not explain how he would like to interpret the Qur'ān. In interpreting the basic beliefs and values of any ideology one must bear in mind that there are foundational features in every ideology and that no ideology can afford to lose such characteristics. As for the Qur'ānic ideology, there are some basic beliefs enshrined in the Qur'ān; for example to believe in the Unseen is a pre-condition to

receive guidance (2: 3) from the Qur'ān. There are a number of other basic beliefs in Islam; such as to believe in the Day of Judgement, to believe in the existence of angels. Any allegorical interpretation of these basic beliefs will hardly be acceptable to the community. We have noted earlier that the Indian scholar Amir Ali's allegorical interpretation of angels in the light of late nineteenth-century liberal values and scientific discoveries was not acceptable to the community. Therefore, one must keep these factors in mind when interpreting Qur'ānic ideas.

In our view, a reinterpretation of certain practices of the early Muslim community in the light of Qur'ānic values will be acceptable to a modern Muslim society. Here one has to understand properly the difference between Qur'ānic values and their interpretation by the early Muslim community. For example, on the question of representative government the Qur'ānic value is 'to run their affairs in consultation among themselves' (42: 38). The early Muslim community practised this instruction in various ways. The first caliph, Abū Bakr, assumed the responsibility after a general consultation among leading Muslims of Madinah and later the rest of the community gave consent to his appointment. The second caliph, 'Umar, was nominated by the first caliph before his death and the community accepted the nomination. 'Umar nominated a committee of seven leading members of the community and the committee then voted the third caliph to power. Based on the verdict of the same committee, the fourth caliph assumed the responsibility of the caliphate and the community accepted it.

This question of representative government is one of fundamental importance for the Muslim community today. Muslims are divided on this question. If a solution to this problem is found it will be easier for the Islamic ideology to claim the supreme loyalty of modern Muslims. In interpreting this issue, however, one has to bear in mind the pre-Islamic practices of choosing a leader.

The pre-Islamic Arabs were known for their egalitarian character and their blood-ties. Generally after the death of a tribal leader, leading members nominated an elderly, wise person among themselves as the leader of the tribe and the rest

of the tribal community would give their allegiance to the newly-elected leader. The tribal leader in return used to decide on affairs of the community after consultation with experienced and wise members, usually clan chiefs, within the community. Islam broke this structure. It considered tribal and blood-ties to be of secondary importance, and established itself as the supreme identity, but it nevertheless retained the principle of consultation in running the affairs of the community. Now the Muslim community will adopt a parliamentary or a presidential form of government or they will develop a new institution capable of running the affairs by consultation of community members if an issue is to be decided by the Muslims themselves.

With the introduction of Western parliamentary systems in some Muslim countries, however, as Fazlur Rahman has pointed out, 'the law-making has become the business of lay parliamentarians, but there are large-scale protests from the *Ulema* and their supporters that law-making must be vested in the *Ulema* institutions.'[6] This is because Muslims have not yet decided whether their supreme loyalty lies with Islam or to their nation-state identity. In our opinion, there is no easy solution to this problem. Fazlur Rahman has rightly suggested that:

> The only way to produce genuine Islamic law is to enlighten public conscience, particularly that of the educated classes, with Islamic values. This, in fact, underlines the necessity of working out Islamic ethics systematically from the Qur'an and making such works accessible to the general reader. There is no short cut to this process for the production of Islamic law.[7]

Muslims established the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to reassert their identity in recent history. But, as we have noted earlier, this political institution has had little effect in achieving collaboration among Muslim nation-states. The collaborative achievement of any group needs a strong social bond; in modern times, for example, nationalism created this bond among Europeans. In Muslim countries, too, a strong bond was created against European colonialism; but in formulating this bond, secular nationalism and the Islamic *ummah* both played equally important roles. After the creation of

independent nation-states, Muslims were confused. Neither secular nationalism nor the *ummah* could form the basis of any group feeling; therefore, a strong feeling of individualism dominates Muslim society today.

Once the hierarchy of identities is clearly defined, the OIC will need to restructure its form. The failure of its resolutions suggests that the OIC cannot be effective as a structure where the components are more powerful than the mother organization. Fruitful co-operation on the platform of the OIC can take place only if the *ummah* identity is given priority by Muslims. Muslim society needs to change as it did under its Prophet; in his time the *ummah* replaced tribal identity; today, it needs to replace the nation-state identity. Nation-state identity does not need to be abolished; rather, like the early Muslim community, modern Muslims need to change the hierarchy of their identities.

This change, however, will not be easy to achieve. For any fruitful co-operation it is necessary to understand well the dilemma of the existing situation. Once this is properly understood, it will be easier to determine a realistic goal. Muslim intellectuals need to re-evaluate lessons from the full range of their history. When the *ummah* was first established under the leadership of the Prophet, it replaced the tribal customary law. Muslim intellectuals need to study the character of law in pre-Islamic Arabian society in order to understand how Islam modified that law to conform with the Islamic concept of *tawḥīd* (Oneness of God). It is also necessary to understand the local Arabian customs which were accommodated within Islam, and similarly it is necessary to understand how Islam incorporated other cultures, specifically the dominant Byzantine and Persian cultures. Muslim intellectuals must understand the nature of these cultural interactions in history in order to accept or reject the teachings of European civilization. However, this will be possible only after a clear definition of their loyalties. Muslim intellectuals must decide about their supreme loyalty – whether it lies with the Islamic *ummah* identity or the ideas of European civilization.

Notes and References

1. See Vernon L. Allen, *et al.*, 'Multiple Group Membership and Social Identity', in Theodore R. Sarbin and Karl E. Scheibe, eds., *Studies in Social Identity* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 98.

2. W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, p. 304.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Altaf Gauhar, 'Islam and the Secular Thrust of Western Imperialism', *Islam and Contemporary Society*, ed. Salem Azzam (London: Longman, 1982), p. 228.

5. For Comtian philosophy and world-view, see Auguste Comte, *System of Positive Polity*. 4 Vols. (New York: Burt Franklin, reprinted from 1857 ed.), Vol. II, p. 8. Also see Auguste Comte, *A General View of Positivism* (New York: Robert Speller, 1957).

6. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernism*, p. 156.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 156–7.

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UMMAH OR NATION? is a study of identity crises in modern Muslim society. It surveys the literature on the development of nationalism in Muslim countries, examines the status of the *ummah* and nation-state identities in contemporary Muslim nation-states, and studies cooperative activities of Muslim nations through the OIC. The book argues that nationalism in Muslim countries was different in character from nationalism in European countries in that it did not originate from a secular thrust. Therefore, after the failure of nationalist elites to solve problems, Islam returned to challenge the legitimacy of nationalism and nationalist elites. Although Islamic forces have not been able to replace nationalist forces, they have succeeded in drawing the attention of the nationalist elites to adopt some Islamic slogans. Meanwhile the society suffers from a crisis of identity between *ummah* and nationalism.

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